

S.P.
T.R.
578
186 centuries. However, formerly the conflict between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians, did not exist in its present day sense. On the contrary, the two parts had a sense of kinship, or even of unity, as may be seen in an examination of the motives for which Bohdan Khmelnytskyj gave himself to Moscow and to Tsar Alexis Mikhailovich (in 1653), after detaching the Ukraine from Poland.

S.P.
T.R.
578
186 The conflict² between the two Russian nations did not in fact break out until the Nineteenth Century.

Its basic causes were:

1. The efforts of the Ukrainians to create or to revive a language and a literature of their own.

2. A whole series of scientific discussions upon the question as to what were the connections between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians, especially from a linguistic and an anthropological viewpoint.

Finally and above all:

3. The actual political and social status of the Ukrainians in the Empire and the general development in these latter years of social and democratic ideas.

/53/ Thus today the conflict is moving more and more from the literary and scientific field into the political field.

S.P.
T.R.
578
186
138 The conflict began in 1798, when J. P. Kotljarevs'kij published in Ukrainian his Aeneid. From that date on there has been a great effort to create an indigenous literature. But these tendencies were quickly opposed by the government, which feared that this literary separatism might be prejudicial to national unity. And upon various occasions, especially in 1847, 1863, and 1876, it was forbidden to print or publish, save for a few rare exceptions, books in Ukrainian. But the result of these prohibitions was completely opposite from that which was intended. The tendencies toward literary emancipation asserted themselves so much the more strongly as they were more rigorously suppressed, and they found favorable soil in eastern Galicia, which belongs, as we know, to Austria.

S.P.
T.R.
197
814
829 On the other hand, the conflict² strengthened by the scientific discussions concerning the ties between the two nations, became aggravated. There were arguments about the antiquity of the Ukrainian idiom, especially in the Kiyev region, about the question of

² [Between Great Russians and Ukrainians, cf. esp. 116 ff. 35-37. And.]

S.P.
T.R.
144
829

are frequently greater than those which exist between them. (1)

1. Furthermore, I am quite willing to admit the existence of two pre-European types in various localities within primitive Slavia. In the period when these two types were pure, there were not yet any Slavs in Europe. When the Slavs appeared, the two types had already crossed with each other; one of them predominated in a certain region the other, in another region. But the original one remained predominant; new arguments are constantly supporting this theory. (Note of the author).

S.P.
T.R.
668

These, then, are the conditions in, and the influences under which, the conflict burst forth, the result of which we see today. The intellectuals of the Ukraine flatly declare that they make up a distinct Slavic nation: and for this "Ukrainian" nation they demand all of the natural rights which may insure its preservation and development. For them the exercise of these rights should not be confined to securing schools in which the teaching is conducted in Ukrainian, or to the free expansion of their literature, but should extend to the recognition of their political autonomy. The moderate and practical patriots, bearing in mind the existing conditions, are content to demand autonomy within the Empire. The radicals are naturally more exigent. They think that the present organization of the Russian State will not last. They count upon a dismemberment, they dream of the creation of an independent Ukraine, organized upon democratic and socialistic principles.

oo /58/ Should I venture to express frankly my opinion upon this conflict and upon the probable outcome of these tendencies? I am among those who believe it natural and equitable that the Russian government should satisfy the legitimate demands of the Ukrainians. But I do not hesitate in declaring that, despite the differences which have been exaggerated, there are so many common features in the history, the tradition, the faith, the language, and the culture of the two peoples--not to mention their common origin--that, to a distant and impartial observer, they are only two segments of a single and unique Russian people.

From the Slavic point of view, and even from the Russian point of view, we hope that this unity may be preserved in relation to outsiders and as far as possible in the political, literary, and linguistic life, while at the same time the needs and political demands of the two parties may be respected. We wish this at least in the field of fine literature. Until the close of the eighteenth century the language was a common one and the greatest writers of the nineteenth century have brought honor to the two groups.

2 [Great Russian-Ukrainian Conflict, cf. cat. n. 6, pp. 35-39-A-nakr. t]

P

SP

175 external development. From their primitive homeland located in the
 648 basins of the Oder, of the Warta, and of the Vistula, they sought to
 spread out in all directions. But they encountered in the west the re-
 sistance of the Germans; they were unable to overcome it; they were
 even compelled to give way and they sought to assure their existence
 and expansion by constant fights and invasions against the Prussians,
 the Lithuanians, and the Russians. Obviously, the Poles clearly re-
 cognized that one of their first tasks was to maintain in the north a
 wide passageway to the sea and in the west, their frontier on the Oder,
 if not on the Elbe. Unfortunately all of the advantages, all of the
 conquests which they gained in this direction were of a purely ephemeral
 character. A terrible blow fell upon them through the Tatar invasion
 and through the battle of Legnica--An German--Liegnitz/ (1241). It
 broke the bonds which united Silesia with Poland and threw this province
 into the arms of Germany, who began to Germanize it. Another check
 was the summons of the Teutonic Knights into the country of Chelm
 and of Loba (1226) which facilitated the Germanization of the seacoast.
 SP
 [56] Finally, let us point out the German colonization which the ecclesiastical
 or lay princes invoked, beginning with the thirteenth century, in
 Silesia, into Little Poland, Great Poland and Mazowie; these colonies
 did not become assimilated and remained completely German in lan-
 guage and customs. Thus a grave peril for Polish nationality was created
 and developed. "Exterminare idioma Polonicum" /exterminate the
 Polish language/ became the order of the day for the Germans on the
 western frontier. Beginning with the thirteenth century, the Polish
 nationality appeared to be gravely compromised.

P

SP

175 However, it succeeded in escaping from this peril.¹ The clergy
 648 showed themselves to be highly patriotic; literature was born and exercised
 a happy influence upon all classes of society. The Hussite movement
 also exercised its influence in Poland against the Germans. The dynasty
 followed a national political line. It accomplished noteworthy successes,
 especially over the Teutonic Knights, who were defeated at Grunwald
 SP
 175 in 1410. In truth, the provinces beyond the Oder and to the north
 648 could not be saved. The Poles lost three-quarters of their primitive
 668 domain; but what they lost in the west, they attempted to regain in the
 east, that is toward the northeast, and toward the southeast. This
 double direction was imposed upon them by the very nature of the
 terrain; in the center, the basin of the Pripet presented an inhospitable
 and insurmountable area; to the south rose the barrier of the Carpathians.
 The Polish flood had to direct itself on the one hand towards Lithuania,
 1 [Germanization of the Polish nationality beginning
 with the 13th century -- Analyst]

on the other, towards the Ukraine, and this double march characterized a new phase of Polish history.

The offensive movement was begun at an early date, /66/ but it achieved no serious result until the Union of Lublin (1569) when Lithuania was rejoined to Poland together with a large section of southern Russia (see above in S. 3).²

Kazimir had already occupied Red Russia in 1340, and in 1370 the Galician area was detached from the political control of Kiyev.

In Lithuania Polish institutions and language gained the upper hand over the native institutions and language; the upper classes of society took on Polish ways, and Polish colonization penetrated into the country, especially in Polesia. The same occurred in Galician Russia, the Volhynia and Podolia. The Poles were unable to hold Russian Galicia except by making it a base of operations for invading the basins of the Dnestr and the Bug. In the fifteenth century they colonized Podolia and Volhynia, and carried on this enterprise through the sixteenth century. Bobrinskii (1) claims that at this period this

1. A contemporary Polish historian. See my Coup d'oeil sur l'histoire de Pologne in the 3d series of the Monde Slave (Paris, Hachette, 1902). Translator.

province was half Polish! To these attempts at colonization was joined a religious action, the "union" of Polish-Lithuanian Russia with Rome.

During that time the Russian princes, emancipated from the Tatar yoke, had formed at Moscow a new and formidable political center. They /67/ had undertaken to group about them all of the Russian countries. We do not need to explain here how this plan was carried out. Moscow naturally entered upon a struggle with Poland: the war at first had as its object the Lithuanian provinces, then the Ukraine and finally Poland proper. It went steadily against Poland and finally resulted in the three partitions of 1772, 1793, and 1795.

These events naturally had an ominous influence upon the development of the Polish national group; the conquests of the Poles were annulled and with them all of the Polish colonization of Russian territory. The states which divided up the Polish domain among themselves had for some time the idea of annihilating the Polish nation. But the vital force of this nation, its great traditions and its high hopes for the

²[cf. *E/6 Slavic Peoples*, 1: Niederle, p. 16, category 116-Analysis]

S.P.
P.
175
642
668

S.P.
175
648
668
future, preserved it and even strengthened it so that its adversaries themselves had partially to renounce their intentions.

The struggle which the Polish national group has undergone for its existence since the fall of the Republic has been extremely painful and still is so today, especially the struggle against the Germans.

S.P.
P.
175
648
When the Congress of Vienna in 1815 perpetuated and revised the partition, it annexed to Russia the Duchy of Warsaw and set up the realm which the Poles call "Kongressowka." It guaranteed to the Poles their nationality and their autonomy. /68/ At first they enjoyed these benefits; but beginning in 1830 the situation changed. The revolution of Warsaw was smothered in blood. An the anti-Polish reaction which already existed in Russia became only more pronounced. The unhappy revolution of 1863 brought about the enslavement and the misery of Poland. Russianization was carried out with eagerness, and it required a terrible blow struck at the governmental system--the unfortunate war with Japan--to permit Poland to breathe a little more freely. The advent of the constitutional regime and the institution of the Parliament provided her with the possibility of making known her miseries, and we can hope that at the present moment, they will, at least in the Russian Empire, receive satisfaction.

The situation in Prussia is more serious. There arose, before 1775, a new and intensive movement of German colonization, especially in the basin of the Netze, and, after the insurrection of 1830, a political evolution which tended very simply to Germanize the Polish element. The attempted insurrection of 1845 and the events of 1848 gave this policy an opportunity to assert itself. At the beginning neither force nor violence was used. The Prussian government was convinced that the Polish element would eliminate itself little by little. The census of 1870 proved the contrary. Bismark then had recourse to new methods. He strove to uproot the Polish nation and had /69/ recourse to the most violent means. Certainly, in Russia the Poles were not comfortable; but in the Empire such violent measures, such refined ones as the Prussians thought up had not been employed. What no nation had ever before attempted to do against another nation, the Germans now undertook against Poland. They sought to dispossess an entire people by the law of colonization (*Ansiedelungsgesetz*), which placed at the disposal of the government one hundred million marks to purchase ground from the Poles and to establish German colonies there. Thanks be to God

175
177 there; about 1700 they were in great measure Germanized; the last Slav group was that of the Dravani (Drawaina) in the district of Luchow which even today is called Wendland, country of the Wends.

1719 The Slavic language disappeared between 1750 and 1766. It was in 1751 that mass was celebrated in Slavic for the last time.¹_A

161 In the years 1890-1900 the newspapers reported, according to A. Parczewski, that the census /94/ of 1890 had found 570 Slavs-Wends still in this region. But it was an error. The official census had indeed found in the Luchow area 570 Wends, but they spoke only German.

197 The Slavic tongue in this region has been dead for more than a century, as Mr. Muka reported without hesitation.²_A He was sent out as an investigator by the Academy of Sciences of Cracow.

000 However, the Slavic character is still found in great measure in the type and in the manner of life of the inhabitants of the Wendland.

101
175 Originally the Sorbs of this region² occupied in a compact mass all of the country situated between the Saale, the Verra*, the Fulda, the upper Havel, and the Spree. They extended as far as Frankfort on the Oder, on the Lower Bobra, the Hvizda (Queis). The group included the so-called Sorbs between the Saale and the Elbe (1) then the Lusatians

1. These Sorbs are designated in Latin texts of the Middle Ages by the name Sorabes. (Translator)

on the middle Saale, and the Milczani on the upper Elster, the upper Spree and the Neisse. From the eleventh century on, the Germans began to penetrate into these regions; but they only came there in large numbers beginning with the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. At this period the Sorb national group began to diminish to the west of the Elbe; it finally succumbed as a result of the Thirty Years War. The situation was better in /95/ Upper and Lower Lusatia, united under the Bohemian crown. Unfortunately, in 1635 the Treaty of Prague ceded the territory to the House of Saxony. The Sorbian national group
• 175
• 668 commenced to decline, especially in Lower Lusatia. Its decadence was not arrested until the nineteenth century by the literary renaissance which restored some energy to this small people.

Thanks to the efforts of a few patriots, the national conscience
²_A [Wendland -- Analyse] ²_A [Among the Polabian Slavs - Analyse]

175
168 was reawakened, literature revived, the Slavic tongue was introduced into the primary schools and the Germans of Saxony granted to their Sorbian fellow-citizens a tolerable *modus vivendi*. How long will this state of affairs endure? It is difficult to foretell.

177 Germanization is making great progress especially in Lower Lusatia, subjected to Prussians.

101
162 S 17. Boundary of the National Group. ---In 1886 Muka established on his ethnographic map, the best which exists up until the present, this boundary by a line which began to the south of Lubja (Lobau), passed between Rychbach (Reichenbach) and Wosporg (Weissenbach), ran to Nizka (Niesky), Reczice (Rietschen), went toward Muzakow (Muskau) on the Neisse, then following the Neisse reached Barse (Forst), ran to Gresna (Griessen), to Barklawa (Baerenklau), to the west of Gubna (Guben). The line then went straight to the west by Luboraz (Lieberose), Mochow, Waldow, Bocklin (Burglehne) then toward the south through Lubnjow (Lubbenau), /96/ through Wotrowce (Bischofsdoef), Kalama (Kalan), Rudna (Reuden) and Bukowina; then towards the southwest the boundary ran around Komorow (Senftenber), Rolana (Ruhland) on the Elster, went through Nadzicow towards Kamence, Elstra, Biskupci (Bischofswerda), where it turned sharply to the east towards Veletin (Wilthen) on the Lubia. Such was the outer boundary of the region in which the majority of the people spoke Sorbian; there was in this region an absolutely Sorbian territory in the neighborhood of Chotebuz (Cottbus) and of Grodk. There were also numerous German islands.

On the map drawn up in 1902 by A. Czerny, the territory had diminished and the Germans had gained ground. Today the northern part of Lower Lusatia is separated from the southern part only by a straight line between Grodk and Chotebuz on the two banks of the Spree. However, Tetzner in his book wrongly indicates Lower Lusatia as forming only an island.

164 S 18. Statistics. --The figures in effect confirm that the number of Lusatians is diminishing. At about 1880-1884, Muka, travelling from village to village, had set the total number of Sorbs at 175,966. He counted 72,000 in Lower Lusatia and 103,000 in Upper Lusatia. The official statistics for 1900 numbered only 93,032 Sorbs, speaking only Sorbian. If one adds about 23,000 bilinguals speaking both Sorbian and

S.P.
C.
175
177
191

1. Quite a long time ago I indicated the importance of this chronicler. See my Boheme pittoresque et historique (Paris, 1867).

At the beginning of the fourteenth century matters had gone so far that at the coronation of King John in 1311 the larger part of the people sang in German and the minority in Czech.

S.P.
C.
175
177
191

Under Charles IV and his son Vaclav a reaction took place to the benefit of the Slavic element. The nobility and the clergy took an interest in this. This evolution was crowned by the wars of the Hussites, who fought at the same time for Czech faith and Czech nationality. The Germans lost their influence in the towns or were completely driven out; the Czech language reassumed its place. Among the towns which became Slavic may be cited Zatec (Saaz), Litomerice (Leitmeritz), Usti nad Labem (Aussig), Dvur Kralove, Jaromer, Hradec Kralove, Nemecky Brod, Caslav, Kutna Hora, Pelhrimov, Susice, Budejovice, Kaplice, Stribro and Plzen, all of which were already Czech at the end of the fourteenth century.

/108/ At this time, in Bohemia, in Moravia, in Siberia, Czech became an official language. It was proclaimed to be the sole administrative language at Opava (Troppau) in 1431, at Tesin (Teschen) in 1434, in Moravia in 1480, in Bohemia in 1495. In short, in the course of the fifteenth century Bohemia and Moravia rapidly became Czech, the national consciousness grew stronger, all the more because germanization became weaker within the country and in the frontier districts. Nevertheless, this very brilliant period had no enduring results. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries a portion of Czech territory was again germanized as a result of the introduction of Protestantism and through the efforts of the new dynasty. Then came a long period of wars and persecutions which desolated entire regions and was followed by the new influx of German colonists from Misnie, Voigtland*, from Franconia and from the Palatinate. Thus, at the very moment when the Czech language became official within the kingdom, when the Czech literature was flourishing, a great section of Czech soil was lost.

S.P.
C.
175
177
191

Then came the defeat of Bila Hora (1620) and the unhappy events which placed the Czech nation in the hands of a dynasty which was German and absolutist. In 1627 a new organization was imposed
1 [Against the influence of the German element
upon the country - Analyst]

S.P.
C.
175
177
191

S.P.
C.
175
177
167
again in 1827 Jungmann in a moment of discouragement gave vent to this sad cry: "We have had the sad fate of being the witnesses and the accessories of the final annihilation of our mother tongue."

S.P.
C.
175
668
517
Nevertheless, certain men succeeded in awakening the nation, in saving what might be saved. The history of the Czech literature since the second half of the eighteenth century shows us in an admirable fashion the work which a little group of men, obscure but impassioned, taken with a great idea, have been able to accomplish.

Aroused by the progress of liberalism in Europe, by the "Josephinism," they succeeded in reviving an interest in national affairs, in shaking the people out of their torpor, at first among the lowly ones who had preserved the language, then in the intellectual class. This Czech people, whose existence appeared doubtful one hundred years ago, of whom the Viennese educator Kindermann von Schulstein, basing himself upon the new scholastic program, had proclaimed the approaching disappearance, this Czech people, is today conscious of itself, it forms a compact mass of six and one-half million persons and constitutes an impregnable citadel against which the powerless efforts of the germanism bent upon the ruin of the Slavs come and break. There is only one thing to regret and that is that political conditions have prevented the union and assimilation of the two million Slovaks settled in northern Hungary.

S.P.
C.
101
S 21. National Frontiers. --The compact mass of the Czechs and Slovaks are distributed among six administrative regions: in Austria, in the Kingdom of Bohemia, the Margraviate of Moravia, and the Duchy of Silesia, in Hungary, and, for a few segments, in Prussian Silesia.

The ethnographic boundary which separates the Slovaks from the other Czechs runs across Moravia; but the Slovaks of Moravia are so closely associated with the life of the Czech nation and are drawing so much closer to them each day that one may /112/ consider as the true boundary the political frontier which separates Moravia from Hungary. There, in the Carpathians, a wall stands which separates the two groups, Czechs and Slovaks, and unless unforeseen circumstances intervene, it is to be feared that their former unity will wind up in a dualism: Czechs on the one side, Slovaks on the other.

Thanks to a series of ethnographic studies, and also to the acute

S.P.
C.
53
162 In Bohemia 50,000 Jews declared themselves to be Czechs, and in Moravia 6,792; 40,521 in Bohemia and 34,261 in Moravia declared that they were Germans. Hungary actually possesses one-tenth of the Jews of the entire world, and they are increasing more rapidly than the other national groups (14.8%). Almost all of them claim that they are Magyars.

S.P.
C.
177
668 In studying the history and the ethnography of the Czechoslovaks, one sees that the Czechs began by losing much more territory than they gained. But this unfortunate situation has ceased; the national consciousness has developed; the spirit of an entire people has set up a solid barrier against the Germanic invasion. Certain losses are still inevitable, but they can be retrieved. The most threatened section is made up of the frontier of northern Moravia where the Germans today are concentrating their strength. They wish to unite their compact masses with the islands of Lanskrout, Zabreh, Olomouc and to cut Bohemia from Moravia. It is here that the Czech nation should especially think of acting and defending itself.

S.P.
C.
161 Moreover, the increase of the Czechs with respect to that of the Germans is good. During the last ten years the Czechs have increased by 8.49% and the Germans only by 1.96%.

/124/ In the German region the Czechs have increased by 0.1% and in the Czech region the Germans have decreased by 0.5%. The least favored region from a Czech viewpoint is that of Moravska Ostrava (Moehrisch Ostrau), where the Czechs are greatly decreasing.

000 It is important to reinforce the Czech element upon the frontier, to raise Czech capital in opposition to German money, to set up Czech schools as opposed to German schools, and, in order to stand against all assaults, to strengthen the national consciousness. It is necessary to build up the Czech element from an economic and physical viewpoint, to improve the general well-being, to increase the means of exchanging ideas.

In brief, the progress of the Germans upon the frontier has been so insignificant for the past century, that it will still be hundreds of years before it becomes a cause of concern.

What is much more serious is that the Czech areas are losing

*Croats EF4
Serbs EF6*

000 only upon the internal situation of the two sections originally unified, but also upon their mutual relations.

*S.P.
Sb.
175
167
191*

There indeed developed between 1830 and 1840 a movement called Illyrian, which sought to unite them,² but it had no other results than to unify the literary language for which the dialect called stokavski was adopted. But from the political viewpoint, each of the two sections, despite the original unity of their language, differentiated only by dialectical shadings, followed its own course.

*S.P.
Sb.
175
167
Sb
[361]*

Their³ development has been particularly hindered by exterior circumstances. At first there were the Turkish invasions and the servitude which followed them. Many of the groups emigrated from their ancient homes to seek a more certain asylum. At the outset, Serbian colonization went upstream on the Morava, towards the south. The first centers, the first /152/ capitals were Novi Pazar, Pristina, Prizren, and Skopije.

But the arrival of the Turks completely displaced the movement. Beginning with the sixteenth century, the Croats went back towards the north, and the Serbs did so even more. To escape from the Turkish oppression, Croat colonies were established in Hungary, in the region situated between the middle reaches of the Raab, the lake of Ferto-Tava (Neusiedler Lake), Bratislava and Vienna. Some even pushed as far as into Moravia and the interior of Hungary.

*S.P.
Sb.
175
167*

These migrations greatly modified the type of the primitive Serbian population. From the regions which formerly had been the home and center of the nation, from Kosovo Polje, from Old Serbia, hundreds of thousands of men came forth to establish themselves in the relatively peaceful regions of Austria-Hungary.

*Sb
[612]*

This movement began at the end of the fourteenth century, after the battle of Kosovo (1389) and the conquest of Skopije by the Turks (1391), after which the Turks began to march towards the region of Lom, Bosnia, and the country of Khum, and finally towards the north. The Serbs then had to withdraw towards the Danube and move their center towards Krusevac and finally towards Smederevo (Semendria). In 1459, the Turks definitely abolished Serbia, and in 1463, Bosnia. The Serbs then began to cross in great masses to the other side of the ⁴ [i.e. Serbs and Croats -- Anal. ...]

Foundations of Russian Culture

115

pictures of the decaying landed gentry. Goncharov composed ⁵³⁸ the classic of Russian imagination paralyzed by inertia. Tolstoi ⁸²⁹ studied the peasant problem, painted the first twenty years of the century on the magnificent canvas of his *War and Peace*, and returned to contemporary agrarian and urban problems with *Anna Karenina*. Dostoevski, after poignantly describing the bitter life of the humble in *Poor People*, acquired still deeper sympathy in his exile, and having expounded his doctrine of atonement through suffering in *Crime and Punishment*, attacked the radicals in *The Possessed*, and revealed the whole scope of his psychological penetration and the breadth of his religious philosophy in *The Brothers Karamazov*. With other authors of scarcely less merit describing contemporary life, these three decades constitute an outburst of brilliance unequalled in any world literature. Russian verse of the period was no less meritorious, and even Russian painters chose subjects which reflected the contemporary state of mind.

While the aims of political and social thinkers expanded, ⁶⁶⁸ the tempo of the reforms gradually slowed down with danger- ¹⁷⁵ ous results. Active revolutionary groups had begun to take shape even in the heyday of reform, and strove for rapid democratization in the public interest. Even in the fifties, literature had ceased to be an exclusive perquisite of the aristocracy and was professionally practiced by many young men from the new middle class who were impatient at the slowness of change. Some of the young radicals made unfruitful efforts to form a community of interest with the peasantry. Others attempted to force the hand of the government by acts of violence. Marxist socialism became known in Russia during the seventies and, while it supplied the young radicals with a more aggressive program, it suggested a transfer of their missionary efforts from the peasants to the urban industrial workers who were expanding in numbers with the progressive industrialization of the country.

The rising tide of radicalism stimulated repressive measures ¹⁷⁵ by the government, which gradually lost much of the sympathy ⁶⁵⁶ ⁶⁵⁸

175* which it had previously enjoyed in more moderate spheres,
 652 and even rejected loyal proposals for conservative reforms ad-
 668 vanced in order to discourage the repeated outrages of the
 terrorists. In 1880 the situation came to a head with an explo-
 sion in the Winter Palace itself at St. Petersburg in which the
 whole imperial family narrowly escaped a violent death. Alex-
 ander II then called liberal statesmen who enjoyed the public
 confidence to work out a series of innovations which, though
 not aiming at a constitution, were at least conciliatory and
 progressive. These reforms were viewed with apprehension by
 the radicals, who not only feared to lose their public but also
 believed (mistakenly, as it proved) that the elimination of the
 tsar would be the prelude to a great popular uprising. They
 thus assassinated Alexander II on March 13, 1881.

The results were devastating. Moderate opinion was pro-
 foundly shocked, the government relapsed into a reactionary
 policy which endured until 1917, only briefly interrupted by
 the revolution of 1905. Political freedom and even political
 thought were discouraged, and many conscientious liberals
 were reduced to disillusion and despair by the bitter convic-
 tion that progress was impossible. The situation was not helped
 by the economic crisis of the eighties which followed an in-
 flationary period of hasty industrial overexpansion.

829 This disillusion is most clearly reflected in the dramas of
 538 Chekhov, those twilight pictures of a class which vegetates
 without hope of change, without faith in its capacity to in-
 fluence events. To this situation the accession of Nicholas II
 in 1894 brought no cure; since he was largely surrounded by
 ministers who deprecated even local self-government as only
 a step toward constitutionalism. But beneath the surface a new
 175* spirit was about to break ground. Some of the younger genera-
 668 tion could no longer accept the resignation which Chekhov's
 characters practiced. For them, failure, however tragic, was not
 an everlasting stop-signal. Marxism gave them a program and
 a method. It warned them not to expect salvation from the
 middle class, and preached the virtues and strength of the so

Foundations of Russian Culture

117

far silent but ambitious proletariat. The lower strata of society ^{175*} were no longer looking for sympathy. They wanted power, and ⁶⁶⁸ if properly led would break down all barriers to its attainment. The voice of the grumbling dispossessed first sounded clearly ^[538] in Russian literature through Maxim Gorki's early stories, which began to appear in 1892. The best example of the young intellectual who discovered saving graces in Marxism was Lenin. He began to study Marx's *Capital* in 1888, organized a group of Marxists at Kuibyshev (Samara) in 1893, and was a social-democratic propagandist in St. Petersburg the next year. The emergence of Marxism as an active political and economic system in Russia dates from this period.

The rise of the Social Democratic party and the foundation ^{175*} of the more activist section known as the Bolsheviks (the maxi-⁶⁶⁵ malists) headed by Lenin himself preceded the outbreak of the ⁶⁶⁸ Russo-Japanese war by barely one year. At the same time, another radical party, the Social Revolutionaries, revived the tradition of terrorism as practiced before the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. The government pursued a policy of ^[661] repression even when the necessity of prosecuting a war for which the nation was totally unprepared might well have dictated a more conciliatory attitude. Profound resentment now mastered not only the middle class but the urban proletariat, and though the police resorted to desperate provocative acts in order to discredit the agitators, a united front against the government was rapidly forming. When open revolution broke ^{175*} out early in 1905, neither the middle-class liberals nor the ⁶⁶⁸ radical Marxist groups possessed an organization equal to or-⁶⁴² ganizing and directing a mass movement. As a result, after the government made various constitutional concessions and the extremists showed every sign of fighting to a finish, the moderate groups gravitated away from the revolutionary idea, leaving the Marxist leaders and the workers isolated. With the urban middle class again passive, the government speedily recovered its sangfroid and applied repressive measures of forbidding severity which were far from supplying any basis for

175★ reconciliation with society. The new parliament was never al-
 668 lowed to function efficiently, and excessive parcellation of par-
 642 ties within it also prevented the formation of a workable
 united front against the government, though the fundamental
 tone was one of hostility.

The first World War began in this atmosphere of mutual distrust between government and society, and only a brief interval of patriotic *entente cordiale* intervened before official incompetence as revealed by repeated military defeats once more opened the breach, which was further widened by a complete collapse of transportation and economic life. General resentment was intensified by evidence of a total lack of comprehension of the situation by the tsar and his advisers, and culminated in the events of March, 1917, by which the tsar was forced to abdicate and a democratic regime was set up. The vacillations of successive moderate provisional governments played into the hands of the Bolshevik leaders, who could always bank on the support of the urban factory workers and certain sections of the army, and on November 7 they were masters of Petrograd. The subsequent fortunes of the Soviets are so close to our own times as to be matters of common knowledge.

175★ The chasm which existed between government and society
 829 between 1894 and the first World War did not prevent simul-
 538 taneous developments in Russian intellectual life. In spite of
 517 government surveillance and occasional restriction of educa-
 tional facilities, a highly educated and talented middle class
 had evolved in Russia during the last quarter of the nineteenth
 century. Though literature declined in some degree after the
 death of Dostoevski, Tolstoi lived on to combine moral philos-
 ophy and creative letters until 1910. Chekhov's later plays ex-
 pressed his own prevision that an epoch was about to end. A
 younger generation of prose writers revived traditional Russian
 realism in a more individualistic spirit without regard to the
 political and social aims that had inspired their predecessors.
 In poetry, symbolism sought to penetrate and express deeper

A CENTURY OF A PHANTOM
PANSLAVISM AND THE WESTERN SLAVS

by S. Harrison Thomson

175
186
• 668
829

AMONG the gorgeous phantoms of history, none has had a more rich or variously enticing story than Panslavism. It may well be that more literate Europeans have enjoyed the thrill of frightening themselves by it and more designing political manipulators have used it as a stage illusion than would be true of any other fiction. On the other hand there have been published several serious histories of the spectre.

By 1848 Panslavism was already an old and ripe story. To go back to the empire of Samo in the early seventh century is perhaps to be too inventive, but we can certainly trace the idea of Slavic reciprocity in the plans of Boleslaw Chrobry (the Hardy) of Poland, who, around the year 1000, planned a western Slavic empire comprising the Poles, the Czechs, the Moravians, the Elbian Slavs and the western Ukrainians. His obvious purpose was to block further German expansion eastward.¹ Whatever their motivation, those grandiose plans proved ephemeral, as did others conceived by Polish or Czech rulers for centuries thereafter. There is no discernible difference, so far as we can judge, between the territorial and dynastic maneuvering that went on among Slavic princes and that of Austrian, Hungarian and Wallachian rulers in these centuries of the formation of national states. One Slavic people was as likely to be antipathetic to a neighboring Slavic people as to a neighbor who was Germanic or Turco-Ugric. Territorial nationalism or dynastic combination were already the prevailing patterns.

But from the seventeenth century on concepts of a common ethnic and linguistic background begin to grow and take shape. From the Croat Juraj Križanić in the seventeenth century,² who spent fifteen years in Siberian exile after proclaiming his Panslav ideas in Russia, to the great Slovak poet, Jan Kollár, in the early nineteenth century, we can trace an unwavering line of western Slavic intellectuals who formulated and reformulated the idea of a glorious Slav race which should of right be united in heart and body, preferably under one paternal Slav ruler.

Somewhat ironically a Baltic German, Johann Gottfried Herder, had contributed much to the most recent upsurge of this Slav feeling by glori-

¹ On whom the classic study is St. Zakrzewski, *Boleslaw Chrobry Wielki* (Cracow, 1925); and cf. more recently, Z. Wojciechowski, "Boleslaw Chrobry i kryzys stosunków polskoniemieckich" in *Przegląd Zachodni* IV (1948), 369-383.

² Smurlo, E., "From Križanić to the Slavophiles," *Slavonic Review* VI (1928), 321-335; of A. Fischel, *Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1919), p. 20ff.; P. G. Scialardi, *Križanić, messager de l'unité des chrétiens et des du panslavisme* (Paris, 1947).

- 175 fying the Slavic race and treating it as one, from the Moldau to the Urals.
 186 He would doubtless have been disturbed to be credited with partial parent-
 668 hood of both Pangermanism and Panslavism. Early in the nineteenth
 829 century most western Slavs were of necessity romantics. Romanticism was
 the only recourse left them: Poland tragically partitioned, the Slavs of
 the Austrian Empire barely existing under Metternich, the South Slavs
 predominantly under the Ottoman Turk. Any voice even faintly suggest-
 ing a prouder past, and by implication a comparable future, would be wel-
 come. Their history was their refuge and their hope in time of troubled
 humiliation.³

Philology, poetry and letters, history and the trend of international events in the forties of the nineteenth century all combined to deepen and broaden the feelings but dimly and sporadically aroused a half century before by the wildfire spread of the ideas of the French Revolution. There was now, after decades of scholarship, scientific and historical ground for the concept of Slavic community. The ferment of the Slav Revival, however, romantic it may have been in a technical sense, was a psychological fact of great moment to all the western Slavs, whether living under Magyar repression in Slovakia or Croatia, clumsy Austrian Biedermeier in Bohemia, or awkward Hapsburg pampering in Galicia. The springs of hope and confidence were filling. The single great Slavic state to the east—Mother Russia—was still victoriously radiant from defeating Napoleon, and her very glamor drew irresistibly the yearnings of the Slavic millions enslaved by alien peoples. In many quarters among the western Slavs there was talk of the all-Slavic Tsar, while in Russia there was not infrequently an expression of interest among scholars and publicists as well as among reflective politicians in the possibility of strengthening the natural bonds between Mother Russia and her temporarily estranged children in the west. Pushkin's lines, written after the Polish revolution of 1830-31

Will the Slavic rivulets pour into the Russian sea,
 Or will it dry up? That is the question.

reflected current Russian thought.⁴ A. S. Chomnyakov, the Slavophil poet,

³ See the illuminating discussion of Panslavism by Wacław Lednicki in *European Ideologies* (New York, 1948), pp. 808-931, particularly rich in literary background. His earlier study, "Poland and the Slavophil Idea," *Slavonic Review* VII (1928-29), 128-140, 649-662, can also be consulted with great profit. It is significant that this study of Polish Slavophilism ends about the middle of the nineteenth century. See also W. Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej w okresie przeobrażenia*. I (Lwów, 1913), *passim*. For the echoes of this current of thought in Polish literature, and an explanation of how and why it took a line divergent from that in other Western and Southern Slavic countries see Zofja Klametówna, *Slawianofilstwo w literaturze polskiej lat 1800 do 1848* (Warszawa, 1926), *passim*.

⁴ See Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 168ff., and Lednicki *passim*. The literature on Russian

in the next year spoke dramatically of "the brothers in fetters, who wait yearningly for thy call and thy protective embrace." There was much more, a good deal of it more effusive, and all of it tinged with theology, from poets, essayists and even historians, but mostly urging the western Slavs, and particularly the Poles, to recognize their divinely appointed lot as part of a great Slavic nation, naturally under Russian leadership. The Slovak Kollár's "On Slavic Reciprocity" was first published in German in 1837, then appeared in Russian in 1838 and a second time in 1840, but the concept of reciprocity was interpreted by the Russian editor and Russian readers in a Russian sense.⁵ It would be difficult to determine whether the Russian espousal of Slavophilism was more or less enthusiastic than that of the western Slavs in the period before 1848, but it is certain that Russian Slavophilism could, even at this early date, be more properly called Pan-russism than Panslavism. 175
186
668
829

We can indeed thus early discern a fairly clear and perhaps radical split in the aims of those who supported Slavic unity. On the one hand the western Slavs thought in terms of reciprocal aid, comfort and support, implicitly and explicitly favoring the independent existence of the several Slavic peoples. On the other hand the Russian Slavophiles, from their proud vantage-point of an independent state existence, regarded the lesser Slavic peoples beyond their borders as strayed, lost or stolen children who should return to the mother's heart and hearth, the mother of course being Russia. Their principal concern, indeed, was that Russia herself should perceive her providential mission to carry on the torch of the true Christian faith which was visibly falling from the hand of the weakening West. It was taken for granted that the errant western and southern Slav brethren would accept the new situation with appreciation and even enthusiasm.

Decades of Romanticism, the European enlightenment followed by three-quarters of a century of Slavic renaissance in philology, poetry, ethnography, history and science, has made the dispersed Slavic peoples very sensible of their similarities and their differences, and eager to grasp and hold their own future. The events of February 1848 in western Europe only precipitated these feelings into action. German nationalism had found its voice in the Frankfurt Parliament. It was only natural that the western Slavs should answer with a Slavic assembly. In April the Slovak Ljudevit Štúr was agitating in Prague for a meeting of representatives of the Slavic

Slavophilism is tremendous. Of the more recent literature in western languages, see Charles Quénet, *Tchadaev et les lettres philosophiques* (Paris, 1931); A. Gratioux, *A. S. Khomiakov et le mouvement slavophile*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1939); Alexander von Schelling, *Russland und Europa* (Bern, 1948); and Bernhard Schultze, *Russische Denker* (Vienna, 1950).

⁵ Clementis, VI., *Panslavism Past and Present* (London, 1943), p. 38.

175 peoples, and Dr. Fr. Brauner received a letter from Ondřej Moraczewski
 186 in Poznań, dated April 23, inviting the Czechs to initiate a Slavic con-
 ● 668 gress.⁶ But the first public suggestion to this effect came from the Croat
 829 Ivan Kukuljević in the April 20 issue of the *Narodní Noviny*, and a re-
 vised call to meet was published on April 30 in the same paper over the
 signature of Palacký and 19 other leading Czechs.⁷ A public statement
 was issued on May 3 to "our brothers of the Austrian Empire" inviting
 them to convene in Prague on May 31, in order "to deliberate on our
 common interests ... We are resolved to remain faithful to the heredi-
 tary house of Habsburg-Lorraine ... and to maintain the integrity and in-
 dependence of the Empire by all means in our power. We therefore re-
 ject all accusations of separatism, of Pan-Slavism, of Russianism, which
 might be brought against us by ill-intentioned accusers. ... Our undertak-
 ing is essentially conservative in nature and should in no wise disturb our
 liberal and justice-loving non-Slavic fellow-citizens." This was the voice
 of Austro-Slavism.

Of the 340 participants, 237 were Czechs and Slovaks, 42 South Slavs,
 60 Poles and Ruthenians, and one Russian. Of the Poles several were from
 Prussian Poland, and the Russian—Bakunin—did not officially represent
 Tsarist Russia. The very thought of revolution of any sort was uncongenial
 to Tsar Nicholas I. The Poles would have preferred to have the Congress
 declare for a restitution of all of Poland, but there was little support for
 so revolutionary a concept.⁸ The ruling motivation was anti-German and
 anti-Magyar. It was certainly not pro-Russian. Bakunin, the sole Rus-
 sian present, a voluble guest, was quite un-Russian in his advocacy of
 Slavic federation.⁹ The enthusiasm was tearful and tremendous, the speeches
 were moving, the parades, dinners and celebrations were elaborate and
 mystic. Palacký's speech of June 12, resuming the conclusions of the
 several commissions, specifically demanded a federalized Empire, with
 Slavs enjoying equal rights and privileges with the Germans and the

⁶ Tobolka, *Zd. Politické dějiny československého národa od r. 1848 až do druhé
 doby*, I (Prague, 1931), 77.

⁷ Published in J.M. Cerný, *Boj za právo I* (Prague, 1893), 183 and F. Palacký,
Spisy z oboru politický (Prague, 1898), p. 24f. See also F. Roubík, *Český rok 1848* (Prague,
 1948), p. 199, and K. Kozbunda, *České hnutí roku 1848* (Prague, 1929), p. 182ff.;
 Albert Pražák, "Slavonic Congress of 1848 and the Slovaks" in *Slavonic Review* VII
 (1928-29), 141-159.

⁸ Batowski, Henryk, *Współpraca słowiańska* (Warsaw, 1946), p. 53. See also W.
 Feldman, *Dzieje polskiej myśli politycznej I* (Lwów, 1913) 288-291.

⁹ *Bakunin od Zporód* (Prague, 1926), p. 72ff.; see also B. P. Heppner, *Bakunin
 et le panslavisme révolutionnaire* (Paris, 1930), pp. 236-284; and on Bakunin's Pan-
 slavism and his participation in the Prague Congress see V. Cejchan, *Bakunin v Čechách*
 (Prague, 1928), pp. 14-30. It seems quite clear that Bakunin had little or no under-
 standing of the orientation of the Slavs of the Hapsburg monarchy.

Magyars.¹⁰ This was the last plenary session of the Congress. Tumultuous events in Prague, not directly connected with the Slav Congress, made further meetings impossible, and on June 28 it was adjourned *sine die*.¹¹ An attempt was made to carry on the work of the Congress through a society bearing the name *Lipa slovenská* (the Slavic linden tree), but it did not survive the reaction that set in the next year. There remained, however, for a few years, one insistently free voice. Karel Havlíček, one of Palacký's adjutants at the Congress, refused to be quiet, and through his journal *Slován* continued, for the two years he was relatively unsilenced, to defend the rights of the Slavs in the Hapsburg Empire, and went so far as to warn Vienna: "If they will not allow the lesser Pan Slavism in Central Europe they should take care lest the greater crash on their necks."¹² This is especially suggestive in view of the fact that Havlíček had but recently returned from a trip to Poland and Russia completely cured of any pro-Russian sentiments.¹³ There was no western Slav who spoke more frankly than this in the early 'fifties.

Thus as of 1849, Austro-Slavism had apparently had its day within the Hapsburg Empire, and Tsar Nicholas I, after reading the statements written out by Ivan Aksakov in answer to a police questionnaire, wrote in the margin of Aksakov's plaidoyer two comments: "Under the guise of compassion for the pseudo-persecution of Slavic tribes there is hidden a criminal thought about an uprising against the constituted authority of neighboring and partly allied states and about a general unification, which is expected, not from God's will, but from a revolution, which is perilous to Russia." "Only God can determine what is being prepared in the distant future, but if an accumulation of circumstances would indeed lead to such

¹⁰ Palacký, *Fz.*, *Spisy z oboru politiky*, p. 46ff.

¹¹ Roubík, *op. cit.*, p. 230.

¹² Quoted in Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 307f. See Karel Tuma, *Karel Havlíček Borovský* (Prague, 1883) who follows the development of Havlíček's thought in these years with extensive quotations from his letters and editorials. In addition to T. G. Masaryk's classic work, *Karel Havlíček* (Prague, 1896), see the more recent work of Jaromír Bělič, *Karel Havlíček Borovský a slovanstvo* (Prague, 1947), especially pp. 27ff. and 180ff. This latter section is particularly illuminating in its analysis of the changes of attitude Havlíček went through toward the Poles, the Russians, and Slavism in general.

¹³ Jirásek, J., *Rusko a my II* (Prague, 1946), 161f.; Tuma, *op. cit.*, pp. 71ff., 92ff. Havlíček saw no reason to modify his unfavorable opinion of Russia even after the failure of the Congress and the onset of reaction. He wrote in the August 30, 1848 issue of his issue of his *Narodní Noviny* (quoted by Tuma, *op. cit.*, p. 234f.): "If Russia were a free constitutional country the Austrian Slavs (in case Austria were to be broken up), could consider a union with their blood brethren like the Germans, the Magyars or the Wallachs. They would then be a part of one of the most honorable, and perhaps leading countries of the world. But Russia is a land of despotism, and the rest of us free Slavs must, unfortunately, consider this our brother as our worst enemy."

175

186

● 668

829

unification, it would be for the peril of Russia."¹⁴ Not only did the Tsar disapprove of Slavophilism, but the presence of Russian armies in Slovakia as allies of Habsburg repression in the same year did not encourage Slavophilism among the western Slavs.

For the better part of a decade, both among the western Slavs and within Russia little is heard of Panlavism or even of Slavophilism. The interest of the Russian intellectuals was taken up, in these years, by the polemics focussed around the question of the relations of the Orthodox to the Roman church. The encyclical of Pius IX to the Eastern Christians set off the sharp dispute.¹⁵ In the Empire the reaction of Bach was severely anti-Slav,¹⁶ and Tsar Nicholas would not hear any talk of Slav federation. But the end of the Crimean war, coinciding with the death of Nicholas I and the end of his absolutism, heralded a change in the Russian attitude toward the lesser Slavic breeds beyond the pale. Russia defeated was more receptive to ideas of Slavic reciprocity than before. But to the western Slavs, for a time at least, the shock of Russia's military vulnerability was a bitter disillusionment.¹⁷ This feeling of despair lasted for a number of years until Austria herself was humbled on the plains of Lombardy. Then hope welled anew. Bach's régime was through and Vienna was a suitor ~~to the support of~~ her Slavic peoples. It is not without interest that at about the same time, 1857 and 1858, a Slavic Benevolent Committee was organized in Moscow,¹⁸ and the Foreign Minister, Prince Gorchakov, gave it his blessing. Its benevolence was preeminently directed toward strengthening cultural and ecclesiastical ties with the southern Slavs, particularly the Bulgars. The Tsarevitch was the patron. The list of the founders of the Committee included all the living Slavophiles, of both currents—the romantic Panlavists and those we must henceforth call Panrussians. The significance of the junction of these two currents cannot be missed. This date may in fact be taken as a convenient dividing line between the earlier theoretical, romantic, Muscovite Slavophilism, best represented by the poet Chomysky, the two Kireyevskys, Samarin and Konstantin Aksakov, and the later political Panlavism which should properly be called Panrussism.¹⁹

¹⁴ Ivan Sergeyevich Aksakov *p jego pismakh* I, ii (Moscow, 1889), 154-55, 160. I am indebted to Professor Leonid I. Strakhovsky for this quotation.

¹⁵ von Schelting, A., *op. cit.*, p. 147ff.

¹⁶ Denis, Edouard, *Le Bobème depuis la Montagne Blanche* II (Paris, 1903), 333ff.; Tobolka, *op. cit.*, I, 187ff.

¹⁷ See chapter VI, "Polonia farà da se (1837-1864)" of W. Feldman, *Geschichte des politischen Lebens in Polen seit dessen Teilungen (1795-1914)*, (Berlin, 1917). This German work is not identical with the previously noticed Polish work of the same author.

¹⁸ Fachel, *op. cit.*, p. 367ff.; cf. also B. H. Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans* (Oxford, 1937), p. 60ff.

¹⁹ Benel, *Unaby a Slovanstvi* (Prague, 1947), p. 79ff. C. Outet, *Tchadars* etc., p.

Theoretical Slavophilism was influenced by poorly understood western thought—Rousseau, Hegel, and Fichte—into paths of unrealistic and un-¹⁷⁵historical grotesquerie and then grafted onto Uvarov's threefold motto of¹⁸⁶ nationality, orthodoxy and autocracy.²⁰ 668 ●

It is a simple axiom of diplomatic history that a great and powerful state does not interest itself "benevolently" in other and lesser peoples unless it either needs their help or hopes to profit from that "benevolence." The change in the momentum of Russian Slavophilism in the late fifties of the nineteenth century clearly illustrates this axiom. Before 1855 Russia was too strong to need the support or loyalty of the western Slavs, and her leadership reasoned that her strength lay in the centralized autocratic system. As the system was regarded as good *per se* it was proper to support it elsewhere, in Prussia, in the Hapsburg Empire and, with qualifications, even in Turkey. But the Crimean War revealed considerable weaknesses in her state structure, and Vienna's affections had shifted to the enemies of Russia. Under these circumstances help, psychological at least, was welcome. Pan Slavism, it was obviously reasoned, might actually have its points, particularly since most of the western Slavs were in the Hapsburg Empire anyway, and a little discreet discontent there might pay diplomatic dividends. This period is thus a decisive period in the history of the theatrical property known as Pan Slavism.²¹ 829

The Benevolent Committee actively wooed the South Slavs with appeals to their Orthodoxy, developing the thesis that West and East were irrevocably separate, that Slav, Eastern and Orthodox were and of right ought to be synonymous with Russia. Then came the January 1863 revolution of the Poles, put down by the butcher Muraviev with brutal ruthlessness. The Benevolent Slavic Committee was able to convince Russian opinion that it was all the Poles' fault, that their Catholicism blinded them to the truth of their Slavic heritage and made them guilty of the "great betrayal,"²² but after Muraviev the western and southern Slavs were farther than ever from accepting the doctrines of Muscovite Slavophilism.²³

408, would call this movement "the second slavophilism." See also M. Prelog, *Poet Slovansko do Moskvy v. 1867* (Prague, 1931), p. 4.

²⁰ See T. G. Masaryk, *Rusko a Evropa I* (Prague, 1930), 406ff. The English edition, *The Spirit of Russia* (London, 1919), was based on the German text which Masaryk revised for the 1930 Czech edition.

²¹ P. N. Miloukov has a chapter in his *Le Mouvement intellectuel russe* (Paris, 1918) p. 377ff., entitled "La décomposition du slavophilisme" in which his explanation of the processes of Russian thought from ca. 1848 to the publication of Danilevsky's *Russland and Europa* is treated mystically. Any resemblance between his discussion and the realities of Russia's changed position in European politics after 1855-56 is not even coincidental.

²² Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

²³ Feldman, *Geschichte der politischen Ideen*, p. 223ff., and contemporary literature there cited.

- 175 Among the South Slavs a considerable element of enlightened opinion,
 186 particularly the younger generation,²⁴ supported the Polish revolutionaries,
 ● 668 and among the leaders there was much openly pro-British and anti-Russian
 829 expression. Nevertheless the dominant sentiment, both among Serbs and
 Croats in the 'sixties was one of nationalist aspirations and, as between
 other Slavic peoples, benevolent neutrality.²⁵

Palacký remarked in 1863 that "Russian Tsardom was not based on Slavic principles but upon an amalgam of Mongolian and German principles."²⁶ The fact that European opinion had largely turned against Russia finally came home to many of the Russian Slavophiles and a natural desire to repair the damage by allaying the suspicions of non-Russian Slavs soon made its appearance. In line with this feeling the Slavic Committee and the recently founded (1863) Society of Friends of the Natural Sciences projected an Ethnographic Congress to meet in Moscow in the summer of 1867.²⁷ Invitations were broadcast to learned societies throughout the Slavic world. Between the invitation in 1866 and the following summer several events transpired to give the Congress more potential significance. Austria had lost another war—this time to Prussia—and, within the Empire, the Compromise (*Ausgleich*) which divided the Empire into two parts, Hungary and Austria, had become law. The Slavs of the Empire were thus not only split, but put under their enemies, Magyars and Germans. Their long-standing aspirations for an equal share in a federative Empire were roughly dashed.²⁸ The outlook was black for the western Slavic peoples and it is not surprising that, with the exception of the Poles, the invitations to the Ethnographic Congress at Moscow were eagerly accepted.

In the meantime Ivan Aksakov, enthusiastic over the implications of the visit of so many leading personalities among the western Slavs to the Congress, constituted himself the propagandist of the Exposition, and many editorials in his journal *Den*, beginning with February 1867, concerned the Slav question. He emphasized the bonds between the Russians and other Slavic peoples, and expressed confidence that they had only to know each other to reject foreign, non-Slav control and join forces with

²⁴ Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 13ff.

²⁵ Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 13ff.

²⁶ Palacký, *Politische Vermächtnis* (Prague, 1872), p. 26, quoting himself in 1863.

²⁷ Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 27ff.

²⁸ Louis Léger recounts the opinion he met on a trip among the South Slavs in 1868, when their participation and hopes in the Moscow Congress were frankly explained to him. See his *Le Panславisme et l'intérêt français* (Paris, 1917), p. 232ff., reprinted from *La revue moderne* of April, 1868.

their motherland.²⁰ His line was followed by most of the Moscow journalists.

In Prague the *Národní Noviny*, the organ of the Young Czech party, avowed openly the political aims in the minds of the Czech representatives:

"We make not effort to conceal the fact that the Moscow Exhibition has for us who are going not only philological or ethnographic interest, but a significance deeply political. We are not responsible for that significance; rather those who have inaugurated dualism in Austria and have endangered the independence of the Czech crown and even of the Czech people... those who have turned the Slovak nation over to the mercies of the Magyars, those finally who are recklessly sacrificing the heroic Croatian people to the greed of the Magyar magnates."²¹

The majority of the Czech delegates, though men of intellectual and often scientific attainments, were yet men active in political life. The delegates of the South Slavs were exclusively non-political. Bishop Strossmayer and Franji Rački, who were especially invited, did not join the delegation, though the Bishop gave the expedition his active support. Ljudevit Gaj, the leading Croat nationalist journalist, went to Moscow, but was unaccountably quiet.²²

In the realization that the Poles would not be represented, Palacký and Rieger were anxious to show their consideration of Polish sensitiveness and went to Paris to explain their reasons for making the trip when the Poles refused to go. Prince Adam Czartoryski and Andrew Zamojski urged the Czechs not to go, and the son of Adam Mickiewicz wrote them an impassioned letter begging them not to attend the Congress. Another special delegation of representative Polish emigrés waited on them to the same intent.²³

Opened by the Grand Duke Vladimir Alexandrovich on April 23, the Congress was ostensibly an academic and scientific meeting, but railway passes had been given the foreign guests. The western Slavs, on their way to the Congress, crossed the Russian frontier at Granice (i. e. in Polish Silesia) on May 16 and on the 20th reached St. Petersburg.²⁴ On the way receptions and entertainment were provided by a number of municipalities, though the government took no official action in the matter. Enthusiasm was unbounded. The Czechs and the Serbs were received by Gorchakov

²⁰ Aksakov, I. S., *Slavyanskii vopros* (Moscow, 1886), pp. 117-122.

²¹ *Národní Noviny*, 1867, no. 11, quoted by Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

²² Fric, J. W., *Die Kebreiseite der slavischen Wallfahrt nach Russland* (Prague, 1867), *passim*.

²³ A considerable literature has accumulated on Gaj's trip and activities. See Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 43ff and literature there cited.

²⁴ Prelog, *op. cit.*, p. 68ff.

175 in separate audiences and greeted with honeyed and unintelligible words.

186 The Tsar received 20 of the leaders of the various delegations in Tsarskoe

829 Selo on May 26. He is reported to have said to them: "May God hearken

- 668 soon to all your prayers," a hope which thus relieved the Tsar of any further need for action or hearkening. But he called them his "blood brothers here on native Slav soil" and thereby caused a sensation in western Slav capitals.⁸⁴ There were copious banquets and eloquent speeches by learned professors and publicists that left no room for doubt that the messianic hope of close Slavic collaboration was well on the way to realization.⁸⁵ They were so busy collaborating that there was barely time to visit the elaborate ethnographic and archeological exhibits for which the Congress had been called. The ghost of absent Poland did discreetly appear at several of the more formal occasions, but it was almost dispelled by confident and urbane diplomacy, which naturally deceived no one. The meeting made a deep impression upon everyone present. The Benevolent Committee was profusely congratulated for its felicitous initiative. But very few felt that much had been accomplished. Gorchakov apologetically stayed aloof, save to opine that the Czechs were apparently working for the King of Prussia. General Peter Suvalov acidly remarked that the pilgrims were pursuing a phantom, and the Austrian minister, Revertea, was told that the Russian court regarded the whole spectacle as foolish.⁸⁶ In the western Slavic press reports were, in a slight majority, critical and skeptical. The Moscow Congress may have been the high point in public tribute to the numerous concepts in the center and at the periphery of Slavophilism, but it left much disillusionment in its wake. The Poles were disgruntled at the Czechs for participating against their expressed wishes. The Austrian government had, or affected to have, more than grave doubts of the sincerity of the Czech leaders in their devotion to Austro-Slavism, and even the Catholic clergy saw in the expedition a leaning to Orthodoxy and a defection from Catholicism. Within the Austrian Empire the large Slavic public had lost confidence in the political sagacity of their leaders. There was, of course, after the Congress, not the slightest trace of implementation of all the high-sounding resolutions calling for increased cultural reciprocity between the general Slavic peoples.

About 1870 the vaguely variegated sensitivities and aspirations fo-

⁸⁴ Kazbunda, K., *Posl' Czechů do Moskvy 1867 a rakouská diplomacie* (Prague, 1924), p. 63, and M. D. Miličević, *Etnografska izložba a slovenska sastanak u Moskvi 1867* (Belgrade, 1884), p. 18ff.

⁸⁵ The classically bitter report on the Congress is that by Julian Klaciko, "Le Congrès de Moscou et la propagande panslaviste" in *Revue des deux mondes* LXI (1867), 132-181. Klaciko, a native of Wilno, had been the editor of the *Paris Wiadomości Polskie*, which ceased publication in 1861. A much more valid short account is that of Louis Léger in *Le Panslavisme et l'intérêt français* (Paris, 1917), pp. 211-249.

cussing around the two general concepts of Slavism and Russian expansion-ism began to coalesce and crystallize. In that year there appeared a small book by General Rostislav A. Fadeyev under the title: *Thoughts on the Eastern Question*.³⁷ It had passed the censor in 1869. Fadeyev, as a soldier, was primarily interested in strengthening Russia's strategic position and in pointing the way to achieving her natural strategic aims—the control of the Straits. To him the Hapsburg Empire was the principal enemy, and not England and France. As the peoples of the polyglot Empire were mostly Slav, Russia should obviously take them under her wing, and eventually head an all-Slav state. This was Pan Slavism, clearly put, for Russia's political benefit. 175 829 186 668 ●

A much more radical and thorough treatment appeared by separate chapters in the periodical *Tsarja* in 1869 and, revised, in book form in 1871: Nikolai J. Danilevski's *Russia and Europe*. He was a trained botanist and geographer, and his broad approach covered questions of race, religion, climate, politics, and strategy. Because of its thoroughness and easily comprehensible conclusions, it became immediately the Bible of Pan Slavism.³⁸ Danilevski posited a deep-rooted antagonism between West, that is the Latin and the German, Catholicism and Protestantism, commercialism and pointless diversity, and East, that is the Slav, the orthodox and the ordered universal. Russia had a destiny to realize. She should save the smaller and weaker Slavic peoples from the curse of europeanization. The Poles had indeed gone farthest in that sinister direction, hence the great tension between Russia and the Poles. In their case Russia had had to be severe, but it was properly not with their Slavic nature but with its europeanized, Catholic perversion. The Poles should realize that Russia had had to discipline them for their own salvation. To Danilevski Pan Slavism, so far as it was good, was Panrussism.

It would be difficult to say which of these two works, Fadeyev on the Eastern Question or Danilevski's *Russia and Europe* had the more in-

³⁶ Reverera, on the other hand, had been instructed by Beust in May to give the whole matter no unnecessary notice. The two governments affected not to count it as of any political significance. See Kazbunda, *Prut' Cechů do Moskvy*, p. 37. Reverera was recalled the next year by Beust and the Tsar told his successor, Albin Vetsers, that he disliked the whole incident and regretted that it had occurred. "Russia is large enough for me; I want nothing from my neighbor" and disavowed any slightest desire to enitre away from the Emperor any of his Slav subjects. See Kazbunda, *op. cit.*, p. 121f.

³⁷ English translation by T. Michell (London, 1871), *Opinion on the Eastern Question*. See also Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 400ff.

³⁸ German translation by Karl Nötsch (Berlin, 1920), somewhat abridged, *Russland und Europa*. See further Benel, *Uvaby*, pp. 98-107, and the recent study of Alexander von Schelting, *Russland und Europa*, where the focus is on the relation of Danilevski to the church. On p. 238 he calls Danilevski "der eigentliche Systematiker der panslavistischen Weltanschauung."

fluence. Their arguments were so dynamic in their implications that together they are a landmark in European psycho-political history. Panrussism now had a divinely appointed mission and a program for political implementation.³⁹ Those whose interests lay in cultural exchange with their western Slav brothers no longer felt unsupported, and those who had before been politically Pan-Russian could not rejoice in the moral support of the intelligentsia. It was a perfect coalescence of ideals and interests. There is no wonder that Gorchakov, the foreign minister, felt very gratified about the jelling of enlightened public opinion. He had shared the distrust felt by the court at cultural Slavophilism, so vocal at the Moscow Congress. It implied equality among the various Slavic peoples. Russian policy would be much happier if Russia's "leadership" and of course "benevolent" hegemony were generally accepted. It is hardly necessary to mention that the acceptance of Russian Orthodoxy—no longer Greek Orthodoxy—was by now assumed as a *sine qua non* of the whole Slavic program. It is not difficult to see how the atmosphere created by the wide circulation of these two sensational books may have convinced Gorchakov and the court that Ignatyev's reports and suggestions from Constantinople correctly represented the proper policy to be pursued—at least in the interests of Russia.⁴⁰ We are here far removed from any semblance of the Panslav sentiments of Kollár, or the Austro-Slavism of the Prague Congress of 1848 or even from the implications of Slav cultural reciprocity, so fervently expressed by most of the leaders at the Moscow Congress of 1867. We are dealing with realistic political opportunism which makes use of the slogans and stage illusions evoked by romantic or even philosophical Panslavism. Gorchakov and Ignatyev and certainly—and indeed avowedly—Fadéyev, were quite aware of the political semantics fluttering around the words Slavophilism, Panslavism, Slavic solidarity. The fact that the words sent shivers up and down the spines of western diplomats and at the same time thrilled the Russian people and some western Slavs could only please the anti-western party at the Tsar's court.

In 1874 an Archeological Congress was held in Kiev under the auspices of the Moscow Archeological Society. It was sparsely attended by non-Russian Slavs, about a dozen in all, out of a total of 206 delegates. Several unpleasant incidents at this Congress showed that the resentments and tensions between, particularly, Poles, Russians and Ukrainians, were

³⁹ See Lednicki, *art. cit.*, p. 843ff., and Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 75ff. Feldman, *op. cit.*, says bluntly: "Unter den Russen vollzieht sich nach dem Jahre 1870 eine Umwandlung der alten slavophilen Bewegung in einen selbstbewussten politischen Imperialismus."

⁴⁰ On Ignatyev see Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 73ff., and his article in *Slavic Review* XI (1932), 343-369.

A CENTURY OF PHANTOM PANSLAVISM

69

deep and lasting. Slavic solidarity was certainly not advanced by this meeting.⁴¹ 175
186

It is true that the Bulgarian atrocities precipitated a resurgence, in Russia herself, of the emotional index of the Panslav idea, but basic political realities were not thereby at stake. The participation of Russian soldiers as volunteers in the Serbian army could not obscure the fact that Russia already saw clearly that Turkey was no longer a major antagonist. Indeed the Balkan wars of 1876-78 were only an incident which, if anything, confirmed the political Panslavists (*lege* Panrussians) of the necessity to consolidate their political program and its psychological and moral bases for use in a coming struggle with enemies much stronger than the Ottoman Empire. The Russian campaign of 1877-78 could have been lifted bodily from Fadeyev or Danilevski. 829
668-●

The fact that Gorchakov and Ignatyev had to retire from public life after the Treaty of Berlin has several interesting if not ironic aspects. What must have played a large part in their downfall was the fact that their aggressive Panslavism or Pan-Russism or Russian nationalism had gained less for Russia at Berlin than was popularly expected.⁴² Yet they themselves, and here lies the irony, were substantially responsible for inducing Russian opinion to expect so much. The significant fact is the generality of the adoption of the Russian-nationalistic thesis, and, in retrospect, the large-scale perversion of the thesis of Slav reciprocity. What, less than a half century before, seen from Paris or London, had been a cloud, small as a man's hand, on the eastern horizon, now seemed a swirling thunder-head, about to loose a torrent and a tempest. This menace bore the label Panslavism. No wonder the west shivered at the word. Yet it was by this time in no sense Panslav but pure Russian expansionism.

It would be of interest to examine the trends of thought among the western Slavs in these years. It was among them that the ideas of Slav reciprocity had first arisen. The great Croat leader, Bishop Strossmayer, had not modified his stand in favor of a South Slav federation and cultural reciprocity with the lands of Orthodoxy. Professor Jaroslav Jagić and George Daničić, the renowned South Slav philologists, both advocated a union of the Croats, Serbs and Bulgars. Nowhere among these leaders do we detect any desire to join a larger Slavic world led by Russia, or any urge to make Orthodoxy the common Slav faith.⁴³ Their insistence on their cultural and political independence constitutes an emphatic rejection of the

⁴¹ Léger, *Le Panslavisme* . . . , pp. 242-249. Léger was present at the Congress.

⁴² Gorchakov's last years have been frequently discussed. See in brief B. Nolde, *L'Alliance franco-russe* (Paris, 1936), pp. 199ff. and 209ff.

⁴³ Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 347ff.; see also R. W. Seton-Watson, *The Southern Slav Question* (London, 1911), p. 126ff.

175 so-called Panslavism emanating from Moscow in these decades. The fact
 186 that, under Magyar rule, any move by South Slavs or Slovaks to cultivate
 827 their native language or culture was proceeded against as "Panslavism"
 ● 666 and consequently regarded as high treason⁴⁴ is obviously irrelevant, because
 erroneous in its factual bases. Palacký in his *Politisches Vermächtnis* ob-
 served that he had come to the conclusion that a Russian universal monar-
 chy would mean "violent compulsion, absolute subjugation and enslave-
 ment of all civilized Europe, the suppression and suffocation of every
 free and noble thought and aspiration of the human race." He added
 that he thought that the enlightened minds of Russia would likewise
 regard the expansion of Russia westward as a misfortune.⁴⁵ He might
 not have counted Dostoyevski among the enlightened minds of Russia.

The Poles, crushed between Russian and Prussian calculated oppres-
 sion, sought solace from their dire despair in their own literature and art.
 It was all that was left them. Memories of the Russian soldiery of Mura-
 viev certainly estopped any warmth of feeling toward the Slavs they knew
 the most about from personal experience.⁴⁶ The less they had to do with
 the Russians the better. Orthodoxy was Russian and therefore they clung
 to their Roman Catholicism with deepening gratitude. The Poles were
 grateful also to Austria for the relative freedom they enjoyed in Cracow
 and Galicia, and used it to fortify their nationalism in literature and science.⁴⁷

By the end of the century, whether because of absorption into a more
 potent and definitely programmatic Russian expansionism, or because its
 vagaries had repelled the western and more rational Slavs, or because the
 anti-Panslav campaign from Berlin, Paris and London had been effective,
 or because Russian imperialism was not too successful, the Panslavism of
 the Prague Congress of 1848, of the Moscow Slavophiles, or the Moscow
 Congress of 1867 or even of Ignatyev, was dead. It might be more exact
 to say that the ghost had been laid.

The subsidence of the noble sentiments of Slavic reciprocity, of "in-
 terslavism," did not mean, however, that the scarecrow of Panslavism was
 not still usable. Eduard Beneš recently put these developments in urbane
 terms:

⁴⁴ Cf. the Vakanović memorandum of 1872, quoted by Palacký, *Politisches Vermächtnis* p. 13; cf. also Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 333f. It would appear that the Magyars were the most consistently fervent believers in Panslavism. At any rate they thought every Slovak was a Panslav. The record contains many instances of such fantasy almost too ludicrous to believe. The most fantastic aspect of this complex is its literal truth. See, e.g. Thomas Capek, *The Slovaks of Hungary: Slavs and Panslavism* (New York, 1906), pp. 47-52.

⁴⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 28.

⁴⁶ Kucharszewski, Jan, *Origins of Modern Russia* (New York, 1948), p. 349ff.

⁴⁷ Chlebowski, Bronislas, *La littérature polonaise au XIX^e siècle* (Paris, 1933), chs. XXVIII and XXIX; and see Feldman, *op. cit.*, chapter IX, "Aufleben der Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen im Zusammenhange mit modernen sozialen Ideen."

A CENTURY OF PHANTOM PANSLAVISM

71

"Panslavism then, up to 1905, solved no question fully, it failed to attain its aims, and could not be transferred into the field of politics in any concrete form. Finally it became a synonym for Tsarist Russian nationalism and as such, in the form of a political doctrine, could only be prejudicial to all concerned: to the Russians, to the other Slavs, to Europe and to the world. It was harmful to the Slavs because, above and beyond the fact that it was in political fact in great measure a fantasy, it was used and misused against them by their opponents to such an extent that not only the Magyars and the Germans but all of western Europe saw in it a real danger and frequently, because of it, opposed them even where the Slavs were in the right. Against us Czechoslovaks it was for instance used during the first world war and here and there one heard echoes of it even during the second."⁴⁸

The year 1905 brought a marked change; not only in Russia's external prestige and her internal constitutional structure, but also in the attitude of the western and southern Slavs toward the whole question of their own future and the relations between them and Tsarist Russia. Whereas for over a half century, since at least the Prague Slavic Congress of 1848, they had consciously or unconsciously looked to powerful Russia for moral or physical support, now, that Russia had been militarily humbled and they found their own strength growing and their interests in their western connections in a more satisfactory perspective, the prospect of a future independent of Russia was not unpleasing. The vestiges of admiration for Russia that remained clouded but did not basically alter the vision of the future that opened out before them.

As for the Poles, who had never accepted the thesis of Russian leadership, the harsh campaign for russification under Alexander III only increased their hatred of everything Russia stood for and their determination to maintain their separate polonism.⁴⁹ Among the Czechs and the Slovaks the "realism" of Masaryk, by which he had meant simply that they should trust in their own moral strength and the logic of national development in order to win out over an already corrupt, artificial and doomed monarchy, had made much headway and was destined to capture the dominant place in the people's thought. The South Slavs had not forgotten the disillusionment brought by the Congress of Berlin and had quickly adjusted themselves to the thesis that they should and could make substantial gains in cultural and political autonomy on their own initiative in the Balkan ambit.⁵⁰ The coup of 1903 in Belgrade furthermore opened vistas of actual independence from the Hapsburg monarchy. All the western Slavs had sensed vividly for a full quarter century that Russia had been increasingly

⁴⁸ Beneš, *Uvahy o Slovanskost*, p. 127f.

⁴⁹ Cf. M. Zdzichowski, *Wpływ rosyjskie na duszę polską* (Cracow, 1920), p. 33ff.

⁵⁰ Cf. E. Denis, *La Grande Serbie* (Paris, 1920), p. 121ff.

- 175 disinterested, indeed bored, with them and their problems. What fleeting
 186 political *rapprochements* took place at top levels did not touch real public
 ● 668 opinion save to confirm the general belief that arrangements between dyn-
 827 asts, foreign ministers and such like were cynical and opportunistic. In this
 case at least it would have been difficult to prove this instinctive judgment
 erroneous.

On a basis of these psycho-political developments among the Slavs within the Austro-Hungarian Empire and along her borders the decade between 1905 and the outbreak of the war of 1914 witnessed the rise to dominance of what is usually described as Neo-Slavism.⁵¹ The leading and best known exponent and expositor of this short-lived but significant movement was the Czech politician, Dr. Karel Kramář. The essence of this movement, fundamentally indigenous and unconnected with Russia or the accidental fact that Russia was largely Slavic, was an effort to counterweight Central Europe and the Balkans against the aggressive expansion of Germany in every field of political, economic and social life in that area. Seeing that Austria-Hungary was weakening in the face of the steady pressure from the north, the Neo-Slavs even advocated support of the Empire on condition that it be federalized. If Austria-Hungary could be weaned away from Germany and the Triple Alliance broken up, Russia and Austria-Hungary could draw closer together. Pan-Germanism would then be blocked and the western Slavs could move and have their being in this larger atmosphere. Along these lines there was even, *mirabile dictu*, talk of a Polish-Russian *rapprochement*. Late in 1905 Swiatkowski, an energetic Russian journalist, proclaimed that the German danger made Slavic cooperation absolutely necessary,⁵² and he proceeded to beat the drums for a broad-gauged campaign to bring it about—among the Sokols, in the press, by congresses, by cultural and social relations on every level. He envisaged a political union of some sort, but specifically an economic and customs union to which the non-Slavic states of Central Europe should also be invited. In the next two years the idea grew that it was time for all the Slavs to get together again, as in 1848 and 1867, to further their mutual interests. The leader of the movement in Russia was Lt. Gen. Volodimirov, whose recent retirement left him with time on his hands. He enlisted some publicists and men of letters of a poetic cast of mind, travelled to Warsaw, Cracow and Prague, where he found other optimists.

The second Slavic Congress of Prague, which met in July, 1908, was the result of this agitation. It was attended by representatives of most, though

⁵¹ Benel, *op. cit.*, p. 134ff. The most complete discussion of this movement is the collaborative work, *Slonastvo: Obraz jeho minulosti a přítomnosti* (Prague, 1912), with a foreword by Dr. Kramář.

⁵² Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 307f.

175 not all, of the Slavic peoples in Russia, in the Austro-Hungarian Empire
 186 and the Balkans.⁵³ The slogans were unity, solidarity, reciprocity, equality
 • 668 and unification, though few if any of the delegates knew precisely what
 829 they meant. Roman Dmowski, the leader of the Polish delegation, ostentatiously shook hands with Krasowski, the head of the Russian delegation,⁵⁴ and the whole Congress echoed for days with the miracle that had been wrought. It all sounded like the ominous approach of peace and good will. But the fact is that the whole idea behind the Congress was based on a completely untenable assumption: that the interests of Russia and Austria-Hungary did not conflict.⁵⁵ It can only be charitably said that the organizers of the Congress had, in a greater degree and with even less excuse than their predecessors of 1848 and 1867, failed to think through their program, its logic and its practicability. Questions which the literate man on the street in Prague, Belgrade or Warsaw knew had to be faced either did not appear on the agenda or were greeted by bland smiles and silence. Two further facts highlight the absurdity of the meeting. The old Panrussians, now benignly veneered with liberalism, were in control of the Russian delegation and there is not the slightest reason to doubt that all their vocal support of the new Slavism was utterly cynical. Neo-Slavism in general and the Prague Congress in particular never aroused any enthusiasm among the Serbs. Roman Dmowski told Beneš in 1917 that his aims at the Congress of 1908 were solely the independence of Poland, and in no sense Slav.⁵⁶

The roseate aura of Slavic amity and hope engendered by the Congress lasted less than three months. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina and the hopes of the western Slavs for an acceptable *modus vivendi* within the then political framework were rudely dashed. The next year it became evident that the promises made to the Poles in Russia in 1905 of modest recognition of their nationalistic feelings were valueless and that reaction was again in the saddle in St. Petersburg.⁵⁷

⁵³ Léger, *Le Panslavisme* . . . , p. 271ff.; Beneš, *op. cit.*, 139ff. A rich source of documentation is the printed (but not published) record of the trial of Kramář, Alois Rašín, V. Červinka and Josef Zamazal, which went on from Dec. 6, 1915, to June 3, 1916. Letters, documents and testimony of all sorts on the whole movement, including the various congresses, are printed *in extenso*. See further Paul Milyukov, "World War and Slavonic Policy" in *Slavonic Review* VI (1927-28), 268-290, particularly interesting in its critique of Kramář's ideas and Beneš' opposition to them.

⁵⁴ Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 149. Dmowski published this same year his *Niemcy, Rosja i Kwestja Polska* (Lwów) in which he argued that Poland's principal enemy was Germany and that it was to the interest of the Poles and the other western Slavs to support Russia.

⁵⁵ Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 135f.

⁵⁶ Beneš, *op. cit.*, p. 134f.

⁵⁷ One of the resolutions passed at the Prague congress to which most weight was

175 Yet there were still pleasantly optimistic souls among the Slavic in-
 186 tellectuals. Another Congress was called for Sofia in 1910. It makes even
 829 more fantastic reading than those that preceded it. Dr. Kramář was fre-
 ● 668 quently eloquent. No Pole was present as a delegate. The Russian delega-
 tion was almost exclusively conservative. No Ukrainian representative came
 and the Bulgarian Tsar was ostentatiously absent from Sofia during the
 Congress. This was the last Slavic Congress before the outbreak of hos-
 tilities in 1914.⁵⁸ Almost everybody save the leading Czech slavophil Dr.
 Kramář left Sofia fully aware that he had witnessed the *rigor mortis* of an
 ailing phantom—indeed a cooling thought. The Neo-Slav movement had
 had a short life and an inglorious end. If it accomplished anything it proved
 that Slavism as a gospel, so long at least as there was an Austro-Hungarian
 Empire, had insufficient grounding in the tissues of international relations
 to have the slightest influence upon the trend of events in Central and
 Eastern Europe.

It is a commonplace among German historians and analysts of the
 origins of the first world war that it was essentially a defensive struggle
 by Germandom against Slavdom. Bethmann-Hollweg made the statement
 early, and so weighty a study as Fischel's *Der Panславизм bis zum
 Weltkrieg* is avowedly devoted to this thesis. But it will hardly bear careful
 examination. There were Germans on one side—there was a majority of
 Slavs on the other. But that is more accidental than essential. Along with
 many Slavic-German issues there was in fact a greater number of issues
 completely unrelated to the Slavic-German question which in the inevitable
 logic of history would have had to be decided completely regardless of
 ethnics and culture. After the war, out of which arose three new or re-
 vised west Slavic states, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the prin-
 cipal inter-Slav questions were solved and there was hardly a whisper of
 Panslavism. Bolshevik Russia, emphasizing its multinationality and its
 supranational foundations, in the early years at least, had no interest in
 Slavic countries *per se*, and Panslavism, Slavophilism, Neo-Slavism and even
 Pan-Russism became historical curiosities, objects of antiquarian research.

attached was to the effect that St. Petersburg should be the meeting place of the next
 Pan-Slav conference the following year. Léger (*op. cit.*, p. 278) says: "l'on se sépara
 en se donnant rendez-vous pour l'année suivante à St. Petersbourg. Ce rendez-vous ne
 devait pas se réaliser." S. B. Fay, *Origins of the World War* (New York, 1929), 401,
 and B. E. Schmitt, *Annexation of Bosnia 1908-1909* (Cambridge, 1937), p. 248, mention
 the congress in the summer of 1909 and the circular letter sent to Slav organizations in
 the Balkans. The contradiction is only apparent. There was such a conference and such
 a secret circular, but very few South Slavs attended the meeting. See dispatch from Count
 Brockdorff-Rantzau (German chargé d'affaires in Vienna) to Bethmann-Hollweg of July
 25, 1909, in *Die Grosse Politik*, XXVI, 844f.

⁵⁸ See the *Kramář-Prozess*, pp. 402-407, for interesting sidelights on the meeting.

175 This should cause no surprise. Whenever in the past these national groups
 186 had existed as independent states there had not been any discernible urge
 829 for exceptional collaboration on a basis of their consanguinity. They had
 668 pursued their particular needs, in the same way as France, Italy and Spain,
 also related by history, language, religion and ethnic bonds, had, throughout their history, tended toward particularism and strenuously rejected any centripetal pressures. It would seem reasonable to allow Slavic peoples to act according to a pattern assumed to be rational and even enlightened farther west.

The Little Entente was, quite accidentally, two-thirds Slav. Its collapse was precipitated by the early defection of Yugoslavia, one of the Slav thirds. The Balkan Entente followed no noticeable Slavic pattern.

The aggressive war of 1939 was variously advertised. It was directed against any people that objected to being nazified, Slav, Teuton, Baltic or Latin. The fourth partition of Poland, shared in equally by Russia and Germany, made it abundantly clear that it was not a war against Bolshevism or of German against Slav. It would have been difficult to arouse among western Slavs, any enthusiasm for the Slav idea from August 23, 1939 to June 22, 1941.

At this point it is possible to draw some deductions from the history of the variations in Slav feeling. The sense of Slavic community weakened, or perhaps more accurately shuffled into the unrealistic or academic empyrean, in times of peace. Under stress and strain or in times of crisis Slavophilism became again, with the limitations of the moment, an active force.⁵⁹ But all wars, the ultimate in national interest, have acted as rapid solvents of these fond dreams. This failure of the idea to stand any real test will explain why we use the term phantom or illusion of the whole concept.

From 1941 on one heard much of Slavic solidarity. There were All-Slav congresses at Moscow in August 1941, April 1942 and May 1943. The Russian speakers emphatically repudiated the political Pan Slavism and Pan-Russism of the nineteenth century and appealed "for the union of all Slav strength in the struggle against Hitlerism."⁶⁰ There was to be a unity of equals with equals, all bound together in a happy family of democratic peoples. Thereafter Slavic committees sprang up and Slavic congresses were held in London, Detroit and Pittsburgh, and in 1945 and following years, in Sofia, Belgrade, Bratislava, Prague and Warsaw. The themes of all these meetings followed the same lines: rejoicing in new Slav unity

⁵⁹ Cf. A. Mousset, *Le Mouvement Slave* (2nd ed., Paris, 1947), p. 383.

⁶⁰ Vl. Ouzmanin, Secretary of All Slav Committee, in May, 1943, quoted by Mousset *op. cit.*

175 under the leadership of Soviet Russia. Whereas the pre-1914 congresses
 186 were usually gatherings of professors and publicists, and the realist poli-
 197 ticians generally abstained, the post-1941 gatherings were almost exclu-
 208 sively made up of politicians and poets. The trained professorate was in
 219 a noticeable minority. It would perhaps be superfluous to quote many of
 230 these political leaders on the subject of Slav unity, but it would not be
 241 difficult to discover a marvelous, perhaps inspired, unanimity.

There were numerous speeches in all the western Slav capitals which emphasized "the Slavic bloc, directed by the great Russian people"⁶¹ "for the protection of their freedom and democracy."⁶² There is no room for question as to what was meant. The signing of every new treaty, of commerce, mutual defense or cultural friendship, was accompanied by headlines, radio propaganda and ministerial banquets, in all of which inter-Slavic devotion was lauded with profound conviction. Ceremonial visits of chiefs of state were exchanged, there were many elaborate parades and happy reunions. In between, naturally, there were visits to Moscow. M. Georgiev, the Bulgarian President, remarked, on landing in Moscow on Jan. 7, 1946: "I am happy to be in the fortress of the Slavic peoples which, thanks to the wise direction of Generalissimo Stalin, has become the hope of all democratic humanity." M. Vishinsky then visited Sofia.

The years 1946 and 1947 brought electoral and diplomatic victories to Russia. As all the Slavs were now safely enjoying their Slavic solidarity, it was no longer necessary to emphasize Slavism. Marxian Socialism was a more comprehensive concept into which Magyars, Rumanians, Austrians, Germans and Balts could conveniently be made to fit. We have therefore to remark upon the relative silence of western Slavic spokesmen on the subject of Slavic solidarity in the years 1947 and 1948. That stage illusion was no longer necessary, at least in so urgent a fashion as before. On the other hand it would be incorrect to say that it had been completely withdrawn from circulation. The enforcement of Russian language instruction in the schools, the extended tours of Russian artists, authors, scientists and athletes throughout all the Slavic countries, the dominant place in areas of cultural expression, education, science, press, radio, screen and stage, given to the products of Russia, all reveal the underlying plan. It should not be overlooked, furthermore, that the Orthodox Church has, with the support of the Kremlin, been incorporated into the program of implementation of the plan with considerable success in at least Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Ukraine. Whereas under Tsarist rule the trilogy of

⁶¹ Quoted by Mousset, *op. cit.*, p. 257, from Zdeněk Nejedlý, Czechoslovak Minister of Education.

⁶² Nikolov, President of Slav Committee, at Sofia, quoted by Mousset, *op. cit.*, p. 262f.

175 nationalism, orthodoxy and autocracy was the slogan reserved for Russia
 186 herself, one is justified in remarking that Russian nationalism has now be-
 829 come Slavic nationalism or Slavic unity, Orthodoxy is being encouraged
 668 outside Russia, and of autocracy throughout the western Slavic states there
 appears to be quite adequate evidence. We have, on the other hand, little
 positive proof that thus far the various Slavic peoples love each other more
 than they did, say in 1860, 1890 or 1935. Titoism rather speaks for it-
 self, and the great popularity of Gomulka in Poland would indicate, if
 there were any need, the continuity of Polish separatism from time im-
 memorial. A thousand years of determined and consistent western orien-
 tation and nationalism are not obliterated in a decade of government by
 loud speakers, force and fear.

As we look back over the last century of Slav thought, interaction and
 political mutuality, several broad lines of change strike our notice. In 1848
 Slavophil enthusiasm stemmed mostly from within the polyglot Hapsburg
 monarchy. A century later, not only has this Empire, officially a bulwark
 of Germanism with all its westward leanings, disappeared, but its place
 and much more has been taken by the heirs of the Tsars. In 1848 Slavic
 thought was largely centered on cultural and moral reciprocity. A century
 later the Slavic nations, under the direction of Russia (excepting, for the
 moment, Yugoslavia), constitute a solid and ruthlessly integrated politi-
 cal, economic and military unity, more tightly welded with each passing
 day. But nothing seemed more sure, and indeed necessary, in 1848 than
 the Hapsburg Empire. Yet that imperial idea was in actuality soon after
 1848 rejected by those who had theretofore felt it to be necessary. Under
 similar circumstances there is every reason to think that the present, stronger
 than imperial, concept will be rejected. Of their own volition the western
 Slavs have never in their long history shown any general desire to become
 part of an inclusive Slav empire. They have at various times experienced
 the imperial idea only to repudiate it. Nor, in spite of present conditions,
 is there any evidence that the people of these nations have lost their his-
 toric particularism. All the verifiable evidence is in the opposite direction.
 These peoples have lived long and are wise from bitter experience, a
 teacher whose lessons last longer than those of ministers of propaganda.
 Nowhere is the common man more anxious to claim citizenship of the
 world than in Central Europe, where the western Slavs for much more
 than this past century have been exposed to the repeated appearances of,
 only to reject, the phantom of Pan Slavism.

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO

Russia as the Protector of the Slavs

13

studies, and allowed themselves to be infected with that racial pride which German science displayed, with a tremendous orgy of texts and compilations.

186*
178
814

Kollár, a Slovak, Koukouljevich, a Croat, Kopitar and Stanko Vraz, two Slovenes, with Vuk Karadžich, a Serb, formed the pleiad of romantic scholars and men of letters who revealed to the Slav peoples the common basis of their culture and their traditions. Their scientific offensive, which Renan was to call, somewhat disdainfully, 'Comparative Philology transplanted to the political domain', was the prelude to an era of ferment, when far-seeing minds could foretell the catastrophe which would abolish the work of the Congress of Vienna. Never had pure learning let loose such a storm. It was destined to pile up, under the throne of the Habsburgs, the explosive forces whose work of destruction has been completed under our eyes.

The movement was precipitated by the recrudescence of racial antagonisms in Hungary. The 1848 Revolution had scattered powder-trails throughout Europe. Austria-Hungary found herself, in the years that followed, a prey to two opposing currents, representing the different life-aspirations, rather than political conceptions, of two enemy groups among the nations of this heterogeneous Empire. While the Liberals of Vienna, in revolt against absolute power, marched in union with the Frankfurt Parliament, and included in their ranks the Germans of Austria; while the Magyar Liberals broke with the Habsburgs and bore Kossuth to power, the Slavs of Cis-Leithania and Trans-Leithania, by a repercussion natural to oppressed races, rebelled against tendencies aiming at the strengthening of the two hegemonies, Germanic and Magyar. The ethnical crisis attained its peak in Hungary, where the Croats marched to the defence of the throne under the leadership of the Ban of Croatia, Jellachich, while the Slavs of Hungary (Slovaks and Serbs) kicked against the persecutions of a régime which Western journalism confused with Parliamentary Liberalism. Russia intervened in 1849 not only, as was long believed, to save the monarchical principle, but also under moral obligation not to let the Slavs of Hungary succumb. By the victory of Vilagos, the Russian armies restored to the Habsburgs Hungary, which they were on the point of losing. Six years later Austria, by her anti-Russian attitude in the Crimean War, was, according to a famous

186*
175
648
668 •

The World of the Slavs

186* saying, to astound the world by her ingratitude. It is said that
 175 Nicholas I, towards the end of his reign, visited Warsaw and,
 648 standing thoughtfully in front of Sobieski's statue, said: 'That's
 • 668 the first of the fools who worked for the Habsburgs. And I was
 the second'.

175 It was in the thick of these racial tussles that the Slav peoples
 186 held their first conclaves. Bohemia, the most civilised of the
 668 Slav nations, was the first to extend her hand to her sisters. By
 way of a counter-stroke to the German Assembly in Frankfurt,
 the Slav Congress took place in Prague in June, 1848. Object:
 the establishment of periodical relations between the Slav peoples
 and the drawing up of a programme of action for such of those
 [171] peoples as were subject to Austrian or Magyar domination. The
 language spoken at the Congress was German, then regarded as
 the Esperanto of the Slavs, thus enabling the Germans to claim
 the Slavs as belonging to their *Geistesleben*. This Congress,
 attended by three hundred and sixty-three members, under the
 chairmanship of the Czech historian, Palatsky, was divided into
 three sections: Russo-Polish, Yugoslav, and Czechoslovak.
 Whilst protesting its loyalty to the Habsburgs, it claimed, for the
 Slav populations, the rights and guarantees granted to the
 Germans and the Magyars. Outbreaks occurred in Prague after
 this meeting, and the manner in which they were repressed
 showed that the Slavs could not expect much from Vienna.
 Once more, the eyes of the Slavonic world turned towards
 Russia.

186 Bakunin, in his *Confession*, has left us a picturesque sketch
 668 of this Congress of Prague. He had pleaded the cause of the
 Russian revolution, and of the Federative Republic of all Slavs.
 'The Slavs', he said, 'are real children, but I have found
 among them an unbelievable freshness, and incomparably greater
 innate intelligence and energy than among the Germans. The
 Slavs' predominating sentiment is hatred of the Germans. The
 forceful, if not very polite, expression, "accursed German"
 ("prokliatni Nometz") pronounced alike in nearly all the Slavonic
 dialects, has produced an incredible result in every Slav. . . .
 Hatred of the Germans formed the inexhaustible topic of all
 conversations; it served as a greeting between strangers. . . . As
 regards the Congress itself, it was, like all the other political

[i. Slav Congress, June 1848 - Analyst]

Russia as the Protector of the Slavs

15

Congresses and Assemblies of the time, void of ideas, and absurd'.¹ 186
668

The poet and precursor of the Russian Slavophile current had been the Muscovite, Alexis Khomyakov, who was born in 1804, and died of cholera in 1860. Although a man of very wide and varied general culture (he invented a gun, and a new type of shell), he was deeply attached to national and religious traditions. Moving in literary and philosophical circles, which looked to the West for their standards, he felt a frenzied need for reaction. To the cosmopolitanism of ideas and to the philosophy of Schelling, with whom his contemporaries were infatuated, he opposed a new system, based on the obligation, for any nation wishing to attain its full development, to preserve its original atmosphere of faith, manners, and traditions. Thus, while the Czechs, the Croats, the Slovenes, had at first perceived in Slavism an instrument of joint solidarity and of liberation, Russia began by regarding it as a rampart against the intrusion of Western thought.

The fundamental idea of the so-called Slavophile school was this: the West was in full decay; it was up to Russia to keep herself free of all contaminations, in order to play the regenerating role assigned to her by Providence. In the history of the universe, it was the destiny of each nation to realise one aspect of human genius and to carry this realisation to its point of perfection. Ancient Greece expressed plastic beauty, Rome's mission was to realise the conception of the State, and of Law. The Christian peoples of Western Europe had developed Rationalism and its applications to actual life by giving special prominence to individualist doctrines; witness Luther's doctrine, English political Liberalism, French equalitarianism.

The late-comers in history, Russia and the other Slavonic peoples, still had a decisive role to play in the evolution of humanity—to define the social value of love and brotherhood. The Slavonic race would find, in its mentality and institutions, the necessary conditions for fulfilling this mission. All it had to do was to foster and develop its original characteristics.

That was the psychological and providential aspect of the Slavophile thesis, in which we find unconscious reminiscences of

¹ *Confession*, p. 105 sqq.

Russia as the Protector of the Slavs

19

heirs of Charlemagne. It had no meaning for Russians, who must reject any permanent agreement with the States of the Continent, and keep her hands free, paying no attention to the doctrines by which other governments are inspired.

186³
829

These ideas found fuller development in the well-known speculations of the Slavophile schools on the decadence of the West. Each civilisation, said Danilevsky, slowly exhausted the sap which had nourished it. There was the time of flower and the time of fruit, and Europe had flowered two centuries ago. She had then passed her maturity, and could but degenerate—so the Russian nation had nothing to expect from her. History, added Danilevsky, showed that spiritual supremacy tends to function 'spirally'; to pass from one human group to another; China, India, Egypt, Greece . . . Europe's mission was completed, he concluded.

These long quotations were necessary, in order to establish the starting-point of the Slavophile movement, and its anti-European aspect, manifesting itself at the very time when one section of Russian thought, and the whole of the other Slavonic peoples, were expecting 'light' from the West alone.

The word 'Slavophile' itself, to designate this specific form of Russian nationalism, was originally a derogatory nickname, given to Chichkov and his partisans, who were taxed with Obscurantism. In fashionable society, it was always to have an unpleasant ring about it. When Dostoievsky makes the hero of his novel, *The Idiot*, enter a drawing-room, people excuse his strange behaviour by saying, 'He's a Slavophile, or something very like it, but not a dangerous case'.

[196]

This movement did not monopolise all the appeals to collaboration among Slavs. There existed a counterpart, of opposite and revolutionary tendency. In the Polish section of the Congress of 1848, Bakunin had denounced the illusions fostered by Tsarist propaganda. 'I have no doubt they anticipate the time, in a distant, very far distant future, when all the Slavonic peoples will form part of the Russian Empire. Before that happens, all the Slavonic peoples will have fallen into decrepitude. . . . Without Russia, Slavonic unity is incomplete; without her, Slavonic strength is non-existent. But it would be madness to expect help for the Slavs and their salvation from contemporary Russia. . . . Be the liberators of the Russian people

186³
668 •

The World of the Slavs

186*
• 668
who, in their turn, will subsequently become your strength and your buckler'.

The Pravoslav *mystique* of the Slavophiles and the revolutionary thesis of Bakunin coincided on two points—faith in the future of the Slavonic peoples, and the expectation of a European order in which no nation should feel humiliated or injured. Transplanted to the domain of international life, this was that 'eternal search for integral justice' in which M. Raoul Labry so pertinently saw the dominating feature of the Russian spirit, with its belief in miracles and 'the totalitarian exigencies which it owes to its long religious education and to the régime under which it has developed'.

The immediate aim of the theoreticians of the Slavophile school was to apply Russian solutions to the problems of their national life. That is why the question of the emancipation of the serfs was studied by Youri Samarin, one of the leaders of this school.

[668] In 1867, in the midst of the enthusiasm aroused by this reform, the Congress of Moscow, which marked the climax of Russian Slavophilia, took place. In actual fact, it was less a Congress than a friendly gathering, sponsored by the Moscow Society for Natural Sciences. Eighty delegates of the Slavonic peoples accepted the organisers' invitation: there were Czechs, Serbs, Croats, Bulgars, Slovaks, and Russo-Galicians. The Poles, still suffering from the 1863 repression, had stayed away. The delegates were received at Tsarskoy Selo. The Russian historian, Pogodin, made a speech in which he expressed the hope that the meeting might be the starting-point of an era of regular contacts between all the Slavs. It was decided to hold a biennial Congress, in a town to be selected in advance, with a view to discussing the various problems of mutual interest to Slavs; to found a publishing company, to knit closer the intellectual bonds between the Slavonic peoples; and to set up in Moscow a permanent committee to act as a link between Slavonic organisations.

[741] This programme remained a dead letter, except for a few philanthropic institutions, which contributed to give to Russian Slavophilia the character of 'help' rather than of real mutual aid. At the Congress, one speaker had proposed the adoption of Russian as the inter-Slav language. He was snubbed. The

Russia as the Protector of the Slavs

21

feature which most reveals the Russian exclusivism that animated the Slavophiles is the very fact that their campaign did not succeed in creating a more effective current of intellectual exchanges. In 1850, a young Russian aristocrat asked for a passport to go abroad, in order to study 'Slavonic peoples and ways'. His application was refused, on the grounds that 'between Moscow and Kamchatka there was ample space in which to pursue this branch of study'.

186*
668 •

Among the Orthodox Slavs there was, moreover, up to the middle of the nineteenth century, only one State exhibiting a certain independence, and that was Montenegro. After a long period of subjection to Venetian influence, it passed entirely under Russian tutelage. Its prince-bishops sent their nephews to study in Russia, to prepare themselves for rule. Many young Montenegrins settled there, and their descendants included several of the Russian generals who opposed the Great Army.

[563]

With this exception, intellectual relations between Slavs and Russians were intermittent and restricted. If, once they had regained their independence, the Serbs and the Bulgars sent their statesmen to St. Petersburg, their students went to Vienna, to Leipzig, or to Paris. Even the Orthodox seminarists often preferred the Protestant Faculty of Tübingen to the Russian religious institutions. In short, the ascendancy of Western civilisation remained the chief obstacle to an assimilation of Russian culture by the Slavonic peoples.

186*
177

The Slavophiles, despite the lack of support (and, very soon, the distrust) which their initiative experienced from the Imperial Government, did not allow themselves to be discouraged. The Moscow Slavonic Committee, founded immediately after the Congress of 1867, and its St. Petersburg branch, set up in the spring of 1868, were continually active in the years that followed. Among other activities, they established charitable societies, which educated young Slavs from the oppressed regions, and publishing houses, which produced books, dictionaries, maps, reviews, etc., intended to propagate the common ideal. Between 1875 and 1878 the two organisations were very much in favour in Russian society; millions of roubles flowed into the collections sponsored by them; Aid Committees came to the assistance of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina; arms were sent to the Christians in revolt against Islam; a legion of Russian

186*
668
575

The World of the Slavs

186*
668
575 volunteers were armed and sent to Serbia a year before Russia's declaration of war, which was not made until April, 1877.

In the other Slavonic countries, the movement borrowed an ever-increasing offensive power from the general upward thrust of the nationalities. While the Czech deputies refused to sit in the Cis-Leithan Parliament, the Slovenes claimed the rights of their race and their language; the Croats, under the leadership of Mgr. Strossmayer, made of Zagreb a centre of national culture; the Serbs completed their emancipation and the Bulgarians, in two stages (1860 and 1870), secured the creation of the Exarchate. The Slavonic world was in full effervescence. Germanism grew alarmed. 'If necessary, we will put the Slavs up against the wall', Chancellor de Beust had said.

[648] The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 was to some extent the military epilogue of this period of effervescence. The Congress of Berlin supplied Bismarck and Lord Beaconsfield with the opportunity of repressing the outbursts of the Slavonic race, and of checkmating ethnical propaganda, under colour of ensuring European peace.

* * *

186*
178 During the years that followed, the interest taken by Russia in the Slavonic countries appeared to decrease. Internal affairs absorbed the attention of the Imperial Government, and the disappointments following the Congress of Berlin kept Russian society of the time of Alexander III in a mood of weariness or of apathy. This disaffection became more marked at the beginning of the reign of Nicholas II. Whilst Europe saw Panslavism as a volcano for ever in eruption, Tsarist diplomacy kept in quarantine the heirs of Slavophile thought. The word *bratouchka* (little brother), coined in 1877, at the time of the liberation of Bulgaria, lost its touching significance, to become a scornful term, synonymous with 'cadger', applied to the Balkan Slavs. German influence, exercised in St. Petersburg by the Baltic barons and the Court, took advantage of the repugnance felt by Liberalism and the Western type of Intellectualism to a movement which claimed to bring the country back to the real sources of its tradition.

186*
668 The Slavonic Congress held in St. Petersburg in May, 1908, was attended by members of the Duma, of *Kolo Polsko* (Polish

Russia as the Protector of the Slavs

23

Club) and the *Skupshchina*. But only secondary questions were dealt with, to be re-examined—without any more practical result—in the following month in Prague. These questions included the creation of a Slavonic Bank, a Slavonic Telegraphic Agency, the preparation of an Exhibition, the extension of Sokolism. . . . The time of heroic debates had passed. 186* 668 •

Then, in the speculations founded on an identical destiny for the Slavonic community, there was one disturbing element—Poland. Towards that country, Tsarist Russia displayed implacable aversion. Had she pursued a really Slavonic policy, she would have tried to utilise the powerful factor formed by the persecuted Poles beyond her own frontiers. A Slavonic policy would have succeeded in making of Russian Poland, governed with tolerance and understanding, a centre of attraction, if not for Little Poland (where the Viennese policy of Austro-Polonism gave the illusion of some measure of individuality), at least for the savagely persecuted Poles in East Prussia, in Posnania, and in Upper Silesia. 186* 563 648

For their part the Poles were inclined to think that there existed only two Slavonic peoples, Russia and themselves, and, of the principles of Slavism, to grasp only that directed against Germany.

It was precisely in the measure in which she appealed to the Slavonic idea that Russia caused them uneasiness. As for the other Slavonic peoples, their relations with them were only occasional. *Bohemi Polonorum infestissimi inimici* ran an old saying. The seventy-seven Polish deputies who made up the *Kolo Polsko*, and together stood for all the parties represented in the Reichsrat, rarely cast their votes with those of the Slav bloc formed by the Czech, Slovene, Serbo-Croat parties of Istria and Dalmatia. Yet the Slavonic Union of 1907 proved—though for a very short time—that, with them, the Slavs would have secured an absolute majority in the Parliament of Vienna. The *Kolo Polsko* adopted a realistic and short-sighted policy; its members derived temporary advantages, but consolidated a régime which the other Slavs declared to be inhuman and condemned by the evolution of the modern world. The Poles saw the Serbs only as Orthodox Christians and vassals of the Russians. They boycotted the last Slav Congresses, in order not to sit at the same table as the Russians. In 1911, the Serbs succeeded in [646]

Russia as the Protector of the Slavs

25

national sentiment. It is not irrelevant to mention that the Orthodox Slavs of the Balkans are the least practising of Orthodox Christians, among whom it is the Serbs who have the largest number of unbelievers. It is said that, for a given number of inhabitants, there would be six times as many churches in Greece as in Serbia, four times as many in Rumania, and twice as many in Bulgaria.

186*

771

Muscovite Slavism differed from Czech Slavism not only in its internal tendencies but in its psychological structure. The patient mysticism of the Russians aimed at achievements on the basis of a millenary evolution. The Czechs, of less nebulous mentality and of intense volitional power, sought immediate results. In Moscow they talked of the divine mission of Eastern Christianity; in Prague, of the boycotting of German goods and the disposal of the products of Czech industry. Between two nations with such a differing mental outlook, it was difficult to maintain concomitant moral action for very long.

186*

563

185

The breach became apparent when the Czech, Karel Kramár, created the 'Neo-Slavism' which held its first Assembly in Prague in May, 1908. A Pole, Roman Dnowski, and a Bulgarian, Stevan Bobtchev, were in agreement with him to rejuvenate the old Slavonic ideal under a new climate. It was a doctrine tending towards cultural unity and the spiritual and economic collaboration of all Slavs, without distinction of religion, and on a footing of perfect equality. An anti-hegemonic conception of Slav solidarity thus replaced 'Russo-Orthodox-Panslavism', relegated to the order of romantic myths. It seemed to provide the positive basis and the practical aims which agreement among Slavs had always lacked.

186*

668 •

But, among the other Slav peoples, this movement did not meet with the success its founder anticipated. Too many of these peoples still had to contend with foreign domination. Kramár more or less approved the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by the Dual Monarchy. He saw in it the legalisation of a state of things which implied an increase in the number, and therefore in the influence, of the Slavs within Austria-Hungary; it was for the inverse reason that the German Liberals in Austria had, thirty years earlier (1878), unleashed furious opposition to the occupation of these same provinces. But bound up with this question were the security and the independence of the Serbian

186*

668

648

The World of the Slavs

186* people, who protested vigorously against Kramár's attitude.

• 668 The latter alienated, in turn, the Croats and the Slovenes,
648 by opposing 'Trialism'; in other words, the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia-Slavonia, considered as a step towards the transformation of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy into an Austro-Hungarian-Jugoslav Triple Monarchy—a transformation which, by an entirely unsupported legend, was said to be favoured by Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian Empire. A memorable verbal passage of arms took place in the Reichsrat on this question, between Kramár and the Yugoslav deputy, Tresich Pavitchich. 'One is surprised', M. Benes was later on to say, 'to see how little effectiveness Neo-Slavism had, and how the governments concerned neglected to make use of it during the critical years between 1906 and 1914. This complete lack of influence was fully illustrated by the documents taken from the Foreign Affairs archives of the three Imperial powers'.

In any case, it is certain that the Czechs derived no benefit from it. In February, 1914, Scheiner, the President of the Czech Sokols, went to Russia to sound the intentions of officialdom. 'You are of no interest to us', said Sazonov. 'Do not count on us, you play no part in our plans of campaign'.

186* In Serbia, Russian Slavophilia found a very different climate
829 in which to survive. The Yugoslav countries constituted an area in which Orthodox propaganda modified the interests of Tsarist diplomacy. The latter, at the beginning of the century, considered the Poles as 'traitors', the Czechs as the fire-brands of democracy in Eastern Europe, the Slovaks, the Slovenes, and the Croats as the outposts of Papism. Out of the fifty million non-Russian Slavs, they were interested in only ten million—the Balkan Slavs. Indeed, the policy of the Romanovs considered the Balkan Peninsula as:—

- (1) The approach which should, one fine day, enable Russia to make herself independent of the whim of the 'porter' of the Dardanelles.
- (2) A field of competition with Austria-Hungary; in other words, the means of exerting counter-pressure on the Vienna Cabinet when the latter encouraged agitation on the borders of the Empire, in the form of Uniatism, Austro-Polonism, or Ukrainism.

Russia as the Protector of the Slavs

31

Thus, at the beginning of this century, the Slavonic idea had permeated all the currents of spiritual life of the nations whose historic personality it exalted. In Russia, after having arisen among the intellectual *élite*, it had been relegated to the rank of diplomatic accessories. But it had been rejuvenated by allying itself with Czech Agnosticism, with Croatian and Slovene Catholicism, with the positive sense of the Bulgars, the legendary spirit of independence of the Serbs. It had been an aspect, a 'phase' of the march of the nationalities towards emancipation. From the minutes of meetings of learned societies, it had advanced to the domain of direct action. After having taken stock (academically) of the injustices which formed landmarks in the history of the Slavonic world, it was preparing to achieve reparation for these injustices by conspiracies, acts of violence, war.

While Russia had given the emotional impetus to this movement, and the Czechs had demonstrated the educative elements in a Slavonic science and conscience, it was left to the Yugoslavs to set the ruthless pace which was to precipitate events. It was under their influence that Slavism entered upon its revolutionary phase. In Hungary it found the oppressive atmosphere which provoked this evolution; the beginning of the twentieth century is marked, in Croatia, by a series of trials and acts of violence which revealed to the world the progress of Yugoslav militancy. It was in fact in Bosnia, from a centre of Yugoslav irredentism, that sprang the spark which was to set the continent afire. Starting from the speculative heights of the learned world, the Slavonic idea culminated in shots, fired point blank, by a Herzegovine student, at the heir to the Austrian Empire, in a Sarajevo street. When the President of the Tribunal interrogated the authors of the crime as to the motives for their action, they repeated, with dogged fatalism, 'Francis Ferdinand was the enemy of the Slavs'.

Russian officialdom took fright at this effervescence. It sought excuses for its passive attitude. To explain why they had abandoned the Serbs at the time of the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Stolypin stated that Imperial diplomacy had simply had an eye to the future. 'Give the peasants of Kostroma ten more years at the plough'. A second humiliation was inflicted on Russia in April, 1913, when, to please Austria, she

186

668

178

186*

829

648

186*
721 coherent nor systematised; no one was pursuing a policy of defending or destroying them as a whole. But the Slavonic world had let loose outbursts of passion which, for some years, had been fanning all the centres of trouble into flame. These had greatly helped to create the psychological atmosphere which had rendered the clash inevitable. So we may say that, if Slavism as such had indeed nothing to do with the development of the drama, it had at least written the prologue to it.

* * *

186*
• 668
648 Such being the case, it is scarcely necessary to remind the reader that, during the 1914-1918 War, the Slavs had no general political policy. They evolved within the framework of their historical antecedents, as long as the conflict offered no other prospect than that of a German victory. On several occasions Russian officialdom even adopted an anti-Slav position. They agreed to the cession of Dalmatia to Italy, opposed the union of the Slovenes and the Croats with the Serbians, resisted the concessions which Russia's allies asked her to grant to Poland, and showed obvious lack of goodwill at the Czech suggestions for the creation of an independent army.

The Czechoslovaks had a more coherent policy, and gave ample proof of loyalism. From the very beginning of the operations, whole units deserted under fire and went over to the Russians. They have been reproached with having first declared themselves in favour of the autonomy of Poland within the framework of Russia, rather than of her full independence. At the time when they adopted it, that attitude was a realistic, rather than a sentimental one.

The Poles were, above all, anti-German; for a long time they humoured Austria-Hungary, and several of them served her brilliantly. It must not be forgotten that the Dual Monarchy's anti-Slav policy was often the work of Slavs: Coluchowski (Minister of Foreign Affairs), Bilinski (Joint Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina), Dumba (ambassador), Tarnowski, etc. In any case, a Slavonic policy would have meant a mortal struggle with Vienna and Budapest; the Poles could not resign themselves to that. Besides, would the Russians have given them sufficient understanding, if not support, to make up for the goodwill they could rely on finding among the Magyars and the Austrians?

The Triumph of the Nationalities

37

The Yugoslavs of Austria aimed at the dismembering of the Dual Monarchy and at the total emancipation of the Slav populations living under its sway. But they found themselves prevented from conducting a policy of integral Slavism, by the caution which the war-map forced them to observe with regard to Russia² and to Italy, owing to the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute and the Macedonian problems, and even by the difficulties encountered at the outset of the negotiations between Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs, for the formation of a single Yugoslav state.

There were, however, some attempts at understanding among the various emigrations, especially between the Polish National Committee (Dmowski, Paderewski), the Czechoslovak National Council (Masaryk, Benes, Stekánik) and the Yugoslav Committee (Troumbich, Hinkovich). These contacts lasted until the Peace Conference. But they never led to the elaboration of a programme, or of any organic agreement. [575]

The Dual Monarchy, moreover, did not lack support among its Slav nationals. Stjepan Radich, a Russophile, a hundred per cent Slav and a poet into the bargain, addressed a rhymed call to arms against the Tsar to his brothers of Austria and of Hungary:—

'... All persecuted, even to the shedding of blood, by
the East,

All having received their Faith from Rome,

All having their fields bathed by the Danube'.

It is true that this same Radich, when things went badly for the Central Empires, reassured his friends, anxious about the fate reserved for Croatia: 'Have no fear', he said, 'nothing can happen to you as long as Russia exists'. This guileless inconsequentiality is rather reminiscent of the whole history of Slavism, adapted by each nation to the daily round of its own politics. Even the war made no change in this behaviour. Russia disappointed her Serbian ally by signing the London Pact, which stupidly dismembered the Dalmation coast, to the advantage of Italy, through ignorance of the fact that there were

² A slight incident will show how much the latter had remained attached to her prejudices. On the Feast of the Epiphany, 1916, the divisions of Serbian and Croat volunteers in Russia arranged for a religious service, at which prayers were recited for all Christians, 'Orthodox and non-Orthodox'. The Russians did not hide their disapproval, and declared this initiative to be 'not very liturgical'.

186*
648
668

Catholics in Southern Dalmatia and Orthodox Christians in Northern Dalmatia. Still the same ignorance of Slavonic geography! Pilsudski raised a Polish Legion against Russia, and the Bulgars made unforgivable war on the Serbs. It is true that, in the last period of the conflict, legions were formed, in which the Slavs of Austria-Hungary rejoined forces for the defence of their own cause. And at the meeting of the Reichsrat in mid-October, 1918, at which the nationalities bade farewell to the Empire of the Habsburgs, one might have believed in a renewal of Slav solidarity. After Stanek, representing the union of the Czech parties, had bravely declared: 'Know that no Czech willingly gave his life for the cause of the Central Empires', the Polish orator spoke of a 'Slavonic bloc, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic'. But, in reality, what they were thinking of was not Slavism, but liberty.

This liberty was to be restored to them by the treaties of 1919-1920. Truth compels us to say that they owed it as much to the collapse of Imperial Russia as to the victory of the Allies. 'Russia', Dostoevsky had predicted, 'will have no more venomous enemies than these Slavonic nations, as soon as she has liberated them. They will immediately begin by seeking from Europe, from England, from Germany, the guarantee of their liberty, and it is against Russia that they will take measures'.

Dostoevsky had not foreseen the collapse of Tsarism. But, if the latter 'liberated' the Slavonic peoples, it was not by virtue of any conscious action, but by its own suicide. By disappearing, it did more for the independence of the Slavonic nations than the Slavophile Romanticism of three Muscovite generations. Old Imperial Russia, at her collapse, was to bequeath to the resuscitated Slavs what remained of the Slavonic idea. She might have repeated to them the beautiful words spoken by Cyril, on his death-bed, to his brother Methodius: 'We were like a yoke of oxen ploughing a field of corn; my days are over, I am going away, and you must carry on our joint task'.

* * *

186*
668

The first result of the Russian Revolution was, indeed, to remove the reactionary fetters which Muscovite Slavism had imposed on inter-Slav relations. Henceforth, all the Slavonic nations were ranged behind one and the same democratic ideal.

The Triumph of the Nationalities

39

But a new Slavonic problem was brought to the forefront—the problem of the Ukraine. A Ukrainian National Committee was formed, and began to negotiate with the Allies. Its action divided the Slavs; Poles and Russians greeted it with equal hostility; the Yugoslavs displayed disapproval or indifference; the Czechs adopted a half-and-half attitude, advocating the administrative and cultural autonomy of the Ukraine within the framework of the reviving Slav solidarity.

186*
648
578

Moreover, it was quite natural that, once in possession of their ethno-linguistic frontiers, the Slavonic peoples should cease to have any other horizons than these frontiers, within which they still had to build up a political, economic, and social organisation. They sought their vocation in their own history. We are continually forced back to this fundamental fact—Slavism has been, in its essence and from the force of circumstances, a revolt of the nation against the State, whether the latter was called Germany, Austria, Hungary, or Turkey. In Russia itself, the Slavophile school maintained the rights of the country (*zemlia*) against the encroachments of the State. With this tendency is connected the tinge of anarchy which the West is apt to associate with the word 'Slav'. The nation, in the spirit of the 1919-1920 treaties, being identified with the State, the Slavonic idea was doomed to lose the centrifugal opposition, the dissolving power which had long characterised it, and under whose action the Habsburg Empire had collapsed.

186*
668 •

And in fact, the triumph of the nationalities, ratified by the treaties of Saint-Germain and of Trianon, restored Slavism to its academic origins. Reminders of racial fraternity now seemed to serve no other purpose than to warm up the atmosphere for after-dinner speeches, or for inaugural meetings of congresses. The Slavonic nations lacked that basis of common culture which gives to Hispanism, for instance, the only positive value to which it can lay claim.

In the political order the counter-indications showed up all the more clearly, inasmuch as the territorial settlements were no longer made in virtue of force, but on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination. Now there were some populations which were caught between two opposing Slavonic currents; the Teschen district of Silesia, Macedonia, the Ukraine. A cynic has remarked that, the farther the distance between Slavonic

186*
728

44.

*The World of the Slavs*186*
829

There was then, in Belgrade as well as in Zagreb, a passing attack of 'Ententophobia'. A Belgrade newspaper which enjoyed a certain authority in foreign policy, the *Epoha*,⁵ declared: 'We must see things as they are, and not hide from ourselves the fact that events in Eastern Europe are of capital importance for us, at a time when our Western friends have completely abandoned us.' . . . If a fresh policy of eastward trend is to be automatically imposed on us tomorrow, as a logical result of our international situation, we fail to see why it would not be wiser to choose it today'.

186*
• 668

The semi-official (radical) press had to react in fairly stiff terms against these appeals for a change in foreign policy. The Serbian municipal elections and the constituent elections of 1920 brought appreciable gains to the Communists. The Government suppressed this movement by the 'Decree' of December 30, prohibiting all Communist organisations and activity. It is superfluous to add that they accused Moscow of fomenting this activity, and submitted any person or propaganda coming from Russia to a still more rigorous quarantine.

But they showed themselves no less unshakeably determined to refuse any assistance, direct or indirect, to anti-Sovietic action. They were to be the last Government to recognise the *de jure* independence of the Baltic States, in whose existence they saw an intolerable dismemberment of Russian power. They were to take part in the campaign of assistance organised at the time of the great famine in Russia, in 1921-1922. Inversely, at the time of the earthquake in Herzegovina and Dalmatia in 1927, they were to refuse all aid from abroad, except (out of a spirit of Slav solidarity) that of the Soviet Red Cross.

186*
829

It is true that they were to defer for a long time—until the eve of the Second World War—recognition of the Soviets. But, in the case of Yugoslavia as in that of Bulgaria, this negative attitude, on closer examination, will be seen to be an indirect homage to the sympathies which Russia enjoyed among the common people. In Belgrade, as in Sofia, it was feared that a Soviet mission would find, among the masses, a support which would be dangerous for the security of the régime. The truth is

⁵ Of July 26, 1920.

⁶ Allusion to the attitude adopted by the Peace Conference in the Adriatic dispute and the reparations question.

186*

the immanence of the traditional values connected with the Slav ideology. M. Krofta, Joint Minister of Foreign Affairs for Czechoslovakia and intimate collaborator of Edward Benes, reviving the latter's ideas in articles published by the *Prager Presse* on May 6, 1933 and June 9, 1935, declares any positive action by the Slavonic peoples tending to a regroupment to be out of the question, 'unless it should be necessary for them to erect a wall of defence against foreign imperialism'.

186*
• 668
829

From Belgrade, a former minister and propagandist, M. Lazare Markovich, retorted with a certain vivacity. In his view, Slavism clung to its prospect of action. 'Our attachment to the Russian people and to Russia', he said, 'must positively exclude any intimate liaison between Yugoslavia and Germany. Hitler's speech of May 21, 1935 has so categorically stated Germany's attitude that there is no hope of any Russo-German agreement. . . . Unlike our Czech confrères, we do not hesitate to say that we ardently desire, and will work with all our strength to reconstitute in Europe, a Slav policy based on joint action by the Slavonic peoples'.¹⁰

So, while MM. Benes and Krofta considered any political construction of Slav solidarity as romantic and out-of-date, M. Markovich considered 'that there can be no real European entente without the participation of the Slavonic peoples, with Russia at the head'. And, when the Four-Party Pact was signed, M. Markovich advocated the drawing-up of a similar pact among Slavonic peoples, 'in order to place the latter on a footing of absolute parity with the Latins and the Teutons'.¹¹

This controversy, perhaps, reflects less the opposition of two principles than the contrast between two temperaments, Czech realism and Yugoslav emotiveness. Events appear to have given the lie to M. Markovich's thesis (German-Yugoslav *rapprochement*, Moscow Pact). But what we must look at in international life is not the episodes, but the constants; is it not in forecasting the imminent that one runs the greatest risk of going astray?

186*

The truth seems to us to lie between the two positions. Slavism is neither a force nor a leading principle of international

113

¹⁰ Lazare Markovich, *Yugoslavia's External Policy*, p. 343 et seq.; *Spirit of Belgrade* of May 14, 1933.

¹¹ *Spirit of Belgrade* of June 11, 1933.

*The World of the Slavs*186*
• 668

Hence the lack of enthusiasm encountered among the Soviets by the apostles of a 'Green International' of Slavonic peoples. The all-powerfulness of Stamboliiski's Agrarian Party in Bulgaria had given birth to the idea of a Slav coalition, on a peasant basis. M. Svehla, chief of the Czech Agrarian Party, went to Warsaw to confer with the Polish Peasant Leader, M. Vincent Witos; he felt himself assured of Bulgarian support, and counted on that of Radich, head of the Croat Peasant Party.

In actual fact, these various peasant parties were alike in name only. In Bohemia, the agrarian movement combined intellectuals, technicians, business men; although in the Prague Parliament it had scarcely half as many representatives as those who supported Radich in the Belgrade Parliament, yet it controlled banks, co-operatives, schools, newspapers, and about fifty magazines. Unlike Radich, Svehla did not dream of a peasant 'dictatorship' incompatible with the political climate of Czechoslovakia. There was the same divergence in point of view with regard to Communism. At his Party Congress, Stamboliiski had declared that he was 'ready to break the Communists' heads, if necessary'. Such was certainly not Svehla's intention. As for Radich, he had made a first visit to Russia in the time of the Tsars, about 1889, when the Russian Peasants' Federation had just been founded—which gave him the first idea for the Croat Peasant Party, founded by his brother Antoine and himself, in 1902-1903. Becoming an apostle of Slav solidarity, he founded the 'Slav Bookshop' in Zagreb, published a Czech Grammar, worked for Serbo-Bulgarian *rapprochement*. When he revisited Russia in 1924, he recovered the strains of his original Russophilia. But the Soviet leaders showed themselves rather cautious: as we have already indicated, they thought him harum-scarum and changeable. He joined the Peasant International, which he considered, he was to say later on, as simply the extension of the Peasant Federation of 1889. Moreover, in the Balkans, the words 'Agrarian Party' have not the same ring about them as they have in the industrialised States of Central Europe. What Balkan party can, by its composition, its origins, its tendencies, be anything but 'Peasant' in States where (with the exception of Greece) the rural class represents 85 per cent of the population? However ephemeral it may have been, the

[162]

The Triumph of the Nationalities

55

movement in favour of a Green International of Slavonic Peasants yet merits a place in the chronology of inter-Slav relations. 186* 668 •

* * *

At the same period (June 4-8, 1924) a Congress of Slav Geographers and Ethnologists was held in Prague. This too, awakened aspirations, either latent or at least dormant since the era of the great assemblies of the nineteenth century. The very choice of Prague was a reminder that Bohemia had been the 'laboratory' of the Slavonic idea. And it was the occasion of a spectacular return of Bulgaria into the community of peoples inspired by that idea. 186 815

But, when the totalitarian States had proclaimed their intention of attacking the 1919-1920 treaties, it was once more to Russia that all these peoples turned. From Moscow alone could come the watchword capable of rallying their energies—on condition that it should not look like an appeal to a Proletarian Dictatorship. 186* 829

Just as the exaltation of Teutonism, in the first half of the nineteenth century, had had as a reaction the awakening of the Slav conscience, so the National-Socialist drive, a century later, was to bring in its wake a defensive reaction tending to align, if not to regroup, the Slavonic forces.

The essentially anti-Marxist notion of race had been repudiated by Lenin. In internal affairs, it could not but hinder the work of 'mixing' undertaken by the Moscow government. In foreign affairs it had no *raison d'être*, so long as Russian diplomacy practised a Eurasiatic policy, and guided the country's destinies towards the East. But, after fifteen years, the problem of the allogeneous inhabitants had passed the crisis. The Soviet régime was firmly established. German imperialism obliged them to turn their attention towards the West: the repetition of the recurrent drama of which Europe had been the theatre since the era of Wilhelm II once more reminded the Russian world of its destiny.

The first check to Hitlerian arrogance on the part of the Kremlin was the signing in London, on July 2, 3, and 4, 1933, of agreements for the common acceptance of the definition of the aggressor, as formulated by Nicholas Politis. The U.S.S.R. signature appears at the foot of this document, side by side with 186* 648 829

Second World War and the Slav Liberation Front 75

which had made of Croatia the bulwark of Christianity
(*Antemurale Christianitatis*).

186*
175

But, while Slovakia was the testing-ground of Germany's 'European' conceptions, it was from Mussolini's Italy that the Croatia of Pavelich took her watchwords.⁵ It was to Mussolini that Pavelich, condemned to death by the Aix-en-Provence Assize Court, fled for protection. It was in the Doges' Palace in Venice that Pavelich signed Croatia's adhesion to the Tripartite Pact on June 15, 1941. Moreover, the 'oustachi' had not awaited the arrival of the Germans and the Italians before rallying to the Axis. The first step towards adhesion to the Tripartite Pact dates from the interview which took place in January, 1940, between Pavelich and Count Ciano, in the latter's home.

175
648

Moreover, the independence of the new State had, from the time of its constitution, been seriously mortgaged, for the Duke of Spoleto, son of the late Duke of Aosta, was to reign over it, with the title of Tomislav II. However, he never appeared in Croatia, and notified his abdication on August 27, 1943.

Italy had counted on Croatia to play the same role in the Balkans as Germany had assigned to Slovakia in the Danube Basin—that of a testing-ground for the New Order. 'Croatia represents the touchstone of the system which the Axis Powers wish to establish in Europe'.⁶ As soon as it came to power, the pro-Hitler minority which governed by terror at Zagreb (or at Banja-Louka) had, in the name of racialism no doubt, abolished the word 'Slav' from their terminology. In the propagandist work (*The Croats*) published in Zagreb in 1943, we read (on page 75) that the Croats are of Iranian stock and 'derive their origin from the ancient cradle of the best European races in the Caucasus', while on page 78 we learn that Professor H. M. Chadwick's theory 'completes and corroborates the thesis concerning the Gothic origin of the Croats'. No doubt these two opinions are somewhat contradictory, but the Gothic connection was calculated to rejoice the hearts of the theorists of Nordic pre-eminence. Pavelich himself declared to a German journalist that he wished the German origin of his nation could be proved

186*
175

⁵ The Croatian National Socialist Party amalgamated with the 'oustachi' movement on July 13, 1941.

⁶ Broadcast from Radio-Rome, April 27, 1942.

The World of the Slavs

186* and that Croatian science would endeavour to elucidate this
175 problem [sic].

186* Croatia had been the starting-point of the defection which
175 dislocated Yugoslavia, but a Croat, Joseph Broz (Marshal Tito),
• 668 was at the head of the movement which resuscitated that country. This movement began as a guerrilla war waged by partisans; it grew into the rising of a whole nation. 'Tito', by his previous political activity, by his participation in the Spanish campaign (where he had met Rodnitzer, the future defender of Stalingrad), had made numerous contacts with Soviet generals and statesmen. He had Moscow's unconditional support in organising resistance in the Balkans and, at the request of the Russians, he ousted, in the confidence of the Allies, General Mihailovich, one of the earliest rebels, but who was reproached with Serbian exclusiveness and with executions of Communists.

By regrouping, under the ægis of Russia, the Serbian, Croatian, Slovene, and Macedonian populations, Tito made himself the champion of a cause that was specifically Slavonic.

In Bulgaria, Communist opposition and popular sentiment (immemorially attached to Russia, but, since Stalingrad, more enthusiastic than ever as the result of the recovery of the Red Armies) obstructed, with increasing boldness the Hitlerophile policy of the Government, which periodic contacts with the Führer failed to stabilise.

* * *

186* In order to galvanise and render articulate the new solidarity
668 on democratic lines which was shaping itself among the Slavonic
544 peoples against their common aggressor, congresses were organised. The first was held at Moscow in August, 1941, only a few weeks after Russia's entry into the war. It may be considered the cradle of this rebirth of Slavism. The opening address was pronounced by the Soviet writer, Alexis Tolstoy. 'We reject', he said, 'the old ideology of Pan Slavism, which we consider reactionary and contrary to the principle of equality among the nations. . . . Slavs, let us unite, that each Slavonic nation may be entitled, as the other nations are, to a free, peaceful existence, that the culture of our nations may flourish without restraint. . . . The fires of Warsaw and of Belgrade are not yet extinct. From the spark springs the flame; the wind of hatred fans these smoking ruins, in which are consumed German

Second World War and the Slav Liberation Front 77

Fascism's dreams of bloodthirsty domination over the Slavonic world. . . . Slavs, Ukrainian Russians, White Russians, Poles, Czechs, Slovenes, Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Bulgars, Slovaks, Ukrainians of Sub-Carpathia, the time has come to unite in the common struggle against German Fascism!'

The Congress paid tribute to the memory of the three million Slavs who had already died on the field of battle or in camps. The Polish authoress, Wanda Wassiliewska, announced that, on Soviet territory, a Polish army was being formed, 'which would fight shoulder to shoulder with the Red Army'. Two days earlier, the Czech Government in London had given the same assurance concerning their compatriots. All civilians of Slav nationality were called upon to sabotage the enemy's means of communication and military equipment, to starve him, to multiply ambushes for him. Before breaking up, the Congress (as in 1867) appointed a Committee to make contact with all the Slav organisations in the world; it was also to publish documents showing how Hitler was carrying out the extermination of the Slavs.

This Congress had been a first contact—a sort of family council. The one held in the following year (April 4 and 5, 1942) was the most extensive, the most eloquent demonstration of Slav solidarity that the world has ever seen. Spokesmen of all the Slavonic nations, each speaking in his own language, succeeded each other on the platform, whence their declarations were broadcast.

The proceedings opened with a call to 'a holy war against Fascism' by Lieut.-General Gondorov (who was to preside over all the great Slavonic Assemblies). They closed on an appeal formulated by the Soviet writer, Nicolas Tikhonov: 'Oppressed brother Slavs, forward for the national war, the war of liberation! This summons will ring like a tocsin in Belgrade destroyed by the German barbarians, in war-torn Warsaw, in Prague, streaming with the blood of her best sons, in the valleys of the Carpathians and of the Balkans, in the Steppes of the Ukraine, in the forests of White Russia and of Poland, on the banks of the Dnieper and the shores of the Adriatic, on the hills of the Vistula and on the blue Danube!'

The Serbian Professor, Bojidar Maslarich, according to the tradition of his country, quoted the epic of the drama in which

78

The World of the Slavs

186*

• 668

[589]

the medieval Serbian Empire foundered, and the oath of Tsar Lazar:—

'If a man has not fought at Kossovo,
His hands shall always be sterile;
His fields shall yield no corn
And his vineyards no grapes!
Forward, brother Serbs!
Liberty is calling you'.

A Bulgar, Ferdinand Kosovskj, proclaimed: 'We are bound to the great Russian nation by our past, our language, our customs. The words "Honour", "Liberty", "Fraternity" are the same in Russian and in Bulgarian. The Bulgarian people will never let themselves be drawn into a war against their liberator, the Russian nation!' His compatriot, Stella Blagojeva, called upon the Bulgarian women to urge the soldiers to turn their arms 'against Hitler, the implacable enemy of Slavism'.

The Croat, Djura Salaj, drew a pathetic picture of the atrocities and the exactions which his country had witnessed—hundreds of thousands of men deported to Germany, 375 members of the Croatian Peasant Party executed at Zagreb, outstanding personalities interned (Machek, the Peasant Leader, Ivan Mestrovich, the sculptor, etc.).

A Czech deputy, Marek Culen, called upon the Slovaks to 'assume their responsibility in the face of history, on the eve of great and decisive battles' and urged their soldiers to go over to the Russians, with their arms.

Two representatives of Poland, the authoress Wanda Wassielewska and the workman Alexander Josis, drew a picture of the fresh martyrdom of their country, and urged resistance.

A German also spoke—the poet, Johannes Becher—to stigmatise the Hitlerian racial theories, the pretext for their colonial schemes in Eastern Europe. 'The crimes perpetrated by Hitler make every German blush to admit his nationality. . . . German people, understand this: the Slavonic nations, in their liberating war, do not and never will, wish to conquer German lands. . . . Join with all the Slavonic peoples, emancipate yourselves from the accursed Hitlerian domination! Wipe out the shame and the curse which weigh upon Germany!'

The Congress also heard the Slovene, Ivan Regent, and

Second World War and the Slav Liberation Front 79

numerous Soviet militants, including the composer, Dmitry Chostakovich, member of the Panslav Committee, who, opposing the Pan-Germanic theories, vindicated Slavonic culture. 'I am proud to be a Russian, I boast of being a Slav. . . . If we must speak of "superior" and "inferior" representatives of humanity, then we can class the German Fascists in the category of the basest! Have they not profaned Yasnaia Poliana (Leo Tolstoy's house), the most sacred treasure of the Russian nation; trodden underfoot Tchaikovsky's scripts at Klin; destroyed at Tikhvina the house where Rimsky Korsakov was born; demolished immortal monuments of Russian architecture at Novgorod and Istra? . . . May all the spiritual forces, all the intellectuals of the glorious family of the Slavonic nations intrepidly fulfil the great mission entrusted to them by history!'

The philosophy of this Congress was summed up in an article in the form of a programme, from the pen of the Russian writer, Alexis Tolstoy, and published by the *Pravda* of Moscow:

'We must revise the whole history of the Slavonic peoples. Our contribution to European civilisation has not been less than that of other peoples. During the space of a thousand years, our young blood gave life to Byzantium in its decrepitude. It was thanks to the Slavs that Byzantium preserved ancient civilisation, and transmitted it to feudal Europe. The Slavonic peoples, hard-working, lovers of liberty, peace, and culture had as their neighbours, on the east, nomadic Empires which always cherished the chimerical design of conquering the world, and, on the west, medieval emperors whose imposing cavalcades were no less vain. These aggressions from the east and from the west broke against the intrepid resistance of the Slavonic world. The role of the Slavonic peoples in the formation of European Humanism has not yet been appreciated at its true value. . . . Slavs, to arms! Up, for our mutual relentless struggle!'

Would you not take this—except for the religious note—for a page from one of the Slavophiles of the forties, or a speech by the historian, Pogodin, at the 1867 Congress?

Anticipating Tolstoy's hopes, the Congress had decided on the publication of a monthly review (*The Slavs*), the aim of which was to make known the services rendered to humanity by the Slav civilisation and to tighten the bonds uniting its present representatives.

186*
668 •[544]
[629]186*
203

The World of the Slavs

186*

814

In Russia, this same year 1942 saw an unprecedented output of works on Slavonic history and philology. Nicolas Derjavin studied Slavonic palaeology, Russo-Bulgarian intellectual relations, the origin and history of the Slavs up to the eleventh century. The literature and history of the Slavonic nations were included in the syllabus of the High Schools; a chair of Slavonic Philology was created in the University of Leningrad; in May, 1942 the chair of Slavistic in the University of Moscow became a 'centre of studies in the history of the Slavonic peoples and of their role in intellectual evolution and in progress'.

186

608

829

The Ethnographical Institute of the Academy of Sciences undertook a huge investigation into the origin of the Slavonic settlements. A Tass Agency communication of July 4, 1943, announced the first results of this inquiry; the Slavs were aboriginals, not invaders. Professor Gudaltov proved that they descended from tribes settled between the Elbe and the Vistula. He pointed out the direct relationship between the Scythians of the Dnieper and the Polanes who played a decisive role in the formation of the State of Kiev.

186

533

536

Literature, the theatre, the arts, vied with each other in contributing to this revival of Slavonic spiritual life. An exhibition of the theatrical art of the Slavonic nations was held in Moscow in July, 1942. Chebalin's *Slavonic Quartet* obtained the Stalin Prize in 1943. The Musicians' Congress, which met in Moscow in January, 1943, praised Victor Belyi's 'Slavonic Suite' (Hymn of Anger, Serbian Guerrilla, To Arms!), the libretto of which, borrowed from Serbian folklore literature, is the work of the Montenegrin poet, Radoul Stijensky.

186*

575

• 668

But the essential task remained a political one. Five committees were formed, for liaison with sympathisers in the allied countries—Panslav Committee, Youth Committee, Committee of Savants, Feminine Committee, Jewish Committee. The Panslav Committee launched message after message to oppressed Slavs, insurgent Slavs, Slavs in exile. They received from the Yugoslav Vetché—a political organisation struggling with Tito for independence—a telegram thanking them for their assistance with a view to the establishment of a 'Democratic Yugoslavia, federal and equal in rights', which concluded as follows: 'Long live the fraternal solidarity of all the Slavs in the struggle against German Fascism!'

Second World War and the Slav Liberation Front 81

The Third Panslav Congress opened in Moscow on May 9, 1943. Two thousand people assembled—authors, artisans, soldiers, partisans, priests of the Eastern rites. There were seen, side by side, the Soviet General Alexander Gonorov, the Czech Colonel Svoboda, the Colonel of the Polish 'Kosciuszko' Division, Sigmund Berling, the Metropolitan of Kiev, Nicolas. Once more the union of all the oppressed Slavs was urged; the Czechs were invited to evade the total mobilisation which the Germans were organising in their country. Already the partisans were everywhere at work; the Soviet victories guaranteed the triumph of the common cause. The Congress voted messages to Stalin, to Churchill, to Roosevelt, to all the Slavs in the world.

In the month of July,¹ an exhibition in Moscow showed specimens of the independent Slav press—of more than a hundred reviews and newspapers which were then appearing in the United States, in Great Britain, in Canada, in Australia, in the Argentine.

The Panslav Committee held its sixth full Assembly in Moscow on October 16 and 17, 1943. It voted congratulations to the Red Army, to the Yugoslav partisans, to the first Czechoslovak Brigade in Russia—which was about to leave for the front—to the Union of Poles (since October 12 the Kosciuszko Division had been in the firing line). The Czech Zdenek Mejedli, Professor of Musical Art in Prague, spoke of the reconstitution of Czechoslovak unity; the Metropolitan Nicolas told of the German Army's atrocities on Russian territory; the Academician Derjavin recounted the exploits of Russian military history—the defeat inflicted by Alexander Nevsky on the Teutonic Knights on the ice of Lake Peipus (1242), the prophecy of the victor, 'He who attacks us with the sword will perish by the sword', which, for seven centuries, was the watchword of the Russians; the crushing of the Teutonic Knights at Tannenberg (Grunwald) in 1410; Frederick's defeat in the Seven Years' War (Jagersdorf, Kunersdorf) which carried the Muscovite troops to Berlin; the failure of the German adventure in Ukraine in 1918.

'We see', Derjavin was to write, 'the Slavonic peoples' hatred of the Fascist invader grow under our eyes. . . . One single front of national revolt unites the Slavs against Hitlerism in the name of the defence of liberty, of political independence, of civilisation and honour'.

2 [1943 -- Anna/yst]

186*
668 •

186*
204

186*
668
575

186*
668

Throughout the year 1944 there was a succession of demonstrations, all striking a similar note. On January 23, the Panslav Committee of Moscow appealed to the Bulgars to join the Serbian, Albanian, and Greek partisans. In Moscow, on February 23, two thousand Slav combatants celebrated the anniversary of the creation of the Red Army. The Polish General, Sigmund Berling, declared that the future of Poland lay 'in the permanent support of the Soviet Union and the common front of the Slavonic peoples'. He dissociated himself from the Polish Government in London, 'who have designs on the liberty of other nations in their desire to sacrifice millions of Ukrainians and White Russians to their own greed'. The 'white-haired' Czech General Ludovit Svoboda prophesied: 'The day is not far off when we shall proudly hoist our flag in Prague the Golden'. The Bulgarian soldiers were once more urged to turn their arms against the Germans: 'Not until they have taken the destinies of the country into their own hands will the patriots perhaps be able to save Bulgaria from terrible disaster'. The meeting implored Czechs to redouble their sabotage. It promised the Poles restitution of 'the centuries-old territory of Western Poland, stolen by the Germans'. It denounced to the Yugoslavs the fratricidal policy 'of the traitors Nedich, Pavelich and Mihailovich'. A special appeal was launched to 'brother Slavs across the Ocean', inviting them to do 'everything in their power to speed up and render more deadly the blows at Hitlerian tyranny'. All the Slavonic peoples were told that their ways would never again diverge; after having crushed the common enemy, they would live in security, liberty, and independence. 'The Slavonic nations have risen up together; they have reared their gigantic form', declared Franciszek Kupez, chaplain to the First Polish Corps.

To commemorate the third anniversary of the national rising, the Yugoslavs living in Russia, in their turn, held a meeting, which was presided over by Bojidar Maslarich. This meeting acclaimed the names of the Yugoslav intellectuals engaged in the Resistance side by side with their doyen, Vladimir Nazor, the Croatian epic bard. A message to Marshal Tito was accompanied with enthusiastic demonstrations; then there was an exchange of views, conducted by a Serb, Stefanovich, a member of the Constituent Assembly; a Montenegrin, Markovich; a

Second World War and the Slav Liberation Front 83

Macedonian, Vlahov; the Slovenes Goustinchich and Ivan Regent; a Bulgarian, Tcherneyov. 186
668 •

Benes, subtle and realistic as usual, in an English newspaper expressed his approval of this propaganda, and the value of this approval lay, not in the personality of the writer, but in the attitude he was long known to have held concerning the problem of Slav solidarity. M. Benes recalled that, 'without the establishment of the Soviet régime in Russia, Poland would never have recovered her independence'. 'The present war', he added, 'is favourable to the settlement of differences outstanding between Poland and the U.S.S.R. as well as between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Whilst preserving their independence and their social institutions, the democratised Slavonic nations—they are democratic by nature—must unite and collaborate in all fields. This union of Slavonic peoples will alone be capable, in future, of neutralising the cruel racial policy consistently pursued by Germany, and thus guaranteeing future peace in Europe and in the world'. 186
*
829

In London, the Slavs in exile also banded together, with a view to common action. Early in 1943, the refugee Slavonic Governments (Polish, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav) formed a 'cultural committee'. Seton Watson, the specialist in the problems of South-East Europe, in a public lecture given in London⁷ thus defined the importance of the conflagration: 'It is the greatest Slavonic war in history. It may well prove decisive for the fate of all the Slavonic nations and their future relations with the Germanic world. . . . The absorption of these nations by Germany would establish that country's hegemony on the continent of Europe; it is therefore as much in the interest of Great Britain as of Russia to go to their assistance'. 186
*
668

A Congress of Slavonic nations met in London on May 25, 1944. The next day a message was read to the Congress from the Slav Committee of Moscow, in which the latter pointed out that Polish troops and Czech military formations were fighting side by side with the Red Army, whilst a Yugoslav unit, trained in Russia, was preparing to join them. They added that the attempts of German propaganda to make the Czechs fall out with the Russians when the latter appeared on their frontiers

⁷ January 12, 1944.

186*
 • 668 had been foiled by the signing of the Soviet-Czech Pact. The message ended with an exhortation to 'unmask the Hitlerian agitators and the political adventurers of the reactionary cliques of exiles who are seeking to disturb the unity of the Slavs'. The Congress, presided over by Seton Watson, was also addressed by Rumanian, Austrian, and Hungarian democrats. It heard speeches by Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, and Poles, and in its turn sent a message of 'fraternity' to the Slav combatants and partisans, especially the Carpatho-Ukraines. We may notice that this term, formerly considered as subversive, had been substituted, on the initiative of the Czech circles in London, for the official designation 'Sub-Carpatho Russia'.

[67] But it was perhaps in America, with its fifteen to sixteen million citizens of Slavonic origin, that Panslav demonstrations attracted most attention. On March 27, 1942, a conference of forty delegates met in New York to prepare the Detroit Slavonic Congress. It was decided to give energetic support to Roosevelt's anti-Hitler policy. The appeal to Slav solidarity has always played its role in American political struggles; when Antoine Cermak, a Czech recently arrived in America, was elected Mayor of Chicago he secured the votes of tens of thousands of naturalised emigrants; many election meetings opened to the strains of the Panslav hymn, *Ei Sloveni!* On the occasion of the Detroit Congress, April 25 and 26, 1942, were declared 'American Slav Days' by the Governor of the State of Michigan. Two thousand delegates—Russians, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, and numerous representatives of the American Trade Union organisations—took part in this Congress, presided over by Mr. Blair Gunther. They resolved to help the military and 'underground' operations by spying out the movements of the 'fifth column'. 'Our relatives, our fatherlands have been plundered, ruined, destroyed. We do not wish America to suffer the same fate, and we are going to avenge our fatherlands'.

At the pro-Soviet meeting in Philadelphia, Jan Mazaryk, Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs, addressed more than fifteen thousand people. In Chicago in July, 1942, thousands of Americans of Slavonic descent celebrated the 532nd anniversary of the defeat of the Teutonic Knights at Tannenberg; they heard a message from President Roosevelt read to them, concluding as follows: 'We will crush the tyrant, we will purge your fathers'

Second World War and the Slav Liberation Front 85

countries and bring peace and liberty to men'. In the following September the Slav delegates to the Washington Congress of anti-Fascist Students passed a resolution calling upon their Anglo-American comrades to bring pressure to bear on their Governments with a view to opening a second European Front. In April, 1943, the Central Committee of the Congress of Slavs in America, sitting at Chicago, declared that if efforts were not made to crush Germany quickly, 'there will be nothing left to liberate but cemeteries'. They organised a 'Panslav Day' for June 22, and demanded the re-establishment of free circulation for Slav newspapers in Brazil.

Needless to add, there were reactionary or dissident movements, and certain Slav groups maintained contacts with the pro-Axis Governments, or pursued an anti-Soviet policy.

Their case was raised at the Congress of Slavs in America, which was held in Pittsburg on January 24, 1944, and was attended by seventy-five delegates from New York, Buffalo, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Saint-Louis, and even from Canada. This Congress studied reports on the activities of a hundred local committees during the year 1943. The chief subject for discussion was the attitude of the Committee of Americans of Polish Origin, of which Colonel Matuszewsky was the head, and of their newspaper, *Nowy Swiat*, which was unanimously censured. Then the Congress applauded a resolution approving Roosevelt's war policy as well as the Teheran, Moscow, and Cairo agreements. A second meeting was held in Pittsburg on September 23 and 24. Like the previous one, its chief object was to create a 'Slavonic electoral front' in favour of Roosevelt's candidature, to speed up the American war effort,⁸ and to combat the action of the Matuszewsky Committee, a Polish breach in Slav solidarity. (The Congress of Americans of Polish Origin held in Buffalo in the preceding month had included this action on its agenda.)

* * *

A few months earlier, the Poles in America had been deeply moved by a strange episode, the journey of Father Stanislas Orlemanski to Moscow. This unassuming priest, of Polish

⁸ The sale of bonds for the Fourth American War Loan by the Slav Committee of New York served to build, among other things, a bomber, 'The New York Slav', and a chaser, 'Spirit of Stalingrad'.

186*
668 •

648
793
159

Second World War and the Slav Liberation Front 87

seeking to encourage the Church in her traditional opposition to the Soviets. But the *Post Dispatch* regretted that the Kremlin should have chosen such an unimportant person as Orlemanski for such a demonstration. The *Louisville Courier* deplored the censure passed on this priest by his bishop; no doubt the latter tolerated disparagement of the Soviet Union, but not efforts to understand it.

The truth seems to be that Father Orlemanski's initiative, whether concerted with Moscow or not, aroused in Slavonic circles reactions calculated to handicap the Government and prejudice Roosevelt's electoral campaign. While the Slavonic Committee of America approved this initiative, the *émigré* Poles threatened to launch a campaign which would have brought Washington and Moscow into opposition. It happened that Orlemanski's superiors were of Irish origin—which, obviously, did not predispose them to regard his journey with a favourable eye. In any case, the episcopal decision and the priest's submission cut short any attempts at propaganda, thus rendering a very opportune service to the Government, but postponing or compromising the perspective of a possible easing of the situation, if not of a *rapprochement* between Poland and the Soviets, and between the Soviets and the Vatican.

In Latin America the headquarters of the permanent Slav Committee were at Montevideo, where, in April, 1943, three hundred and ninety-four Slav delegates assembled at a Congress which established the Union of Slav Nationals (they were estimated at two millions), to organise the struggle against pro-Hitlerian activities.

* * *

This sketch of the recovery of the Slavs in the Old World and the New brings out two features: the gravitation of all the Slavonic nations round the Muscovite colossus, and the repugnance of a sector of Polish opinion to this method of regrouping.

As was to be anticipated, German propaganda affected to see in this the execution of a plan tending to 'Bolshevise' Europe, and even America. Germany again launched her old common-places about the inferiority of the Slavs. A Radio-Paris broadcast (February 21, 1943) assured listeners 'that about one-quarter of the American population is composed of Slavonic elements, of

Second World War and the Slav Liberation Front 91

When the collapse came, all these nations turned against an aggressor who had not only trodden their sovereign rights under foot, but even violated their consciences. The Governments which had been at his beck and call were either handed over to popular justice, or taken along with the baggage of the defeated army. On September 7, 1944 Bulgaria broke with the Reich; a few days later the Pavelich Government was dispersed; Slovakia gradually passed under the control of the partisans; Belgrade was occupied by the Tolbukhin army on the following October 20, the day that Tito liberated Ragusa. In the last few weeks of 1944 the map of war operations reflected the real political positions of the Slavonic world, based on Soviet victory. 'Fraternal union with Russia is one of the most deeply-rooted sentiments of the Slavonic peoples', declared King Peter of Yugoslavia in a communiqué dated from London on January 11, 1945.

Within this Slavonic world, relations were entering upon a new phase. They were ceasing to be a speculation of the learned world, a poet's dream, a field for sentimental outpourings. They had become a reality of international life. The resisting elements in the Slavonic community had at first represented a complete range of specimens of the struggle against oppression—the Czech's masked militancy, the Poles' street-fighting, Serbian guerrilla warfare, Bulgarian terrorism. They had made contact, concerted their action. Early in 1945 it was possible to speak of a 'Slavonic Front', a thing unknown to history. Something had changed in the destiny of the Slavs. The representative of Pavelich's Croatia accredited to the Vichy Government was one day lunching with some French ministers. He went so far as to say, in an expansive moment: 'All the same, the time has come to give the Slavs their place in the sun!'

A very unexpected remark in the mouth of the envoy of an Axis Government, and, moreover, an envoy who had officially repudiated his ethnical ties.¹² It passed unnoticed by the guests, who were not very well acquainted with the historical laws of European evolution; but it revealed the depth and unanimity of the Slavs' faith in a revival of their fortunes as the result of the Second World War.

¹² It should be noted that the visit to France of Croatia's 'diplomatic' representatives seems to have inspired them with a clearer feeling of realities. The first of them, Kokotovich, went to Switzerland, whence he sent a letter to the French Foreign Minister, begging him not to pay any attention to what his successor did. Moreover, the latter, Krenik, joined Kokotovich in Switzerland a few months later.

186*
648
727186*
668 •

Russia as Arbiter of the Slavonic Nations 93

'Young Brigade', and by the predominance of the 'social' over the 'political' and even over the 'national'. 177
64

This revolution was in the logic of events; was there any need to invoke the ascendancy or the presence of Russia to explain it? On emerging from an upheaval unprecedented in their history, the little nations, stupefied by the blow and completely helpless, saw their recent past only as error or treason. 177
18
181

We cannot even reproach Russia with having bound up her action with a policy of patronage or aimed at an ideological synchronisation of the régimes born on the territories she had liberated. In Hungary, for example, she was very careful not to recreate the atmosphere of the time of Bela Kun, whose sinister memory, she found, was still alive.

But, in the Slavonic countries, the parties of the extreme Left, almost everywhere identified with the Resistance, took advantage of the presence and the prestige of Russia in order to get into power and stay there. This led to a misunderstanding which, by associating the Russian authorities with the Governments which they were believed to favour, risked one day exposing the popularity of the Soviet Union in these countries to a turn in the tide of internal politics. 662

Obliged henceforth to gravitate in the orbit of the powerful Russian State, the Slavonic nations could not consider the future from the same angle as they had done in 1918. At the conclusion of a devastating war, Russia would never again allow neighbouring States to serve as a diplomatic or military jumping-off ground for a possible adversary. She regarded them as her security ramp. 186*
829

One might be tempted to see in this Muscovite hold over Eastern Europe a revolution of an international order. In truth it was a revolution only in relation to an abnormal state of affairs—that of the 1920–1940 period, which rested on Russia's inertia in Europe. It could not reasonably be expected that this state of affairs would last indefinitely. The Europe of 1945 was more logical than that of 1918—at any rate, more in conformity with the classic play of international forces. 648

The slogan of Slav solidarity, which formed the *leit-motiv* of the Moscow Congresses of 1942–1944, had galvanised and co-ordinated the movements for resistance to the invader. In 186*
668 •
000

*The World of the Slavs*186*
• 668

In 1945 it became the common denominator of the foreign policy of the liberated States which were more directly subject to Russian influence, i.e., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria. But the international personality of those States and their liberty of action will never again be what they were between the two wars. Is it necessary to quote the opinion of the leading Slavisers of the nineteenth century to remind readers that, outside Russia, the idea of Slav solidarity has always excluded the domination of one people over the others, and that, in popular terminology, it has never been expressed otherwise than by the word 'fraternity'? That is why we have known men who, avowedly attached to the Slavonic *mystique* but not prepared to admit that this may become a predominantly political policy, were obliged to choose between conformity and exile, and disappeared from public life.

In their innermost hearts the Governments were not far from believing that this *mystique* had exhausted its virtue and could not contribute much to the rebirth of political and social life that the Russian presence infused into them. Slavism had not played the role in unleashing this war that it had assumed in the previous war. Stalin had not drawn the sword for the Czechs in 1938, nor for the Poles in 1939, as Nicholas had done in 1914 for the Serbs. It was not against the oppressor of Slav nationalities, incarnated in 1914 by the Dual Monarchy, in 1938 by the Reich, that Russia had risen. It was against a design which aimed at overthrowing the structure of the world.

But how could one forget the great Panslav Assemblies of the war years? How gloss over the fact that Stalin, forsaking Lenin's anti-racial determinism, had reintroduced the words 'Slav' and 'Russian' into the official terminology of the régime? Finally, how overlook that intuitive reflex that assigns to Slavism, in international life, a place analogous to that of the proletariat in social life?

Then, too, the idea of Slav solidarity had an unacknowledged advantage. It allowed the leaders of the liberated countries to disguise under the appearance of fraternal solidarity the state of dependence to which they were doomed by the new Eastern equilibrium.

Russia was indeed the arbiter of the Slavonic world, but of a Slavonic world condemned to model its ideology on her political

Russia as Arbiter of the Slavonic Nations 95

mediatisation. In the past, Slavism had mobilised more feeling ^{186*} than will-power, animated more Congresses than Crusades. It ⁶⁶⁸ now reassumed the academic, 'poet and professor' form it had exhibited a hundred years earlier.

So that Russia's first acts as a liberating power were ^{186*} not particularly Slavonic. In virtue of the ethnical principle, ⁶⁶⁸ exercised in her own favour, she annexed to the Ukraine ⁷²³ Carpatho-Ruthenia, which had been a Civilisation Front for another Slavonic power—Czechoslovakia. As far as Poland was concerned Russia drew the logical advantages of her victory. Poland's annexation of Prussia's Eastern Marches was simply compensation for the amputations she suffered in favour of the Ukraine and of White Russia. The support discreetly given by Moscow to the Bulgaro-Yugoslav claims on Aegean Macedonia reflected less concern for Slav solidarity than the desire to liberate the outlet from the Straits.

The award of the Teschen Basin, once more disputed between Poland and Czechoslovakia, provided Russia with a very delicate arbitration task, in which the necessity for compensating the sacrifices demanded of the Poles weighed more heavily than the memory of Czech fidelity; had not Czechoslovakia, for ten years, been considered as the 'aircraft-carrier' of Soviet military power?

In reality—and a large dose of ingenuousness was required in order to believe that it could ever be otherwise—the territorial changes over which the Russians presided were all inspired by Russian interests, in the historical and traditional sense of the word.

* * *

Let us briefly recall the evolution of the Slavonic peoples ⁶⁴⁸ immediately after their liberation. ¹⁷⁵

Poland was, during the war, represented by a Government-in-exile in London, which negotiated with the Allies, to whom they gave valuable military assistance. In Moscow this Government was regarded as 'reactionary' and incompatible with a policy of good Polish-Sovietic relations. So it was constantly attacked by the Russian leaders and the Russian press. [824]

As long as the war was conducted outside Polish territory, London and Washington classed this dispute with those that are

725 with 'Great Serbian' and 'reactionary' tendencies. Subsequently
 648 a much more serious charge was made against him; carried away
 175 by his struggle against the Communist elements, he was said
 to have parlied with the Occupying Authorities and with the
 agents of Nedich, the Serbian 'Quisling'. General Mihailovich
 was nevertheless the War Minister *in partibus* to the London
 Cabinet, where the accusations brought against him were never
 seriously considered until Churchill¹ echoed them. They were
 the basis of the case brought against his partisans in July, 1945,
 and the severe sentence passed against them.

[829]

Then there was, between the London Government and the
 'Tito Movement', the psychological opposition between the
 exiled politicians (except those of Czechoslovakia) and the
 insurgents, who, remaining within the country, risked their lives
 day in and day out. The latter were inclined to see the 'London
 people' as theorists, if not profiteers of the Resistance, who, in
 assured comfort and relative security, carried out a paid task
 with the pen or by radio.

• [618]

Finally, Tito's partisans merged, in many cases, with the
 Communist or extremist elements, for whom the old Yugoslav
 political formations and their staffs embodied a régime of
 despotism, patronage, and reaction, whose return to power would
 have constituted an historical retrogression.

643
661
648
175

However, the break did not come immediately. Although
 King Peter agreed, under pressure from the Allies and especially
 from Russia, to disown Mihailovich, he showed greater hesitation
 in negotiating with Tito, whose republican trend and attachment
 to the Soviet régime were well known.

On June 16, 1944, he resigned himself, rather against his
 convictions, to authorising Choubachich to sign an agreement
 with Tito, which provisionally safeguarded the rights of the
 Crown. On the following November 1 he agreed to the forma-
 tion of a National Union Government in liberated Yugoslavia.
 But he reserved his approval as to the nomination of a Regency
 and the exercise of political power by one single party, the
 National Liberation Front, until a Constituent Assembly should
 have met. On this point he even entered into conflict with his

¹ 'General Mihailovich, I regret to say, has gradually adopted a changed
 attitude, and certain of his leaders have parlied with Italian or German
 troops'. (Speech in the House of Commons on February 22, 1944.)

The World of the Slavs

175 in the Bolshevik Revolution, and distinguished himself in the
 643 attack on the Kremlin. He fought on all the Soviet fronts, from the Caucasus to Finland. He married a Russian, who died, leaving him a son of Soviet nationality (who, for his part in the defence of Moscow in 1941, was to win the title of 'Hero of the Soviet Union').

He returned to Croatia in 1924 and took his place as a militant in the Communist and Trade Union ranks. Arrested for illegal propaganda, he served four years' imprisonment. As soon as he was liberated he went to Paris, travelled in various European countries, and returned to France in 1936, charged with the organisation of the so-called 'railway' for supplying volunteers to the International Brigades in Spain.

When he learned of the capitulation of Yugoslavia in 1941, he returned to Zagreb and launched a summons for a general revolt. He had two interviews with Mihailovich, but the Communist and Proletarian ideology which he openly professed frightened the Serbian general—no basis for agreement was possible.

175 The Serbian rising began on July 7, 1941. On that day was
 643 constituted, in the region of Belgrade (the seat of the partisans'
 • 668 general staff), the first formation destined to embark upon the struggle with the invader and to continue it until he was crushed. Tito proved to be an irresistible organiser and 'live wire'; his influence grouped around him a veritable army, whose numbers increased daily, and constantly deprived the Occupying Authorities of food supplies and communications.² Starting with 35,000 men, Tito's army was to number 700,000 at the liberation. This epic is one of the most glorious pages in the history of the Yugoslav people—and they already possess not a few.

175 Not only did Tito enjoy the confidence of the Russians, who
 643 considered him as one of themselves, but he was in constant
 643 touch with the Allies. The first English mission reached him on May 27, 1943, during its fifth offensive. At the very end of 1943 Churchill placed his son with Tito, to assist him during the most

² At Bihach, on November 27, 1942, he declared: 'Our country is enslaved, our people the victims of a fruitful terror. Barefoot, starving, bloodless, they are at the mercy of the occupiers and their acolytes. But their determination to live is unshakeable, because they believe in victory'.

*The World of the Slavs*186*
829

create an indissoluble union of Slavs which will be a bulwark against the repetition of catastrophes similar to that of 1941'.^a

On October 2, addressing a group of Polish journalists, Tito used the expression 'Slavonic era'. But this expression must be understood in a constructive, not an imperialist sense. 'United spiritually, the Slavs form a barrier against medieval [sic] ideas directed against culture and humanity. . . . The Slavs will bring peace and security to Europe'.

There were the same oratorical outpourings among the Bulgars. Kimon Gheorgiev's programme included 'a cordial friendship with the Soviet Union and an eternal friendship with the sister nation of Russia'. Nikolov, President of the Slav Committee in Sofia, also protested against the legend of Slavonic imperialism, but announced a 'union of the Slavonic peoples for the protection of their liberty and of their independence'.

[795]

In the same spirit the Bulgars, walking hand in hand with Tito's Yugoslavia, affected an ostentatiously detached attitude to the question of Macedonia. They abolished the schism caused by the Exarchate, which had been created solely for the purpose of propaganda on behalf of annexation. Formerly the Macedonians were divided into Orthodox (Serbs) and Exarchists (Bulgars). Once this distinction was abolished, Bulgaria could, according to international circumstances, proclaim her disinterestedness or extend her claims to Macedonia.

[648]

The Slavonic Governments backed one another's reciprocal claims. Marshal Tito approved the Czech policy with regard to the Hungarian minorities; Poland and Czechoslovakia handed to the London Conference notes supporting the Yugoslav territorial claims, which ran counter to those of Italy. Bulgars and Yugoslavs conducted a joint campaign against Greece regarding Aegean Macedonia.

• [668]

There was another manifestation of this general fraternisation. A Slav Congress was held in Bratislava in July, 1945. It passed a motion favouring the conclusion of a regional pact of friendship and mutual aid among all the Slavonic nations. The speakers indulged in striking forecasts of the possible effect, in international life, of a bloc of 205 million Slavs, i.e., one-third of the total population of Europe, covering two-thirds of its surface.

^a Speech made at Bela Turka on July 8.

Chapter Six

THE SLAVONIC WORLD AND THE PEACE TREATIES

186*
• 668 THE negotiation of the peace treaties, which occupied the whole of 1946, was both a testing-time for the solidarity of the Slavonic States, faced with international problems, and the period of their internal consolidation.

In an article published on February 3, 1947, by *Pravda*, the Russian Professor Voznesensky, Vice-President of the Panslav Committee, defined these two aspects of the post-war period for Slavs.

'The present Slav movement has no precedent in history. Our peoples have undertaken two main tasks. The first is the struggle against the traces of Fascism and the struggle for peace against political reaction. The second consists in a fraternal collaboration in the political, economic, and cultural domains, the bases of development and progress for any country'.

During this 'second phase' of the post-war period, demonstrations of Slav solidarity were to be based on two watch-words:—

(1) An almost ritual affirmation of gratitude and attachment to Soviet Russia.

(2) The external 'democratic' and 'pacific' aim of this solidarity—hence the strict avoidance of the words 'race' and 'bloc'.

In the diplomatic field the unity of view of the Slavonic peoples followed from an elementary postulate—the collapse of Teutonic power, a collapse with which their common security was bound up.

186*
648
726 That is why, on April 25, 1946, the eve of the opening of peace negotiations by the meeting in Paris of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the four Great Powers, the Diplomatic Editor for the Moscow Radio, Yermachov, thought it well to recall that the struggle against Teutonism was the common denominator of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. and of the other Slav peoples:—

The Slavonic World and the Peace Treaties 129

Solidarity between Slavs in Europe and those in America
 among whom the attitude of a part of the population, Polish in origin, maintained a dangerous schism—was revived by a mission sent to Moscow, at the end of 1946, with M. Leon Krycky, Leader of the United States Panslav Congress, as its President; he was received by Stalin. The latter is reported to have declared to him that the Soviet Union and the United States were the only two countries capable of guaranteeing world peace. This was the outcome of the Third Congress of Slavs in North America (held in New York on the previous September 23), during which the meeting had cheered the name of Stalin and booed that of Mr. Byrnes, who had recently, in Stuttgart, made a speech reopening the question of Poland's western frontiers.¹ At this meeting the Polish delegate, M. Lange, emphasised the role the Slavs could play as permanent links between the United States and their countries of origin. But this American-Slav Congress failed in its task; prepared during the Roosevelt era, but actually meeting under the Truman administration, it functioned in a very different atmosphere from that which its organisers had anticipated. It was vigorously attacked by a section of the American press.

186*
 668°
 575

After a preparatory Conference of the Panslav Committees, held in Prague in May, 1946, the first great post-war Panslav Congress took place at the Kolarats University, in Belgrade, from December 8 to 12 of the same year. It was attended by delegates from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, the Serbs of Lusatia, and the Slavs of North America.

Its organisers made very marked efforts to prevent the Congress from assuming the aspect of a demonstration of Slav nationalism. On the contrary, they emphasised the benefits which could accrue to the cause of peace and universal democracy from harmony among the Slav States. Consequently the agenda was restricted to very general questions, bound up with cultural propaganda and the struggle against Fascism. Alexander Gundorov, President of the Moscow Panslav Committee, and a veteran of these assemblies, declared that 'the Congress would reveal to the world the truth about the Slavonic peoples and destroy the lies propagated by reactionary circles

¹ This Congress gave rise to a diplomatic incident, arising out of the refusal of the American visa to eight Yugoslav delegates who owed allegiance to the Communist Party. 648

186*
• 668 in Europe and in America'. And in the Belgrade newspaper, *Politika*, M. Stankovich, President of the Serbian Assembly, showed still greater discretion: 'Only the enemies of democracy could see in this meeting of Slavonic countries a manifestation tending to the creation of a Slav bloc, or an attempt to separate East and West'.

Marshal Tito, supported by Marshal Tolbukhin, the Metropolitan of Kiev, Mgr. Nicolai, and the President of the Yugoslav Assembly, Ivan Ribar, opened the Congress. 'The Slavs', he said, 'have a mission, but not a mission to create a bloc. Yet the time has come to decide that they shall never again be divided against one another'. A message from Stalin, on the same lines, was read. The *leit-motiv* of the speeches was the merit of the Slav peoples in the triumph of democracy, and their contribution to universal civilisation.

In short, the eloquence of the Congressists did not go beyond a speculative exchange of views; it avoided drawing too much attention to the agreement of views between the small nations and Moscow.

[175]

Nearly a hundred years had elapsed since the Prague Congress of 1848. By a curious trick of fate, over both these demonstrations of Slav solidarity, at a hundred years' interval, Russia exercised unopposed control. Great as was the opposition between the ideas of the Slavophiles and those of the Congressists of 1946, both Assemblies, with the same pride, saw their work as a threat to reaction—Austro-German reaction in 1848 and Western reaction in 1946.

The Congress organised the strengthening of economic and cultural relations between the Slav States. It formed a permanent Liaison Committee to sit in Belgrade.

[208]

The press in the Slavonic countries gave enthusiastic reports of these assemblies. In general, newspapers in the other countries were very reserved in their comments. On December 17 the *Manchester Guardian* recalled the century-old vision of a Slovak poet, a vision of the Slavs united in a powerful body with Russia as the head, Poland the trunk, Bohemia the arms, Serbia the legs. 'The new Panslav movement has arisen out of a common struggle against the invader. If it fosters the community feeling on the human plane, it may do good. If it tries to establish itself in the political domain, it will fail, as in the past'.

The Slavonic World and the Peace Treaties 131

A sceptic might have observed that, despite the oratorical manifestations of harmony and goodwill, three specifically Slav problems which had arisen in 1919 still appeared on the agenda of questions at issue in 1946—the allocation of the Teschen Basin, the definitive status of Macedonia, the fate of the Lusatian Serbs. 186* 668 •

Indeed, the Macedonian question does not seem to have been finally settled by the creation of a Macedonian Republic within the framework of the Yugoslav Federation. That is why, at the end of 1946, Yugoslav newspapers demanded the incorporation of the Bulgarian districts (Petrich, Gornya-Djumaia, Nevrekop) in the Popular Republic of Macedonia, and reproached the new Bulgarian constitution with submitting every project for the transfer of territory to the decision of the legislature—a step which Belgrade considered as a stipulation derogatory to the 'Macedonian minority's' right to self-determination.² In other words, in Yugoslavia the Macedonian population of Bulgaria was still considered as non-Bulgarian in character. Latent, but still discernible, it was the old quarrel which had, for half a century, set the two peoples in opposition to each other. It was recalled in the Sobranje on December 12, by an Agrarian Deputy, who asked the Government whether it did not consider the Yugoslav claims as an interference in Bulgarian Home Affairs. And early in 1947 a much-talked-of action brought at Skopje plainly pointed to the survival of the famous ORIM (Macedonian Internal Revolutionary Organisation) directed by Vanka Mihailov—that organisation which had been so widely discussed at the conclusion of the previous war. 563 578 648 175

² An action which the French Press Agency described (on January 27, 1947) as 'typically Macedonian' was brought against Albanians, Yugoslavs of Albanian or Turkish origin and 'real Macedonians', accused of having organised, in 1945, an illegal society—*National Chiptare Demokratia*—to overthrow the Albanian Government of Enver Hodja and set up a 'Great Albania', including a part of Western Macedonia, with Kosovo and Metova. The conspirators were in league with Mihailov's Revolutionary Committee—the famous ORIM (Macedonian International Revolutionary Organisation), whose hand had already been detected in a separatist Macedonian plot which had been judged in November 1946. In this plot was involved no less a person than Metodijé Andorov Cento, one of the most popular figures among the Macedonian 'partisans' and, up to the spring of 1946, President of the Macedonian Liberation Assembly. Cento was sentenced to eleven years' hard labour. Decorated by Tito, he was in opposition to the Government, criticising its Communist affiliations, and in conflict with Lazar Koulichevsky, Prime Minister of the Macedonian legislature. [68]

194

*The World of the Slavs*666
175

98.89 per cent (110,180 blank votes), the electors having no other option than to vote for the 'Front' or to register a blank vote.

185
175

Faithful to the guidance of Benes, Jean Masaryk and Ripka, the Third National Front Government, presided over by Gottwald, endeavoured to secure the triumph of a policy of equilibrium between East and West, between Liberalism and Marxism. 'In our country', declared Benes, 'under the pressure of the masses, Communism has become national.'

648
175

The first signs of Soviet pressure were seen when, after the Czech Cabinet had decided, in July, 1947, to accept an invitation to attend the Paris Conference for the application of the Marshall Plan, it was forced, on orders from Moscow, to withdraw its acceptance.

[578]

The final crisis was reached in February, 1948. An exceedingly violent press campaign was launched against Vaclav Nosek, Minister of the Interior, as the result of a purge which followed the discovery of illegal arms deposits. The Communist Party accused the National Socialists (Beres Party), the Popular Democrats and the Slovak Democrats of attempting to constitute an 'anti-Communist bloc' within the Government, and of paralysing the legislative power of the National Assembly. Tension reached its peak with the approach of the elections, then fixed for April 11, 1948.

• 668
642
175

The partisans of obedience to Moscow centred their efforts around the nucleus of the police and the trade union organisations. A 'Central Action Committee' was established, to back up, by mass movements, the offensive led by President Gottwald and his Communist colleagues against the moderate section of the Government. On February 20, 1948, the Ministers belonging to the three incriminated parties resigned. The Marxists held demonstrations in the streets; a political strike was declared on February 4, and the Congress of Works' Committees demanded the removal of the 'reactionaries'. President Benes, taken unawares by the suddenness of this attack, rejected the idea of a Government of Civil Servants and, on February 25, he formed a new National Front Ministry, with Gottwald as President, Gapotocki as Vice-President, Jean Masaryk at the head of Foreign Affairs. The Communists secured entire control of this Cabinet, which was in favour of unconditional collaboration with the Soviet Union. The opposition was reduced to

Slav Solidarity Breaks Up

195

helplessness; Benes capitulated before Gottwald's ultimatum. 668 •
 It was the end of the Putsch which Hubert Ripka later described 642
 as a 'prefabricated revolution'. On March 9¹ Jean Masaryk, 175
 Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote a personal letter to Stalin, in [56]
 which he denounced the intervention of Zorine, the Soviet [286]
 Ambassador, in the events of February: 'When a time of mortal
 danger for the country, and for all Slavs, comes, you will have
 in Prague nothing but a Government hated by the country,
 despised by the *élite*, and relying entirely on the bayonets of its
 police organisations'. The next day Masaryk committed suicide:
 contradictory versions of his death were circulated, although the
 above-mentioned letter had made clear his intention of ending
 his life.

Thus the inspirer of two Czech liberations, heir to the 186*
 thought of Thomas Masaryk, disappeared in shameful oblivion;
 the commentaries in the Communist press, in which he was later
 accused of having betrayed the interests of the country, lead us
 to wonder whether his inglorious end did not save him from an
 even more tragic fate. Posterity will pronounce a mixed
 judgment on his political achievement. His tomb might
 fittingly have been engraved with this epitaph, taken from
 one of his books (*Whither the Slavs?*): 'The existence and the
 prosperity of all the Slav States is inseparably bound up with a
 régime of true democracy, that is to say, a régime in which the
 elementary principles of individual liberty, liberty of conviction,
 liberty of religion, liberty of political expression and liberty of
 public opinion, are guaranteed and fully respected'.

As for Benes, whose authority was henceforth without scope, 175
 on June 7, 'for health reasons' he resigned his presidential [643]
 office, which he had held since June 19, 1946, in a message by
 which he invited his fellow-citizens 'to encourage liberty and
 consciously enjoy it'. He died a few months later, on
 September 3, 1948.

The events of February were to be mentioned at the United
 Nations Security Council, with a view to appointing a commis-
 sion of inquiry—which was opposed by a Soviet veto (May 24).

On March 9, 1948, was voted the Constitution which made 642
 Czechoslovakia a 'democratic peoples' republic'. It instituted a 175
 Single House system, and proclaimed the equality of Czechs 563
 and Slovaks: the republic was to be a bi-national State. Unlike
 1 [1948 - Analyst]

PANSLAVISM

813

plete disaster. He was imprisoned, and Moscow declined the union.

186*
175

Ever since that time Moscow considered herself as the new and unique center of pure orthodoxy, of pure Christianity. When in 1453 Byzantium was invaded, Moscow's prestige became even greater in her own mind. The Muscovite monks, working out a sort of Muscovite historiosophy and formulating the Muscovite political program, gave a very significant interpretation of that catastrophe: Byzantium had been punished by God for the sin of the Union of Florence. And then came the establishment of the theory of the "Third Rome": "Two Romes have fallen, but the third still remains." This third Rome was Moscow.

Thus was established a Muscovite eastern Messianism. This Messianism became more and more universalistic in its scope. The Muscovite tsars began to consider themselves the representatives not only of their own Orthodox world but of the whole Orthodox community in the world and, even more, of pure, unsoiled Christianity in general. Very soon after the fall of Byzantium and the spread of the Turkish invasion in the Balkans, many Serbian and Bulgarian émigrés, intellectuals of those times, arrived in Moscow with all sorts of Bulgarian and Serbian Messianic and imperialistic conceptions and theories, modeled on Byzantium and on Greek and Hebrew texts. Messianistic honey was collected from these Bulgarian-Serbian-Hebraic-Byzantine hives by various monks and old men like Philotheus. There were fantastic genealogies, orthographical mistakes — consciously or unconsciously committed — daring eschatological solutions of such problems as why the world did not come to an end on March 25, 1492, which escape it was supposed to owe to Moscow for not having acceded to the Florentine union. Greek prophetic legends, exploited by Bulgars as well as by Serbs, legends promising victory for the *rusy* (reddish) race, *xanthos genos*, became *ruscky* (Russian) race; and so, as Professor Milyukov stressed, "an orthographical mistake became a source of the Russian imperialistic dreams about Constantinople and the Straits." In a word, ortho-

186*
175
668●
795

186* graphical errors and boundless imagination, fed on Byzantine and
 175 autocratic Imperial doctrines, decided for a long time the style
 ●668 of Russian political thought. Hence, practically, the Moscow
 795 Tsar and later the St. Petersburg Emperor became the head of the
 church of a Byzantine Caesaro-Papist type and assumed the position
 of a Byzantine theocrat. The conception of absolute power coming
 from God, absolute in the universalistic sense, meaning that the
 monarch was the ruler of all material goods as well as of human
 souls, became established in Russia particularly in the fifteenth
 and sixteenth centuries, after the period of the Mongolian yoke
 had excellently prepared the ground for such a conception of
 monarchical power. As the ultimate result of these events Moscow
 represented the type of an Oriental despotism with a tendency
 toward state control characteristic of these organizations
 (especially at the time of the *oprichnina* of Ivan the Terrible
 and later) and the equally characteristic tendency towards
 imperialism based on Byzantine religious and historical
 premises.

175 These bonds with Byzantium became particularly strong after,
 643 and in connection with, the marriage of Ivan III to Sophia
 Paleologus, the Byzantine princess in exile whom Ivan III received
 from Italy. This marriage is also an interesting story. Both Rome
 and Venice were still meditating a war against the Turks in order
 to liberate Byzantium. For the realization of this new, grandiose
 enterprise the help of the already developed might of Moscow
 appeared very desirable. Moscow had succeeded at that time through
 all sorts of belligerent activities and political manoeuvres in
 establishing its predominance among Russian princes and was on
 the eve of liberating Muscovy from the Tartar yoke. Led by
 western political conceptions, Rome and Venice thought that the
 good will of Ivan III could be bought by the offer of the title of
 king, and on the other hand by a marriage with a Byzantine
 princess who after the death of the legitimate heir to the Byzantine
 Empire would become vested with the right to the Byzantine
 throne.

186*
829
177
18
ern world. The Slavs, organized around the holy Orthodox faith and under the leadership of Russian autocracy, based on the strong foundations of the Russian land community, would become a powerful political organization strong enough to bring the Western world to the Russian pale.

186*
178
829
Here we are already in the center of the Russian Panslavistic doctrine. And this is, by the way, the picture of the whole Hegelian road of the Slavophil philosophy of history: thesis, anti-thesis, and synthesis. Chicherin in his profoundly interesting memoirs, mocking the Slavophiles and especially Constantine Aksakov, says: "He (Aksakov) conceived Russian history according to all the rules of Hegel's logic; the old Russia represented the statement, the new—the negation, and the future announced by the Slavophiles was to be the restoration in a superior form of the original statement. This formula could be successfully applied perhaps only to the beard: the beard existed in old Russia, in the new it was shaved, in the future it would be restored."¹¹

As long as the Slavophiles were busy with their national costumes, traditions, orthodox theology, and glorification of the Russian past, they might be considered more or less independent, distinguished, and inoffensive satellites or offshoots of the official national ideology—but satellites and offshoots who confined themselves to the worship of what they considered Russian national traditions. But when they extended their love to other people and their hatred embraced not only Peter the Great but the West, they became involved in political problems. And at this point some of them degenerated into Pan Slavism; besides, some new adherents, acting in the purely political field, joined the Slavophil group. Here again we must take into consideration certain other sources of influence and tradition—this time purely political.

Some of the political conceptions adopted by the Slavophiles appeared earlier—even at the time of Peter the Great and Elizabeth. From time to time conceptions of the liberation of the "Slavic brothers" emerged, but they developed especially strongly,

¹¹ *Vospominaniya B. N. Chicherina*, Moscow, 1926, p. 236.

PANSLAVISM

827

of course, at the time of Catherine II when Russia began the "liberation" of White Ruthenians and Ruthenians from the Poles through the partitions of Poland and finally "liberated" the Poles from themselves. At the time of Alexander I the same conceptions reappeared. V. N. Karazin, a well known liberal of the times of Alexander I, wrote in a memorandum: "Is it possible that the sovereign ruler of free Slavs, the unique protector of the Orthodox Church, can look indifferently upon the sorrow of nations close to them by blood and by religion?" "It is true," says Pypin through whom I quote Karazin, "that Karazin suggested cautious action in order not to offend Austria. But his dreams went very far: he dreamed of the establishment of a 'Slavic Empire' with one of the brothers of Alexander at its head: this empire was, with time, to be extended to the Adriatic Sea in Albania and Macedonia, and on the other side to embrace the southern 'Serbo-Croatian' lands of Austria. . . . This Empire, which would very soon develop and organize, would be bound to the Russian Empire by ties of religion, blood, and thankfulness, and would become Russia's 'storehouse' and natural base for all her activities and relations with Europe and Africa."

The same were the conceptions of other political writers of that time—Bronevsky and General Chichagov. (cf. Pypin, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-79). These conceptions were also discussed in Masonic lodges and even in several lodges of Slavic Unity which had been established in Kiev and in Petersburg. The Russo-Turkish War of 1828 again galvanized these feelings of Slavic solidarity, but this was the time when there began in Russia the great discussions between the Slavophiles and the Westerners—in other words, the time when the Slavophil doctrine started its period of crystallization.

I should like to stress the fact that we must have in mind several important historical dates around which the Panславistic discussion became especially animated. These historical events and dates are: first of all, the Polish Insurrection of 1830-31, the Cracow Insurrection of 1846, the Slavic Congress in Prague in

186*
829
668●186*
175

186* 1848, the Crimean War of 1854-56, the Polish Insurrection of
 175 1863, the Slavic Congress in Moscow in 1867, the time of the
 Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, the period preceding the World
 War of 1914-18 with the so-called Neoslavism and finally the re-
 cent movements organized by Russia in Moscow and in this coun-
 try among the American Slavic population and the Congress or-
 ganized recently, also by Russia, in Belgrade.

2. The Polish Problem

186* The first "set" of the Muscovite Slavophiles was composed of
 ● 668 well-to-do people, people belonging to the Russian landed nobil-
 648 ity; they had estates with serfs, they had fine and rich apartments
 in Moscow. In the beginning they devoted their time either to dis-
 cussions on historical, theological, and literary problems in Mos-
 cow salons or to writings in which they expressed their views.
 And they also manifested these views in a special national type
 of domestic life; they wore peculiar hats and *kaftans*, which very
 often provoked sensations in the streets of Moscow; they ate Rus-
 sian meals and drank Russian vodka. All these details concern-
 ing their private lives and their naïve manifestations of Russian-
 ism are very pleasantly related in the memoirs of Herzen and Chi-
 cherin. At this stage of their development they were rather in-
 nocent and pacific, but they later became strongly intolerant and
 aggressive. Chicherin gives some episodes characteristic of this
 intolerance and aggressiveness. This appears particularly in con-
 nection with the great Slavic and European problem which the
 Muscovite Slavophiles, by the very fate of their doctrine, were the
 first to be called upon to solve. This problem was the Polish one.
 Slavic reciprocity, Slavic sympathy, harmony, regeneration, wars
 for the liberation of the oppressed Slavic nations—all these slo-
 gans, ideas, and initiatives could mean but very little in the face
 of the still bloody Polish nation under the Russian regime. How
 could other Slavs who were outside of Russia trust all the great
 promises given to them by the Russian Slavophiles and later Pan-

PANSLAVISM

829

slavists if these same Slavophiles and Panslavists had no solution ^{186*} for the fate of a Slavic nation which was within Russia? As in ⁶⁶⁸ our days, Poland was a test case, and without a just solution of ⁶⁴⁸ the Polish problem there was no possibility of offering any more or less satisfactory solution for the Slavic problem in its entirety. And just here the whole system broke; and sympathy, justice, and harmony were replaced by pure violence. The usurping character of the whole doctrine and its demagogical essence became obvious in the light of precisely this problem. As a matter of fact, the ⁵³⁸ Slavophiles had a precursor in this field—and a great one. This ⁶⁶⁸ man was Pushkin. And unfortunately he may be considered ide- ⁶⁴⁸ ologically responsible for the direction taken by Russian poli- ^{186*} tical thought toward Russian-Polish relations. The intransigent and even ferocious attitude which Pushkin took at the time of the Polish Insurrection of 1830-31 predetermined the attitude of many generations of Russians toward Poland.¹² His anti-Polish and anti-European odes published immediately after the defeat of the Polish Insurrection could not but create an abyss between Russia and Europe. This historical event was especially tragic because of the fact that its creator was the most outstanding and captivating symbol of Russian Europeanism—a Russian who indeed might be considered the Peter the Great of Russia in the field of her spiritual culture. Pushkin refused to see that Russia's annexations in Poland brought her geographically closer to Europe only at the cost of moral separation. In his odes he expressed not only a violent anti-Europeanism and an aggressive imperialism but also traced the lines for broad Panslavistic, Pan-Russian conceptions. These vociferous odes, belligerent as they were, became a kind of poetical citadel, an arch of triumph under which passed one generation after another of Russian Russifiers and persecutors of Poland as well as all Russian Slavophiles and Panslavists. These odes became a canon, a national catechism, a kind of lasso thrown by the powerful hand of the great Russian

¹²I cannot enter into details of Pushkin's role in this case. I have devoted a special book to it.—*Cf. Pouchkine et la Pologne*, Paris, 1928.

186* poet over the heads of Russian politicians, writers, and poets.
 ●668 From this point of view it would be difficult to evaluate the enor-
 648 mity of the moral disaster achieved by Pushkin. And, as I men-
 538 tioned before, the fact that it was just the great European Rus-
 sian who assumed the responsibility for this makes it particularly
 painful. One has the right to say that had Pushkin taken a differ-
 ent attitude, the fate of Russian-Polish relations and therefore
 partly of Russian-European relations could have been different.
 It is possible, however, that my point of view is too idealistic and
 that I evaluate too highly the importance of poetical texts in the
 life of nations; nevertheless I am not at all certain that I am wrong.
 When examining the works of the Russian Slavophiles and Pan-
 slavists—the Aksakova, Khomyakov, Samarin, Pogodin, Leont'ev,
 Katkov, Danilevsky, Dostoevsky, and even Vladimir Solov'ev
 (whose opinions were in many respects opposite to those of the
 Slavophiles and especially the Panславists), whose views are so
 actual for our own day, one sees how completely Pushkin's poems
 were in accord with the basic tendencies of Russian nationalistic
 historical and political thought, and particularly with its anti-
 Polish aspects. As a matter of fact, the sources of the historic,
 philosophic, and religious inspirations of the Slavophiles were quite
 different; Pushkin had nothing to tell the Slavophiles in this sphere.
 Yet it is sometimes difficult to resist the impression that they had
 him in mind and that his "anti-Polish trilogy" was a sort of poet-
 ical noose cast over Russian political thought, the coils of which
 bound even the most courageous and the most spirited.¹³ It ap-
 peared that the Muscovite Slavophil system was unable to find
 any solution for the Russian-Polish problem which would harmon-
 ize with the general conception of Slavic unity. The Slavophil
 systems, both Russian and Polish (to which I shall come later),
 failed to produce anything positive and creative: the Russo-Polish
 antagonism in these systems could be dissipated only at the ex-
 pense of either Russia or Poland; there was no other alternative.
 This applies especially to the Russian side—to Aksakov, who in

¹³ Cf. my article "Poland and the Slavophil Idea," as mentioned above.

PANSLAVISM

831

the presence of foreigners preferred not to speak of this "family quarrel," and to Pogodin, who, forgetting the ethnographic frontiers of Great Russia, attempted to enclose Poland within ethnographic and "democratic" lines. In Pogodin's opinion the latter boundaries were soon destined to disappear, since the only obstacle to an alliance with Russia lay in the Polish gentry, of "mixed Celtic and Latin origin," which should be destroyed by the Russian government with all possible speed. Aksakov used similar arguments in regard to the old Polish frontiers, while both Strakhov and Katkov attacked these frontiers even more vehemently.¹⁴ Samarin saw in "Latin and Catholic Poland" "not only a historical contradiction of Russia but of all the Slav world." According to him Poland, "having become a poisoned sword and an instrument of destruction in alien hands, has received the same poison into her own flesh and blood." Her only salvation lay in union with Russia, which should become "the historical representative of the Orthodox and Slavic element." This would, in Samarin's view, be the triumph of the one cultural view over the other, although he admitted the possibility of Poland's separation from Russia. Aksakov admitted this separation in the same way, prophesying that in such case Poland would be eaten by Germany. But even here we see the break of the Slavophil conception: the Slavophiles indeed did not know what to do with Poland. However, the most characteristic speculations were connected with the analysis of possibilities as to how a real union between Russia and Poland might be realized. The Slavophiles were sure that the only obstacle between Poland and Russia was the Polish Latinism and Catholicism—in other words the Polish Western civilization. They thought that this civilization did not penetrate to the masses and that only the Polish intelligentsia—the gentry—represented that civilization. Consistently enough, they advocated the liquidation of this class—a liquidation which would bring into the Russian pale the amorphous masses of the Polish peasantry. This was

¹⁴ The case of Strakhov, however, was less simple in this circumstance. Cf. my article "Russian Polish Cultural Relations," *New Europe*, New York, 1944.

186¹ the liberation and regeneration which the Muscovite Slavophiles
 ● 668 were trying to secure to the enslaved Polish nation. The whole
 648 armament of their arguments and weapons may be found in the
 829 writings of Aksakov, Pogodin, Samarin, Leskov, Danilevsky, and
 Dostoevsky. In the light of the present Slav movements organized by Soviet Russia and in the light of the present extermination of the Polish intelligentsia under Russia's "liberating protection" one may see that the most audacious dreams of the Slavophiles and Panslavists of the nineteenth century are now being realized. The Russian autocracy was not able to use all means of extermination against the Polish spiritual culture because some of the elements of it were attached to a social regime which the Russian autocracy was bound to protect and preserve in Russia itself. From this point of view Stalin's hands are more free, and his policy of Russification might become more efficient in its destructiveness. However, even at the time of Alexander II and Alexander III, in accordance with the plans of the Muscovite Slavophiles and Panslavists the Russian government began certain reforms aiming at the gradual liquidation of the Polish landed gentry through the emancipation of the peasants and through measures favoring the latter at the expense of the former. These reforms would have been entirely justifiable if they had not followed the principle *divide et impera*. Russia was usurping the role of a liberator of the peasants, because the Polish revolutionary national government of 1863 proclaimed the emancipation of the peasants and promised them land without any compensation for the landlords. At this time the Slavophil school became indeed a political one.

And here something very important should be stressed: the Russian democratic and radical groupings were sympathetic to the Poles just because of the democratic character of this insurrection. Such was the attitude of the society *Zemlya i Volya* and of Herzen in his *Kolokol*. They were even trying to prevent the Russian soldiers and officers from fighting against Poles. Herzen at that time published eloquent articles in which he attacked the

PANSLAVISM

833

"patriotic syphilis" which was raging in Russia. The whole of reactionary and nationalistic Russia launched its offensive precisely at this point—the slogan was that the Polish Insurrection was not a national one and that presumably the Polish masses had nothing in common with it. This point of view became the leitmotif of all Katkov's writings, but very soon Aksakov's *Den'* (the organ of the Slavophiles) joined Katkov's *Moskovskiya Vedomosti*. The Slavophil phraseology followed that of the government, and Aksakov as well as Samarin explained the Russian-Polish War of 1863 as a war of Slavs against Latinism, as a war of Russia against the Polish landlords. We may see that history indeed repeats itself. The same slogans were used during this war when it was necessary to abolish the legitimate Polish government in London. Herzen understood this situation very well. On January 1, 1864 he wrote in his *Kolokol* as follows: "Having grasped here and there some vague ideas about the social mission of Russia and about her lack of any solid aristocratic principle, our sweet dreamers preach that Russia represents some sort of democratic empire, some sort of kingdom of *equality* and masses, that *she* fights with Poland in the name of the freedom of the peasants against the landlords, etc. Do not be mistaken. . . ."¹⁵

Sumner in his excellent book *Russia and the Balkans* (Oxford, 1937) brings very correct comments to this development: "The Polish revolt of 1863 unleashed century-old hatred and fears. In the years which followed, the old 'Congress Poland' was mercilessly dragooned within the framework of the administration common to Russia proper while the 'Western Lands' Lithuania, White Russia, and the Western Ukraine were subjected to every measure of Russianism. Meanwhile a campaign was initiated of the same nature in the Baltic provinces and Bessarabia; and, to show without mistaking that Russian meant Great Russian alone, the Little Russian or Ukrainian cultural revival of that time was successfully attacked by Moscow, above all by the prohibition in 1876 of the use of the Ukrainian 'dialect' for any academic or

¹⁵ *Istoriya Rossii v six Vekov*, vol. 3, 2, Lenaky, "Polskoy Vopstanie," p. 322.

186*
668
648
829

186*
175
648

186*
175
648 literary purposes. Symptomatically two of the men most actively associated with this denationalizing, Russianizing policy, were among the most prominent Slavophil or Panslav Muscovites of the day: Prince Cherkassky and Yuri Samarin, a close friend of Aksakov."¹⁶

186*
● 668 Cherkassky, Samarin, and N. A. Milyutin worked at the agrarian reform in Poland, and Cherkassky "distinguished" himself in the campaign for reuniting the Uniates with the Orthodox Church. "Samarin and Cherkassky are significant in the Panslav movement in that, unlike Aksakov or the earlier Slavophiles, and unlike the professorial type, represented by Lamansky, Miller, or Grot, they were active in administration and were well-known public figures. . . . Both men are also, above all, significant as representing the transformation of the idea of Panslavism into that of Panrus-sianism." (*op. cit.*, p. 67) Characteristically enough, Samarin was, besides all the traits mentioned by Sumner, a "considerable theologian," the collaborator of Khomyakov in this field.

186*
812 It is not mere chance that I mention this trait of Samarin's personality. The Slavophil doctrine was from its very beginning deeply rooted in religious thought. The father of the Muscovite school, Ivan Kireevsky, was first of all absorbed by problems of religious and moral categories. Parallel to the pre-Romantics, the Romantics, and the German idealistic philosophers, he was primarily interested in the spiritual structure of the human personality and in the problem of perfecting it. He was fighting for the unity and entirety of the human personality and believed that the superior truth cannot be conceived by rationalism but by the entire spiritual personality in which the factors of feeling and belief were more efficient than reason. M. Gershenzon, in his book, *Istoricheskie Zapiski* (Berlin, 1932), sensationally enough stresses that Kireevsky committed a mistake which became the starting point for the whole Slavophil Doctrine. Milyukov pretends that the century-old Russian trends toward Constantinople and world domination also originated from a mistake—from an orthographic

¹⁶ R. H. Sumner, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

PANSLAVISM

243

ble of historical development and has already risen from infancy. 186*
 However, not all nations are equally capable of historical de- 829
 velopment. There are some whose destiny is to serve as ethno- 814
 graphical material to other stronger and more stabilized nations.
 Those others are God's whips whose mission is to smash from
 the face of the earth the outlived cultures and nations. Danilev-
 sky gives a series of historical cultural types: Egyptian, Chinese,
 Assyrian-Babylonian-Phoenician, Indian, Iranian, Hebrew,
 Greek, Roman, New Semitic, German-Roman or European, and
 finally Slavic with Russia at its head. Each of these types works
 out its own culture, and the principles of the civilization of one
 type are not transferred to another. Various types differ by the
 degree of versatility of their culture. Danilevsky sees four spheres
 of cultural-historical activity: the religious, the strictly cultural,
 the political, and the social-economic. No one of the listed cultural-
 historical types developed all of these four spheres of activity at
 once, with the exception of the Slavs and Russians, whose mis-
 sion will be to accomplish a complete 'four-principled' culture."²⁵

The road to that Russian predominance is a purely nationalistic 186*
 one; and, neglecting any declamation on Russian religiosity and 829
 other well known features of the Russian character as presented 668 ●
 in the writings of the Slavophiles and abandoning all ideas about
 brotherhood and universal love, he brutally opens the door into
 the great future of Russia. Russia is destined for that future, but
 the road to it leads first of all to Constantinople and secondly to
 the emancipation of the Slavic nations. I shall not bring to the
 fore all his violent criticism applied to "rotten Europe." The
 Russian anti-Westernism here reached its climax. The book is
 supported by quasi-scientific arguments taken from anthropology,
 zoology, geology, geography, and the social sciences. It might be
 considered one of the most important scientific manifestos or ra-
 tionalistic Panславic theories. However, the most important im-
 plications of the book are, of course, the political ones. "Being

²⁵ Danilevsky, *op cit.*, and article by V. Myakotin on Danilevsky in the *Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar'*, T-A Granat, vol. 17, pp. 552-557.

186* foreign to the European world because of its internal structure,
 829 and in addition being too strong and powerful to occupy the place
 ● 668 of one of the members of the European family, to be one of the
 great European powers, Russia cannot occupy a place worthy of
 herself and of Slavdom in history other than by becoming the
 chief figure of an independent political system of states and by
 being a counter balance to Europe in its entirety. These are the
 advantages: the utility and the significance of the Panslavic alli-
 ance in its relationship to Russia."²⁶ And this is another progra-
 matic assertion: "Sooner or later, whether we want it or not, the
 fight with Europe (or at least with the greater part of it) is in-
 evitable, and it will be a fight because of the eastern question, that
 is, for the freedom and independence of the Slavs, for the pos-
 session of Tsargrad—for everything which in the opinion of Eu-
 rope represents an object of illegitimate Russian ambition and
 which in the opinion of every Russian worthy of that name rep-
 resents the inevitable demand of Russia's historical mission."²⁷

186* Of course, on his road, Danilevsky fatally met Poland. His
 829 fight in this case was very simple. He liquidated Poland with the
 help of all kinds of historical accusations and political insinua-
 tions. In the same way he destroyed every spiritual cultural tie
 between Russia and Europe. His formula was not at all com-
 plicated, and one cannot really deny that this formula is the key
 to Stalin's present policy. When referring to the theory of poli-
 tical balance he says: "It is not at all difficult to be convinced that
 between Europe and Russia in this as well as in other respects there
 exists a direct and complete contradiction. It is precisely the
 balance of political forces in Europe that is harmful and even
 fatal for Russia; and the disturbance of this balance, from what
 ever side it may come, is advantageous and beneficent."²⁸

After several historical examples, Danilevsky gives the follow-
 ing formula: "At every disturbance of balance Europe is naturally

²⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 437.

²⁷ *Op. cit.*, p. 474.

²⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 486.

186* sels. Lelewel "told him about the primitive democratic Polish
 829 municipality, about the agrarian Slavic collectivity, about broth-
 648 erly institutions and customs distorted later by the class structure
 and the enslavement of people which came from the West. At
 that time he conceived a new goal for himself which was "a Rus-
 sian revolution and a republican federation of all Slavic lands,
 and the establishment of one indivisible Slavic republic, federa-
 tive only as regards administration, and politically centralized."⁵¹
 At that time, under the influence of western European populism
 and socialism on one side and, on the other, of his intimate con-
 tacts with the Polish emigration in Paris, Bakunin started to crys-
 tallize his own Russian populist and revolutionary ideas. The first
 manifestation of these crystallized ideas took place in Paris in
 1847 when he delivered his famous Polish speech at the com-
 memoration of the Polish Insurrection of 1830-31. In this speech
 he attacked Nicholas I, he asserted that the Russian and Polish
 nations must be reconciled, that both were paying for the discord
 introduced by Russian autocracy, and that the Russian revolution
 would bring freedom to both nations. He said that this task could
 be realized only through the Russian-Polish alliance: without the
 liberation of Poland, Russian freedom could not be born. And
 finally he called for the liberation of all Slavic nations in order
 to bring about the final collapse of despotism in Europe.

186* A little more complicated was the atmosphere of the Slavic
 668 Congress in Prague, in which he took part and delivered several
 [575] speeches. At that Congress, as we know, Palacký advocated the
 idea of a Slavic federation with Austria in which the Czechs would
 play the dominant role. This idea was not popular among other
 Slavs, and the atmosphere of the Congress was not at all encour-
 aging.

Bakunin first of all stressed the fact that Russia, by enslaving
 Poland and especially by giving a part of her to the Germans—the
 main enemies of the Slavic race—tore herself away from Slav-

⁵¹ J. Kucharszewski, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 161-162; cf. also V. Polonaky, *M. A. Bakunin*, vol. I, Coa. Ind., 1925, pp. 155-156.

PANSLAVISM

861

dom. She could return to Slavdom only by the liberation of 186^x
 Poland. In this point Bakunin was certainly much more consis- 668 ●
 tent than the Muscovite Slavophiles ever were. On the other hand,
 he tried to warn the Congress against narrow nationalism, against
 hopes attached to the Austrian dynasty as well as against hopes
 attached to the Russia of Nicholas I: "Entering the Russia of
 Nicholas I you would enter a coffin without any national life or
 any freedom." In several articles such as *The Foundations of*
a New Slavic Policy, *The Foundations of a Slavic Federation*,
The Interior Organization of Slavic Nations, and finally in his
Manifesto to the Slavs, he formulated his view on that future
 federation. He dreamt about the abolition of tsardom through
 Russian revolution, which was to be preceded by a Slavic revolu-
 tion. He thought that the Slavs under the leadership of a free
 Russia would fight against Austria, Turkey, Germany, Hungary,
 and even against the whole world if that were demanded by the
 interests of the Slavic Union. This Slavic Union was to contain
 not only Slavic peoples but also the Magyars and Greeks. It would
 be an Eastern world with Constantinople as its capital and it
 would be opposed to the Western world. The political regime of
 the Union would be republican but without a parliament, a dic-
 tatorship would be established especially because of Russia, which
 would be unable to reach a higher level of civilization without
 it.²²

These articles and his manifesto passed without any great effect.
 His striking idea of dictatorship representing a kind of anarchical
 despotism was an idea which obsessed him and which reappeared
 in different forms on many occasions during his life. He even
 admitted that a Russian tsar, Nicholas I or Alexander II, or a gen-
 eral, such as Murav'ev-Armursky or Nicholas Ignat'ev, might be
 a beneficent dictator over the Slavs. The next most important mani-
 festation of Bakunin's Pan Slavism took place after his Siberian
 exile, when in 1862 he published his revolutionary *Manifesto to*
Russian, Polish, and all Slavic friends. As a matter of fact,

²² Polonsky, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-227.

186* he returned in this manifesto to his former ideas—of an agrarian
 ● 668 revolution, of the abolishment of bureaucracy and the privileged
 classes and a federation of Slavic peoples. Characteristically
 enough, and this is what Kucharzewski stresses in his studies on
 Bakunin, Bakunin's relationship to Poland was a very peculiar
 phenomenon. He was attracted by Poles (in Siberia he married
 a young girl of Polish origin), he always spoke very warmly
 in his writings and manifestos to Poles, but on the other hand
 these contacts with Poles each time, just as during his rencontre
 with Lelewel, aroused in him Russian national feelings. I may
 add that in his youth he greatly admired Pushkin's anti-Polish
 odes. When discussing the social structure of the future Slavic
 federation, he strongly stressed the fact that that structure "will
 in no way be different from ours." It is clear enough that his
 manifesto expressing such views on the future of the "Slavs
 liberated by a revolutionary Russia" could not awake great en-
 thusiasm among them.. Hence Bronislaw Zaleski, a distinguished
 Polish émigré, wrote a long answer to Bakunin's manifesto in
 which he said that: "Bakunin wants not only the abolishment
 of despotism but he also wants the destruction of everything
 which existed before, in other words he wants a deluge—and into
 the ark, which would save from this deluge a creative idea for
 mankind, he puts only the Russian village community with its
 common landownership as it had been formed in serfdom. Hence
 any individual property must be abolished forever. . . . How many
 ruins it will be necessary to make in order to prepare that vast
 pasturage—is what the new reformer does not take into con-
 sideration."²⁸

Besides this, Bakunin pushed the Russian frontiers of his federa-
 tion so far into the West that indeed only a very small part of
 Poland would remain as a Polish entity in the Union. The Polish
 periodical *Review of Polish Affairs* ended its analysis of Baku-

²⁸ Kucharzewski, *op cit.*, vol. II, p. 443.

PANSLAVISM

863

nin's manifesto by saying that "Russian revolutionism is, in its consequences for Poland, similar to Russian despotism."⁸⁴

186*
668 •

I shall not enter the further complication of his relations with the Poles, the details of his self-imposed activities in the Polish Insurrection of 1863, nor the mutual deceptions between himself and Poland.

After the Polish Insurrection the Panslavic conceptions played a less important role in the second part of his life with the exception of his program for the Slavic section of the International in Zürich in 1872.⁸⁵

8. Herzen (1812-1870)

Herzen also has some ties with Dostoevsky and these ties are to be found in his critique of the West and in his enthusiasm for the Russian village community which, as we know, was one of the chief objects of admiration of the Muscovite Slavophiles though they first heard of it from the German Haxthausen who in 1845 published his work on his travels in Russia. Herzen's cult of the Russian peasant, his populism, made of him a precursor of *narod-nichestvo*.

186*
829

That evolution was not quite simple—Herzen, before his trip to Europe and stay there, was one of the most enthusiastic Russian Westerners, and he very often opposed the Muscovite Slavophiles. His stay in Europe changed his opinions, and there he became one of the most violent fighters against *l'esprit bourgeois* of the Western civilization. The conception of the dying Western civilization became a kind of obsession with him and against these constantly drawn pictures of the chaos, agony, and disease of Europe suddenly arose in the mind of this former Westerner his Russian and even Slavophil messianism. To Chaadaev's formula that the past of Russia is empty, the present unbearable, and that she has no future, Herzen replied that the "past of the Russian

⁸⁴ Kucharszewski, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 412.

⁸⁵ Cf. Kucharszewski, *op. cit.*, and E. H. Carr, *M. Bakunin*, London, 1937.

PANSLAVISM

869

was formulated in *The Scientific Dictionary*, a Czech Encyclopedia.⁶⁴ The article referring to Panславism is very reserved. 186*
 The speculations of the Muscovite Slavophiles on the item of Hus- 175
 sianism as a purely Slavic movement which presumably had its ties
 with Slavic Orthodoxy did not appear very convincing to the
 Czechs.

In general, the Prague Congress of 1848 reduced the Panславic 186*
 tendencies to a formula of political organization of Austria which 668 ●
 would satisfy the national political demands of the Slavs. In this 575
 way was developed a special Austrian Panславism directed against
 Russia and later called Austroslavism. The same trends might be
 discovered in the so-called "Slavic Union" in the Vienna Par-
 liament of 1908. However, under the leadership of the Czech
 Kramář there developed at the same time the so-called neo-Slav-
 ism, which stressed the political solidarity of all Slavic nations on
 the condition of complete cultural equality, but which certainly
 contained pro-Russian tendencies. The movement was created in
 1908 at the Slav Congress in Prague, followed by a Congress in
 Petersburg in 1909 and one in Sofia in 1910. There took place
 only vague and very general formulations of Slavic mutual re-
 spect, sympathy, and efforts to calm the inter-Slavic antagonisms
 —Russian-Polish, Serbo-Croatian, Serbo-Bulgarian, and so on.
 In spite of the participation in this movement of several impor-
 tant political leaders among the Slavs, it did not reach any con-
 crete results. Most Poles and Russians very soon abandoned it.
 The War of 1914 brought again to the fore ideas of Slavic union,
 proclaimed this time by representatives of Russian public opinion
 and by the Russian government. I should also mention the out-
 standing activity aiming at spiritual and intellectual collabora-
 tion among the Slavs of the brilliant Polish scholar, thinker, and
 writer Marian Zdzichowski, who established his Slavic Club in
 Cracow with its review *The Slavic World* before the War of 1914
 and who entertained close relations with the Russian sympathizers
 of these trends, about whom I shall speak below.

⁶⁴ Quoted by Pypla, *op. cit.*, pp. 152-153.

PANSLAVISM

905

nant admonitions of Ruskin, the anxiety of Renan, not to mention the period of the *fin de siècle* and the modern European pessimism of Spengler's jeremiads?

This does not change the fact, however, that in the light of the events of the 19th century and especially in the light of the present tragedy of Poland, the Polish "message to Europe" becomes particularly poignant. History has repeated itself almost textually with, however, one exception—that the present betrayal of Poland by the Western democracies has followed an even more cynical and indecent road. And has not the same fate overtaken Yugoslavia?

Of course in all Slavophil and Panslavistic texts one may find political hyperbole, exasperation, dreams, vain hopes, idealistic universalistic conceptions of fraternity of nations, beliefs in international justice, aspirations for national independence, imperialistic pretensions, the ideological play with various historical traditions. But as I stressed above, all that Slavic polyphony starts and ends with a dirge for Europe. Indeed we see all of them—those brilliant prophetic writers like Tyutchev, Dostoevsky, Mickiewicz, Krasiński, and so many others, involved in a great ideological battle, in which clashed their most essential thoughts about humanity and civilization, as if petrified by the same vision of Europe which we find in Herzen's terrible suggestions about "*facies hippocratica*, by which the doctors recognize that death has raised its scythe."

14. Post Scriptum

I mentioned on several occasions the fact that we are witnessing a kind of revival of the Panslavistic conceptions under the Soviet sponsorship. Indeed there was created in Moscow in 1941 a new Panslavic committee under the chairmanship of a general, A. Gundorov, and with representatives of different Slavic nations as its members. This committee started to organize first of all Panslavic meetings in Moscow. Then later Panslavic meet-

*
186
668
575

EUROPEAN IDEOLOGIES

186^{*} ings, manifestations, and commemorations in America; in June 1942 such meetings and congresses took place in New York, in Pittsburgh, in Detroit, in Kansas, in Cleveland, in San Francisco, 668^{*} in Oakland, and also in Canada, Argentina, etc., organized by 575^{*} local Slavic committees. These organizations in America and in other countries represent ramifications of the Moscow center; and at each meeting they manifested this relationship by sending addresses and telegrams not only to the Panslavic committee in Moscow but to Stalin, Kalinin, Molotov, and so on. Around the Muscovite center were organized during the war all kinds of Slavic national committees and unions of patriots at the head of which one could find the members of the Panslavic committee in Moscow. These committees and unions were nuclei from which originated the "democratic governments" imposed by Russia to the Slavic and non-Slavic countries (similar committees were organized for Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria) which found themselves in the sphere of Russia's influence.

[202] For the task of propaganda of these Panslavic ideas of union and fraternity of the Slavs under the protection of Soviet Russia and under her cultural leadership there has been established a monthly review under the title *The Slavs*, published in Moscow in Russian.

186^{*} It is paradoxical enough that if one takes different Soviet encyclopedias one may find a radical refutation of Panslavic conceptions; the Panslavism of the 19th century has been always 829^{*} qualified there as a bourgeois imperialistic doctrine. It would 656^{*} be very difficult, however, to find any salient difference between the Panslavistic imperialistic conceptions of Tsarist Russia, as far as their essence is concerned, and the Panslavistic policy of the Soviets, even though their motives and ultimate goals are not identical. In order to save appearances the official Soviet press still stresses that difference; so N. Leonidov in his articles *The New Phase in Slav History* published in *New Times* in Moscow in September, 1946, said: "The Russian people never identified themselves with the imperialistic chauvinistic Panslavism of the

186²
666 glorifying the outstanding Soviet generals and, of course, men like Molotov, Lenin, "the great son of Slavdom"; and Stalin, "son of the nations of Russia"—it would be rather difficult to make of him a Slav. There are also articles about different manifestations of old and modern Slavic culture, biographies of great Slavs, predominantly Russian. Copernicus, one of them, had a rather amusing fate under the pen of Soviet clerks writing under the *Politburo's* dictates. The *Small Soviet Encyclopedia* (1926) calls Copernicus the "greatest Polish scholar"; and later, its *Great* brother leaves the reader with the impression that he was a German Scholar. Finally, the review *The Slavs* emphasizes his Polish patriotism and the prestige of the University of Cracow!

186²
575
● 668 The activities concerning the further organization of Panslavic meetings abroad have not been abandoned. On the contrary, recently at the end of 1946 there again took place such meetings in America and in Belgrade with the predominant role played by official and unofficial agents and delegates of Soviet Russia, ending with telegrams and addresses expressing loyalty to Soviet Russia, sent to Stalin, Kalinin, and Molotov. All these facts must lead one to the conclusion that we are witnessing here the organization of a new International, of a Slavic International, parallel to the Comintern, and that the numerous ramifications of this organization outside of Russia represent nuclei of a Slavic fifth column in the countries which are outside of the immediate zone of Soviet influence. Within this zone Russia is much less interested in the development of the Panslavic movement through any special organizations, as she has there at her complete disposal the governments of the countries which are under Russian political domination. I do not have to stress what I mentioned before—that Stalin has in his hands means of Russification about which Goldmann and Katkov could only dream.

Not without interest is the fact that the Inter-Slav Bureau of Foreign Contacts had during the war six sections—for the United States, Canada, Central and South America, Australia and New Zealand, the Near and Middle East, and Great Britain. A seventh

PANSLAVISM

909

section dealt with the "occupied countries" and came partly under the jurisdiction of the Bureau and partly under that of the Committee for Active Struggle Against Fascism. In 1942 the All-Slav Committee's budget amounted to 320,000,000 roubles, in 1943 to 400 million, and in 1944, when the financial division had ceased to come under the control of the Secretariate, the Committee's budget had risen to 550 million roubles. The All-Slav Congress which took place recently in Belgrade has afforded some indications of the place which the All-Slav Committee holds in Russia's post-war political propaganda apparatus. The main speech of the Soviet delegate, General Gundorov, was an invitation to the Slav peoples to ignore "the sinister forces of world reaction" and submit to Communist guidance. Two resolutions passed by the Belgrade Congress deserve attention. The first, which makes Belgrade the center of the All-Slav Committee and Maslavitch its chairman, is an indication of the importance attached in Soviet policy to Slav sentiment in the Balkans, where to some extent it is a substitute for nationalist sentiment. The second resolution provides for the participation in the work of the All-Slav Committee of representatives of "the largest progressive Slav organization from non-Slav countries, with the right to an advisory vote."

In order not to be misunderstood I feel it necessary to stress that in spite of some striking parallelisms in the use of Panславic conceptions by Soviet foreign policy and by the Russian tsarist government, the differences remain enormous—but not at all in the sense of Mr. Leonidov's views. As I mentioned before, the Russian tsarist government of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was bound by international and public law; and because of this the fate of the Russian subject of those times cannot be compared to the fate of the modern Russian citizen. Russia was not hidden behind an iron curtain from the world, and foreign travelers could visit Russia and freely observe her life. Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Russians were sent to Siberia, but tsarist Russia did not know concentration camps; and the conditions of

186
575
668

[656]

178